Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co., 45687
| Decision Date | 15 January 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 45687,45687 |
| Citation | 242 La. 471,137 So.2d 298 |
| Parties | DIXIE DRIVE IT YOURSELF SYSTEM NEW ORLEANS CO., Inc. v. AMERICAN BEVERAGE COMPANY and Northern Insurance Company of New York. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
David C. Treen of Beard, Blue, Schmitt & Treen, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Dufour, St. Paul, Levy & Marx, Leonard B. Levy, William M. Lucas, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
This is a tort action. The plaintiff, Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co., Inc., seeks to recover from the defendants, American Beverage Company and its insurer, Northern Insurance Company of New York, the sum of $2,665.49 for property damage to an International stake-body truck and the loss of income sustained by its withdrawal from use.
In the operation of its business, Dixie leased the truck to Gulf States Screw Products Company. On June 3, 1957, an employee of Gulf, Paul Langtre, was operating it in a southerly direction toward New Orleans on U.S. Highway 61 (the Airline Highway). At about 12:45 p.m. he collided with an R C Cola beverage truck (a tractortrailer type) owned by the defendant, American Beverage Company, and driven by its employee, which was stopped on the highway about three miles north of Kenner.
The highway at this point embraces two roadways divided by a neutral ground. The roadway on each side of the neutral ground consists of two twelve-foot traffic lanes. The shoulders on each side of the highway are fifteen feet wide.
It had been raining heavily prior to the collision, and the highway was wet. At the time of the accident, it was drizzling or misting.
Before the collision the R C Cola truck was also proceeding in the direction of New Orleans. A coil wire to the distributor became disconnected and killed the motor. The driver brought the vehicle to a stop in the right-hand traffic lane, leaving a clearance of less than fifteen feet in the left lane. It remained in this position from eight to ten minutes prior to the collision. The driver did not display signal flags on the highway or take any other action to protect approaching traffic.
Langtre, the driver of the Dixie truck, was proceeding in the right-hand lane at a speed of about forty-five miles per hour. His windshield wiper was operating, and his headlights were on. Langtre testified that he was following an unidentified truck which moved into the left lane and passed the R C Cola truck. Two other witnesses did not recall seeing the unidentified truck.
Langtre estimated that he first observed the R C Cola truck at a distance of about a quarter of a block, or about 200 feet. At that time it appeared to him to be moving. When he reached a point estimated by him to be eighty-five feet away, he perceived that it was stationary. He immediately started pulling into the left lane to pass, but was prevented from doing so by an overtaking automobile operated by Dr. Frank B. Wheeler in the left traffic lane at a speed of fifty-five or sixty miles per hour. Langtre applied his brakes, but was unable to avoid colliding with the rear end of the R C Cola truck. Dr. Wheeler, who perceived that the R C Cola truck was stopped at approximately the same time as Langtre, likewise applied his brakes. His automobile crossed the highway and came to rest on the left side of the road.
For recovery the plaintiff relies principally upon the following complaints of negligence against the driver of the obstructing R C Cola truck:
1. Stopping and parking the truck upon the main travelled portion of the highway and leaving less than fifteen feet of the highway unobstructed in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:241. 1
2. Failing to display signal flags or other warning devices on the highway at a distance of one hundred feet behind and in front of the truck to protect approaching traffic as required by LSA-R.S. 32:442. 2
3. Taking no action to warn approaching traffic of the stalled vehicle.
The defendants denied that the driver of the R C Cola truck was guilty of any negligence and assert that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the Dixie truck (who is not a party to the suit) in driving at an excessive rate of speed under the prevailing conditions, in failing to keep a proper lookout, and in failing to have his truck under sufficient control to avoid the accident. In the alternative, the defendants contend that the negligence of Langtre is imputable to plaintiff and plead contributory negligence.
The district court rejected the demands of plaintiff. On appeal the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.
The Court of Appeal found that the driver of the obstructing R C Cola truck was negligent in failing to place signal flags behind and in front of the truck as required by LSA-R.S. 32:442 and, for purposes of the decision, in stopping the truck on the main travelled portion of the highway and leaving less than fifteen feet clearance in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:241(A). The court held, however, that the negligence of the driver in these respects was not a proximate cause of the collision. See La.App., 128 So.2d 841.
We granted certiorari to review this judgment.
The principal question presented for decision is whether the driver of the obstructing truck was guilty of negligence and, if so, whether that negligence was a legal cause of the collision.
Preliminarily, we consider the contention that the alleged negligence of the driver of the Dixie truck is imputable to the plaintiff. For this determination it is of importance that the plaintiff had leased the truck to Gulf States Screw Products Company. The vehicle was under the exclusive control of Gulf and was operated by its employee. The relationship between plaintiff and Gulf was one of bailment.
It is well established that the negligence of a bailee cannot be imputed to the bailor. 3 It follows that the defendants are liable if the driver of the obstructing R C Cola truck was negligent and that negligence was a legal cause of the collision. When the actionable negligence of two tort feasors contributes in causing harm to a third party, each of them is responsible for the damage. They are solidarily liable. 4
The Louisiana Highway Regulatory Act imposes upon the driver of a vehicle disabled on the highway a 'responsibility to protect traffic', 5 and during the daytime he is required to place a red signal flag one hundred feet behind and in front of the vehicle 'in such position as to be visible to all approaching traffic.' 6
The evidence in the instant case discloses that the driver of the R C Cola truck stopped it squarely in the lane of traffic. He had a companion in the truck with him. Inasmuch as eight to ten minutes elapsed prior to the collision, the driver had ample time to take precautions. 7 Despite this, he did not position the signal flags, warn approaching drivers, or take any action to discharge his responsibility to protect traffic. He remained in the truck. We conclude that the driver violated the statute by failing to display the red signal flags and to reasonably discharge his responsibility to protect traffic.
The statute was designed to protect life and property on the highways. It is a safety measure. The violation of its provisions is negligence Per se, and this negligence is actionable if it was a legal cause of the collision. 8
There is no universal formula for the determination of legal cause. In the instant case it bifurcates into two distinct inquiries: whether the negligence of the obstructing driver was a cause-in-fact of the collision; and whether the defendants should be relieved of liability because of the intervening negligence of the driver of the Dixie truck.
It is clear that more than one legally responsible cause can, and frequently does, contribute to a vehicular collision. 9
Negligent conduct is a cause-in-fact of harm to another if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that harm. 10 Under the circumstances of this case, the negligent conduct is undoubtedly a substantial factor in bringing about the collision if the collision would not have occurred without it. 11 A cause-in-fact is a necessary antecedent. If the collision would have occurred irrespective of the negligence of the driver of the R C Cola truck, then his negligence was not a substantial factor or cause-in-fact. The question is not free from difficulty. A brief review of the circumstances surrounding the accident is essential. For the purpose of this review we accept the finding of the district court that there was no intervening truck preceding the Dixie truck prior to the collision. This circumstance is not crucial to the decision.
The evidence discloses that the weather was rainy, and the highway was wet. It was drizzling or misting at the time. Langtre, the driver of the Dixie truck, was using his windshield wiper. He was also driving with his lights on.
Although he had seen the R C Cola truck a moment earlier, he did not perceive that it was stationary until he was rather close to it. He estimated the distance at eighty-five feet. Dr. Wheeler, the other overtaking driver, observed that the truck was stopped at approximately the same time.
Upon first observing that the truck was stationary, Langtre commenced moving into the left lane of traffic to pass the truck. The overtaking automobile of Dr. Wheeler, approaching from the rear in the left lane, thwarted this maneuver and trapped the Dixie truck in the right lane behind the stalled truck. Langtre applied his brakes immediately, but was unable to avoid striking the truck.
Dr. Wheeler, who is conceded to be a disinterested witness, described the critical moment as follows:
'Q. What truck did you say you saw?
'A. It was a truck and trailer, an R C Cola truck stopped in the right lane and apparently when me and the driver of the stake body truck evidently realized that the truck was stopped, we both realized that the truck...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wagoner v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
...... Luker, Lynn Luker & Associates, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Exxon Mobil Corporation et al. ORDER & ... manufactured by Defendant Radiator Specialty Co. (“Radiator”), and Varsol, which is ...American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala.1976). The ...Under our federal system, however, “the highest court of the state is ... See [813 F.Supp.2d 798] Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co., Inc. v. m. Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298, 302 (1962). ......
-
Brister v. Gulf Cent. Pipeline Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1069 to 82-1089
......(Exhibit M-16, Gulf Central System Map). The segment of pipeline that runs through ...542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972); Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System, Inc. v. American ...Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 284 So.2d 905, 913 (La.1973); Dixie ourself System v. American Beverage Co., supra at 302. We have no difficulty finding ......
-
Roberts v. Benoit, 91-C-0394
....... v. . Joseph T. BENOIT, the City of New Orleans, Parish of . Orleans, Criminal Sheriff for the ... Foti, Jr., individually, and Southern American Insurance Company, the insurer for the Criminal ...Hartford Insurance Co., 559 So.2d 467, 476 (La.1990), the dissent would ....2d 1, 5 (La.1989); Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage ... Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d ......
-
Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp.
...... Black v. Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 La.Ann. 33 (1855). In the case before us, ...4th Cir.1985); Gibbons v. Orleans Parish School Board, 391 So.2d 976 (La.App. 4th ... and shock and injury to her nervous system" that resulted in "great physical and mental pain ...542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972); Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage ......
-
Jones v. Robbins: The Rhyme and Reason of Duty-Risk
...5, at 922. 52. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s seminal duty–risk decision was Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System v. American Beverage Co. , 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962). 53. Louisiana courts continue to utilize duty–risk analysis. See, e.g. , Granger v. Christus Health Central La., No. 2012-C-1982, ......