Dixon v. Brown
| Decision Date | 29 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-01222-GCS |
| Parties | TONY DIXON, B-15849, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTINE BROWN, VIPIN SHAH, JAMES BLADES, THOMAS SPILLER, JACQULINE LASHBROOK, LOUIS SHICKER, MICHAEL DEMPSEY, STEPHEN MEEKS, MICHAEL SCOTT, ROBERT JEFFREYS, and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Southern District of Illinois |
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Between 2014 and 2018, Plaintiff Tony Dixon was an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"). (Doc. 198). Prior to his incarceration, Plaintiff received a full orthotropic heart transplant, which required him to take immunosuppressant medications to prevent his body's rejection of the new heart. (Doc. 73). Plaintiff also suffers from hyperkalemia (high potassium), chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), high blood pressure, constipation, type two diabetes, high cholesterol, renal osteodystrophy, and gout. Id. These ailments require Plaintiff to take various medications and consume a renal diet. Id.
On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff entered Pinckneyville Correctional Center ("Pinckneyville"). (Doc. 73). However, because Plaintiff was involved in a pending criminal case, he was regularly transported between Pinckneyville and the Northern Reception and Classification Center ("NRC") for required court appearances. Id. In addition to these transfers, Plaintiff was also housed at the NRC on a writ from October 29, 2014 through February 4, 2015. Id.
Plaintiff filed suit against numerous defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 25, 2016. (Doc. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the defendants repeatedly failed to provide him with the medical treatment and medication necessary to care for his heart transplant, heart disease, and kidney disease. (Doc. 73). According to Plaintiff, these failures resulted in multiple medical complications which culminated in combined cardiogenic shock and acute renal failure, the treatment of which required a 16-day hospital stay. Id.
On March 29, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part a motion for summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff's exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 127). After summary judgment, the remaining defendants include: (i) Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. ("Wexford"); (ii) Defendants Shah and Scott, both employees of Defendant Wexford and physicians during the time period underlying the events of Plaintiff's complaint (the "Wexford Defendants"); (iii) Defendant Shicker, the IDOC Medical Director prior to June 2016; Defendant Dempsey, the IDOC Medical Director between June and November 2016; and Defendant Meeks, the current IDOC Medical Director ('the "Medical Director Defendants"); (iv) Defendant Spiller, thewarden of Pinckneyville prior to July 2015; and Defendant Lashbrook, the warden of Pinckneyville after July 2015 (the "Warden Defendants"); (v) Defendant Jeffreys,1 the current director of IDOC; and Defendant John Baldwin, the former director of IDOC at the time of the events underlying Plaintiff's complaint (the "IDOC Director Defendants"); (vi) Defendant Brown, the Health Care Unit Administrator at all times relevant to the complaint; and (vii) Defendant Blades, a lieutenant at Pinckneyville at all times relevant to the complaint. Id. at p. 2-4.
Four counts in Plaintiff's amended complaint survived summary judgment. See (Doc. 127). In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that the Wexford Defendants, the Warden Defendants, and Defendants Brown and Blades were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff asserts that the Wexford Defendants, Warden Defendants, and Defendant Brown failed to provide him with continuous and timely access to his required medications. Id. Plaintiff additionally claims that Defendant Shah, the Warden Defendants, and Defendant Brown were deliberately indifferent in violation of the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide Plaintiff with a low-cholesterol, renal diet. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Shah, Defendant Spiller, and Defendant Brown demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to (i) monitor and control his medical issues; or (ii) coordinate withoutside physicians to provide care for his medical issues. Id. He also states that Defendant Shah, the Warden Defendants, and Defendant Brown failed to communicate and coordinate with the NRC during his transfers to ensure he received his medications. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Shah, Lashbrook, and Blades failed to provide him access to the physically challenged gym. Id.
In Count II, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wexford, the IDOC Director Defendants, and the Medical Director Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights because they had notice and knowledge of failures in the medical system for prisoners transferred to the NRC but failed to take reasonable measures to protect him from harm. (Doc. 127, p. 4). Instead, the defendants continued to allow certain policies and practices to continue. Id. These practices and polices included failing to ensure that prisoners have continuous and timely access to required medication and failing to ensure that prisoners transferred between Pinckneyville and the NRC were provided uninterrupted medical care. Id.
Finally, Counts III and IV, respectively, allege that the IDOC Director Defendants, in their official capacities, and Defendants Blades and Lashbrook failed to provide Plaintiff with reasonable accommodations in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 24 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. (Doc. 127). Plaintiff asserts that these Defendants denied him access to the physically challenged gym at Pinckneyville. Id.
Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment by the IDOC Director Defendants, Medical Director Defendants, Warden Defendants, and Defendants Bladesand Brown (Doc. 197), as well as the motion for summary judgment by the Wexford Defendants. (Doc. 192). For the reasons outlined below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Several years prior to Plaintiff's incarceration, he received a heart transplant. (Doc. 193, p. 3). In order to ensure that his body does not reject his new heart, Plaintiff is required to take two anti-rejection medications, Prograf and CellCept, twice daily. (Doc. 213, p. 14.). Plaintiff also suffers from a variety of other interrelated diseases, including hyperkalemia, chronic kidney disease, COPD, constipation, type II diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, renal osteodystrophy, and gout. Id. at p. 13.
Beginning in January 2014, Plaintiff was housed in the NRC. (Doc. 213, p. 18). Plaintiff was then housed at Pinckneyville between February 14, 2014 and September 8, 2016. (Doc. 198, p. 3). Plaintiff claims that, for the first five days in which he was housed in the NRC, he did not receive his required doses of Prograf. (Doc. 213, p. 18). When Plaintiff was transferred to Pinckneyville, he again missed doses of both medications as his transfer paperwork from the NRC had crossed off Prograf and did not list CellCept, which suggested he did not receive those medications. Id. at p. 18-19. Plaintiff's medical administration records, in which administrators were to circle when they provided Plaintiff with his medications, also included missing dates in February 2014 indicating that Plaintiff did not receive his medications during some dates that month. Id. at p. 19. Plaintiff also states that he did not receive CellCept for at least six days in March 2014. Id.
In March 2014, after missing his doses of CellCept, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance requesting examination by an outside cardiologist and stating that he did not receive his anti-rejection medication. (Doc. 213, p. 19). Defendant Spiller reviewed Plaintiff's grievance and deemed it a non-emergency because the period in which Plaintiff claimed he had not received his medication had already ended. Id. He then took no further action to investigate Plaintiff's claims. Id. at p. 20.
Between April 2014 and March 2015, Plaintiff was again transferred between the NRC and Pinckneyville on a court writ for a court appearance in a separate criminal matter. (Doc. 213, p. 20). However, the NRC was limited in its ability to care for inmates transferred on writ. Id. Inmates on writ were classified as belonging to another institution, and the NRC would not oversee or take over the management of any inmate on a writ. Id. Moreover, Pinckneyville would only send a one-page, handwritten "health transfer summary" with an inmate rather than sending the inmate's medical chart. Id. This policy was maintained for at least twenty-four years. Id. While housed at the NRC, Plaintiff again missed doses of his medications; Plaintiff again submitted grievances to that effect. Id. at p. 21.
During one period of transfer between the NRC and Pinckneyville in August 2014, Pinckneyville officials confiscated Plaintiff's medications in order to inventory them. (Doc. 213, p. 21). Plaintiff was not given his medications for two days following the confiscation. Id. When officials did return his medications, they did not provide refills. Id. During this time, Plaintiff sent Defendant Shah three medical slips requesting that hismedication be refilled. Id. Plaintiff again missed doses of his medication in September 2014.
When Plaintiff was transferred back to the NRC in October 2014, Plaintiff was sent without his medications. (Doc. 213, p. 22). Prior to Plaintiff's transfer, Defendant Shah noted: Id. Though Plaintiff received some of his medications three weeks later, officials still failed to bring three of Plaintiff's medications. Id. at p. 23. Plaintiff continued to submit grievances regarding his missing...
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