Dixie Ohio Express Co v. State Revenue Commission of Georgia

Decision Date30 January 1939
Docket NumberNo. 260,260
Citation306 U.S. 72,83 L.Ed. 495,59 S.Ct. 435
PartiesDIXIE OHIO EXPRESS CO. v. STATE REVENUE COMMISSION OF GEORGIA et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. Allan Watkins and Edgar Watkins, both of Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.

Messrs. O. H. Dukes, of Valdosta, Ga., and M. J. Yeomans, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellees.

Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether, as applied in this case by the highest court of the State, the Georgia Maintenance Tax Act1 violates the commerce clause of article 1, § 8, cl. 3, or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A.

Appellant is an Ohio corporation engaged exclusively in interstate transportation as a common carrier of property for hire by motor vehicles, including hauling between points in Georgia and points in other States. A certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing appellant's in terstate transportation in Georgia,2 does not extend to transportation over rural post roads, which are roads not included in the state highway system over which United States mail is carried. 3

Appellant owns for use in its business about 100 pieces of equipment consisting of trucks and tractors with manufacturer's rated capacity of a ton and a half and two tons and trailers having factory weight of 4,000 pounds. If used to haul not for hire, the tax on each ton-and-a-half motor vehicle is $15; on each two-ton vehicle, $30; and on each trailer, $30. But when used to haul either as a common or contract carrier for hire, the taxes are respectively, $50, $75, and $50. § 3.

For the collection of tax on one of appellant's two-ton trucks, the state revenue commission obtained from the superior court of Fulton County an execution on which it caused the sheriff to levy upon that vehicle. Appellant gave a bond to the sheriff with an affidavit of illegality.4 In order to avoid seizure of all of appellant's equipment, the state commission allowed it to deposit in escrow the amount claimed under the Act on account of other equipment and agreed that levy should be made only on the one truck. The commission demurred; the superior court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the affidavit. The supreme court affirmed. 186 Ga. 228, 197 S.E. 887.

In addition to the description of appellant's equipment, operations, and use of Georgia highways given above, the statements of the affidavit of illegality, so far as concerns the issues here to be decided, may be summarized as follows:

The Act directs that upon payment of the maintenance tax the director of the motor vehicles division of the state commission shall issue a tag (§ 9), and that the money derived from the sale of these tags shall be allocated to the United States rural postal roads division of the Georgia highway department. § 11. Thus, no part of it is applicable to highways over which appellant operates. The maintenance taxes on its equipment for each year will be about $6,000. In addition, the Georgia laws require it to pay $3 for a license tag5 and $25 for a public service tag6 for each vehicle and six cents per gallon of gasoline purchased in Georgia;7 it annually buys in that State about 90,000 gallons. Two-thirds of the gasoline tax is for maintenance of state aid highways.8 Appellant hauls in seven States; annually its trucks travel an average of 6,870,000 miles of which 725,000, less than 11 per cent of the total, are in Georgia. The 1936 total taxes collected by Georgia amounted to $30,058,092.68, of which motor vehicles bore $19,207,909.59 in license and fuel taxes.

In conclusion, the affidavit asserts that the tax in question is an unreasonable fee for appellant's use of the roads and is therefore repugnant to the commerce clause, and that it discriminates against carriers for hire in favor of carriers not for hire and for that reason violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const.

1. Is the Act repugnant to the commerce clause?

With exceptions not material here, it requires that all who own or have exclusive right to use for more than 30 days a motor bus, truck,9 or trailer 'shall pay a maintenance tax for the operation * * * upon and over the public roads of this State' (§ 1) according to a schedule (§ 3) which specifies the amount of the tax on each vehicle. The Act makes no distinction between vehicles used in intrastate commerce and those used in interstate commerce. It discriminates in favor of equipment used not for hire. It lays upon trucks and tractors taxes graduated according to manufacturer's rated capacities and upon trailers amounts graduated according to factory weights. The tax imposed on appellant is the same as if it operated exclusively in intrastate commerce of carried on both intrastate and interstate transportation.

It is elementary that a State may not impose a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 171, 48 S.Ct. 502, 504, 72 L.Ed. 833, 62 A.L.R. 45; Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 185, 51 S.Ct. 380, 75 L.Ed. 953; Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed. 272; decided January 3, 1939, and cases there cited; also those cited in the concurring opinion. But, consistently with the commerce clause, a State may impose upon vehicles used exclusively for interstate transportation a fair and reasonable tax as compensation for the privilege of using its highways for that purpose. The applicable principle is stated in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385. We there said (pages 623, 624, 35 S.Ct. page 142): 'In view of the many decisions of this court there can be no serious doubt that where a state at its own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor. The amount of the charges and the method of collection are primarily for determination by the state itself; and so long as they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair, and practical standard, they constitute no burden on interstate commerce.' That rule has been applied in many cases. See e.g. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 168, 169, 37 S.Ct. 30, 32, 33, 61 L.Ed. 222; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557, 47 S.Ct. 702, 703, 71 L.Ed. 1199; Sprout v. South Bend, supra, page 170, 48 S.Ct. page 504; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 289, 55 S.Ct. 709, 710, 79 L.Ed. 1439; Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 412, 56 S.Ct. 756, 758, 80 L.Ed. 1245. While ordinarily state action is deemed valid unless the contrary appears, we have held that to sustain a charge by the State for the use or privilege of using its roads for interstate transportation, it must affirmatively appear that the charge is exacted as compensation or to pay the cost of policing its highways. Sprout v. South Bend, supra; Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, supra, 186, 51 S.Ct. page 381; Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 294, 57 S.Ct. 439, 441, 81 L.Ed. 653.

The scope and language of the challenged enactment unmistakably disclose intention of the State to require payment of compensation for the privilege of operating over its roads the specified vehicles for the transportation of property. It contains no hint of hostility to interstate commerce or of purpose to impose a charge on the privilege or business of interstate transportation. The exaction is not to be deemed offensive to the commerce clause merely because the State, in the conduct of its fiscal affairs, chooses...

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