Dixon v. Alcorn Cnty.
| Decision Date | 01 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:19-CV-167-SA-DAS |
| Parties | JONE MARIE DIXON PLAINTIFF v. ALCORN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI and JIMMY MCGEE DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
On September 12, 2019, Jone Dixon initiated this action by filing her Complaint [1] against Alcorn County and Jimmy McGee (in his individual capacity and his official capacity). Dixon alleges her previous employment with Alcorn County was unlawfully terminated in violation of her First Amendment rights and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). She also asserts a state law claim for malicious inference with employment against McGee in his individual capacity. Now before the Court is Alcorn County's Motion for Summary Judgment [64], as well as Jimmy McGee's Motion for Summary Judgment [66]. Both Motions [64, 66] have been fully briefed and are ripe for review.
Jone Dixon is a 67-year-old female. In January 2000, she began working for Alcorn County as a Deputy Clerk for the Justice Court. Dixon held that position for approximately ten years until the Board of Supervisors promoted her to the position of Justice Court Clerk in or around 2010. She served as the Justice Court Clerk until she was terminated from that position on May 7, 2018.
As the Justice Court Clerk, Dixon was responsible for various matters at the Justice Court, including but not limited to maintenance of the court records and other clerical duties. Alcorn County has two Justice Court Judges. During Dixon's tenure as Clerk, the two longstanding Judges were Steve Little and Jimmy McGee. Dixon's working relationship with the Judges (especially McGee) is at issue in this case.
Dixon alleges that, during her tenure as Justice Court Clerk, McGee oftentimes failed to show up on days when court was scheduled. She also contends that he would simply never issue a ruling in cases that had been taken under advisement. Furthermore, Dixon avers that on at least ten occasions McGee made comments regarding how the Justice Court needed younger women working in the Clerks Office.
In early 2018, Dixon complained about McGee to Greg Younger, who served as the Alcorn County Chancery Clerk. Dixon contends that she told Younger about McGee's failure to timely dispose of cases and that she believed the County needed to appoint a special judge to handle McGee's caseload. Regarding this conversation, Younger testified:
Jone approached me, I don't know if it was in person or by phone, and related to me that Judge McGee had several absences over a period of time and that their workload was backed up and they were having attorneys complain and things of that nature.
[66], Ex. 1 at p. 8.
When questioned about what he did with the information learned from Dixon, Younger testified Id. at p. 10. Dixon contends that Younger disclosed the information to a member of the Board of Supervisors, who in turn relayed her complaint back to McGee.
Also in early 2018, a complaint was lodged against McGee with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. The complaint concerned McGee's purported failure to timely dispose of cases. Dixon alleges that, as part of its investigation, the Commission sought from her the file for a case on which McGee had not made a ruling.
Concerning her communications with the Commission, Dixon testified via affidavit as follows:
In early 2018, I was contacted by attorneys from the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance and asked to provide the case file for a case that Judge McGee had not made a ruling on. I told them that there were numerous other cases that Judge McGee had similarly not made a ruling on. They told me they wanted to see those files as well. I provided these files to them and they made copies of the files.
[70], Ex. 12.
Dixon avers that shortly after she spoke with the Commission, McGee called her, accused her of reporting him, and said that she would “be sorry” for doing so. McGee denies making such a statement and testified that he never thought Dixon reported him to the Commission. Contrary to McGee's denial, Dixon contends that Judge Little told her that McGee was mad at her; in addition, she contends that one member of the Board of Supervisors, Tim Mitchell, told her that “Jimmy McGee is on a witch hunt.” [66], Ex. 2 at p. 65, 71.
The Alcorn County Board of Supervisors is comprised of five members. At all times pertinent to this case, the members were Lowell Hinton, James Voyles, Tim Mitchell, Steve Glidewell, and Jimmy Tate Waldon. On May 7, 2018, McGee spoke to the Board of Supervisors in executive session regarding Dixon's job performance. Little also participated in the meeting via phone. Dixon was not present for the meeting. According to various Board members, McGee reported to them that Dixon was holding court without a judge being present and was rude to people who owed fines. Ultimately, according to Supervisor Hinton, McGee told the Board that “he couldn't work with the lady any longer.” [66], Ex 9 at p. 9. According to Supervisor Glidewell, Little and McGee “both confirmed that Jone had been opening court on her own and she had been signing judgments in their place[.]” [64], Ex. 4 at p. 14. At the conclusion of the executive session the Board unanimously voted 4-0-1 (with Supervisor Waldon abstaining) to terminate Dixon's employment.
Also during the May 7, 2018 meeting, the Board unanimously voted to appoint Donna Taylor, a 52-year-old female, as the Interim Justice Court Clerk. Taylor had served as a Deputy Clerk under Dixon for a significant period of time, and Dixon had previously complained to the Board about Taylor's poor work performance on multiple occasions. A short time later, Briony Mitchell, a 39-year-old female, became the permanent Justice Court Clerk.
After exhausting her administrative remedies, Dixon initiated this action against Alcorn County and McGee (in his official and individual capacities). As to the County, Dixon asserts claims pursuant to the ADEA and unlawful retaliation under the First Amendment. She also alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim against McGee, as well as a state law claim for malicious interference with employment.[1]
Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Nabors v. Malone, 2019 WL 2617240, at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 26, 2019) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
“The moving party ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “The nonmoving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings' and ‘designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Importantly, “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the affidavits, depositions, and exhibits of record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Waste Management of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., 920 F.3d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir. 1997)). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalist arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Nabors, 2019 WL 2617240 at *1 (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgewick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)) (additional citations omitted).
As noted above, both the County and McGee seek dismissal of the respective claims asserted against them. The Court will first address Dixon's ADEA claim and First Amendment retaliation claim against the County and then turn to her First Amendment retaliation and malicious interference with employment claim against McGee.[2] I. ADEA Claim Against Alcorn County
In her Amended Complaint [28], Dixon avers that Alcorn County is liable under the ADEA “because it knowingly allowed Defendant McGee to terminate her from her position as Justice Court Clerk because of her age or blindly accepted his age-based request.” [28] at p. 7. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). “To establish an ADEA claim, ‘a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for' cause of the challenged employer decision.'” Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)).
“In analyzing an ADEA claim, the court employs the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” Vanderberg v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 2017 WL 507610 at *3 (N.D Miss. Feb. 7, 2017) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, “a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence...
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