Dixie Coaches, Inc. v. Ramsden

Citation190 So. 92,238 Ala. 285
Decision Date15 June 1939
Docket Number6 Div. 529.
PartiesDIXIE COACHES, INC., v. RAMSDEN, LICENSE INSPECTOR.
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Rehearing Denied June 30, 1939.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Walker County; Ernest Lacy, Judge.

Petition of Dixie Coaches, Incorporated, for declaratory judgment against Pete Ramsden, as License Inspector of Walker County. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under Code 1923, § 7326.

Affirmed.

Curtis & Maddox, of Jasper, and Foster, Rice & Foster and Hyman Rosenfeld, all of Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

Thos S. Lawson, Atty. Gen., and Clarence M. Small, Asst. Atty Gen., for appellee.

THOMAS Justice.

The decision in this case affects the State's revenue and hence falls within the class of preferred cases.

The petition sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the license schedule governing the licenses for motordriven passenger busses is based upon a so-called (1) "manufacturer's rated carrying capacity" or (2) upon the actual seating capacity of motor-operated busses, as the said schedule is set out in the Revenue Laws of 1935, p 520, as follows: "Schedule 158.3. (a) Each automobile motor car or motor bus used for transporting passengers paying fare or charges, shall pay the following named amounts for license tax: With seating capacity of five persons, or less $37.50, with seating capacity of more than five and not exceeding ten, $50.00. With seating capacity of more than ten and not exceeding fifteen, $75.00. With seating capacity of more than fifteen and not exceeding twenty, $100.00. With seating capacity of more than twenty and not exceeding forty, $150.00. With seating capacity exceeding forty, $200.00." [ Italics supplied.]

As stated by the appellant in his statement of the case, the question presented to the trial court for determination was whether or not under said schedule 158.3 (a) the term "seating capacity" as therein mentioned, and for which a license on a graduated scale is levied, means (1) the actual seating capacity of the bus or whether or not the license is based upon a (2) so-called "manufacturer's rated carrying capacity."

The evidence on behalf of the appellant, Dixie Coaches, Inc., tended to show that Dixie Coaches, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Alabama engaged in the transportation of passengers, their personal effects and small packages as common carriers in the State of Alabama under a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued to it by the Alabama Public Service Commission, along the route, among others, of Florence, Alabama, to Birmingham, Alabama, via Jasper, Alabama, and that in conducting its business as such common carrier motor vehicles are used for which a license is required under Schedule 158.3(a) of the Revenue Acts of 1935, General Acts 1935, p. 520, and that for the license year 1937-38 there were issued to it by the Probate Judge of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, automobile bus licenses on its busses. The evidence tended to show that most busses come equipped with two types of seats all of which are securely bolted to the floor of the bus in such way as to make them permanently attached to the same. One type of seat has cushions in the back and on the seat proper. The other is a small type of seat bolted to the side of the larger seats and is known as a "drop seat," which may, when necessity demands, be pulled down so as to allow it to extend across the aisle of the bus in such manner that the back may be unfolded or raised up allowing it to be used for a passenger, and when not in use it may be folded up and pushed up against the seat to which it is bolted in such manner as to leave the aisle open and free for the purpose of passing back and forth.

The evidence further tended to show that the Dixie Coach Lines, Inc., operates coaches numbers 29 and 21 which have a seating capacity, inclusive of the "drop seats," or "jump seats," as they are referred to, for nineteen passengers. Busses numbered 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 operated by the same company have an actual seating capacity of twenty-six seats when the socalled "drop seats" are included, or if counted by the so-called "manufacturer's rating" the seating capacity would be limited to twenty seats.

The petitioner purchased licenses from the Probate Judge of Tuscaloosa County based on the number of seats less the number of "drop seats." Of course, this number of seats was a basis presented to the Probate Judge by petitioner, and not a finding of fact by said official. For these coaches the licenses paid were on a lower schedule than would have been the case if the license had been paid upon the basis of actual seating capacity.

The evidence for the State tended to show that no administrative ruling or construction by those departments of the state government charged with the enforcement of this law had been placed upon the statute here involved, and that the license inspectors had been instructed to make citations on bus drivers and bus companies who were operating busses with a sufficient number of seats, including "jump seats," to show a seating capacity in excess of the seating capacity for which a license tag on said bus would be proper.

The evidence of the State further tended to show that "manufacturer's rated capacity" was a term unknown to the administrative agencies of the state charged with the enforcement of this law and that no such term as "rated capacity" applicable to passenger vehicles is known to the said agencies required to enforce the provisions of the law here in question; namely, the Revenue Acts of 1935, p. 520, Schedule 158.3(a), quoted supra.

The trial court decreed that under the statute having application, and as set out above, seating capacity as mentioned in the statute did not mean the "manufacturer's rated carrying capacity" of the vehicle, but the actual passenger seating or carrying capacity of said vehicle.

The industry of the respective counsel disclose several of the rules of statutory construction that are pertinent.

All "particular rules for construing statutes must be regarded as subservient to end of determining legislative intent." Middleton v. General Water Works & Electric Corp., 25 Ala.App. 455, 149 So. 351; certiorari denied, 227 Ala. 219, 149 So. 352.

The intention of the Legislature must primarily be determined from the language of the statute itself if it is unambiguous. Steber v. State, 26 Ala.App. 148, 155 So. 706; certiorari denied, 229 Ala. 88, 155 So. 708.

To justify a departure from the language of the statute, there must be a moral conviction that its practical effect under existing law, the spirit of the whole statute and its legislative history, as well as the purpose to be accomplished, duly disclose the Legislature could not have intended such result under a rational, sensible construction. Mobile Liners v. McConnell, 220 Ala. 562, 126 So. 626; Birmingham Paper Co. v. John C. Curry, etc., Ala.Sup., 190 So. 86; City of Birmingham v. Southern Express Co., 164 Ala. 529, 51 So. 159; Board of Revenue v. McDanal, 213 Ala. 349, 105 So. 191; Napier v. Foster, 80 Ala. 379; Cloverdale Homes v. Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712, 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 607; Watson v. Clayton, 230 Ala. 59, 159 So. 481; Shepherd v. Clements, 224 Ala. 1, 141 So. 255; Id., 224 Ala. 3, 141 So. 256; Storrs v. Heck, Comptroller, Ala.Sup., 90 So. 78; and many authorities cited; Paterson v. Wisener, 218 Ala. 137, 117 So. 663; State ex rel. Austin v. Black, 224 Ala. 200, 139 So. 431; Swindle, County Treas., v. State ex rel. Pruitt, 225 Ala. 247, 143 So. 198; State ex rel. Ellis v. Griggs, 227 Ala. 681, 151 So. 850.

The general rule is that where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and there is no room for construction. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 195 Ala. 124, 71 So. 118, Ann.Cas.1917B, 696; Board of Education of Jefferson County v. State, 222 Ala. 70, 74, 131 So. 239; May v. Head, 210 Ala. 112, 96 So. 869; White v. City of Decatur, 25 Ala.App. 274, 144 So. 872; certiorari denied, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873, 86 A.L.R. 914.

In Holt v. Long et al., 234 Ala. 369, 174 So. 759, a rule of...

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24 cases
  • State v. Robinson Land & Lumber Co. of Ala.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • November 4, 1954
    ...arriving at our decision in the instant case. And, in support of this proposition, he cites a number of authorities. Dixie Coaches, Inc. v. Ramsden, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92; Birmingham Paper Co. v. Curry, 238 Ala. 138, 190 So. 86; State v. Tuscaloosa Building & Loan Ass'n, 230 Ala. 476, 16......
  • Gotlieb v. City of Birmingham
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    ...the taxing power. State v. Roden Coal Co., 197 Ala. 407, 73 So. 5; State v. Seals Piano Co., 209 Ala. 93, 95 So. 451; Dixie Coaches v. Ramsden, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92; 18 Alabama Digest, Statutes, k245, p. 141. And as a matter course this rule is alike applicable to municipal ordinances o......
  • Bishop v. Bishop, 2090628.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • August 10, 2012
    ...1975, after it was enacted in 1978, this court stated: “In giving this statute a rational, sensible construction, Dixie Coaches v. Ramsden, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92 (1939), we find the legislature intended to strike a balance between the occasional brief sojourn and the common-law marriage.......
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    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • October 22, 2010
    ...1975, after it was enacted in 1978, this court stated: "In giving this statute a rational, sensible construction, Dixie Coaches v. Ramsden, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92 (1939), we find the legislature intended to strike a balance between the occasional brief sojourn and the common-law marriage.......
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