Dixon v. Clem

Citation492 F.3d 665
Decision Date10 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-5856.,No. 06-5468.,No. 96-5857.,No. 06-5060.,06-5060.,06-5468.,06-5856.,96-5857.
PartiesDavid H. DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward G. CLEM, Susan C. Lawson, Timothy Saylor, Michael Head, and Two Unnamed Employees of the Kentucky Attorney General, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

ARGUED: Jeffrey M. Blum, Law Offices of Jeffrey M. Blum, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. D. Brent Irvin, Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, Jonathan C. Shaw, Porter, Schmitt, Banks & Baldwin, Paintsville, Kentucky, Kris D. Mullins, Savage, Elliott, Houlihan, Moore, Mullins & Skidmore, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey M. Blum, Law Offices of Jeffrey M. Blum, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. D. Brent Irvin, Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, Jonathan C. Shaw, Michael J. Schmitt, Porter, Schmitt, Banks & Baldwin, Paintsville, Kentucky, Kris D. Mullins, Robert F. Houlihan, Jr., Savage, Elliott, Houlihan, Moore, Mullins & Skidmore, Lexington, Kentucky, Johnnie L. Turner, Law Offices of Johnnie L. Turner, Harlan, Kentucky, for Appellees.

Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

AMENDED OPINION

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

In 1996, David H. Dixon lost his job as a teacher at Cumberland High School in Harlan County, Kentucky after the revelation that he had taken topless photographs of S.C., one of his female students. A state administrative tribunal subsequently upheld his termination following a hearing in which the school introduced numerous photographs to validate its determination that Dixon had indeed engaged in "conduct unbecoming a teacher."

Claiming that the state tribunal and related defendants had violated his constitutional right to the due process of law by allowing "faked" photographs to be submitted against him, Dixon brought the instant suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Dixon's claims against each of the defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that Dixon had failed to comply with the applicable one-year statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background

At the time Dixon lost his job, he was in his 26th year of teaching carpentry at Cumberland High School. He also maintained a studio in downtown Cumberland that allowed him to satisfy his lifelong passion for photography. Dixon is considerably accomplished in the field, having received several awards for his work. He was allowed to pursue his alternative career as a professional photographer with the official permission of the school.

At least in the beginning, the photo shoot at issue in the present case was completely innocent. Dixon, operating with school approval, had offered students the opportunity to come to his studio on October 24, 1995 to retake their senior yearbook pictures. S.C. was one of the students who took Dixon up on his offer. She and another female student arrived at the studio around 6:00 p.m. that evening. Ultimately, the other girl left, and S.C. and Dixon found themselves alone together. In at least some of the pictures that Dixon then took of her, S.C. was wearing no clothing from the waist up, although her nipples were covered either by her hair or a "fishnet."

Dixon received a letter almost five months later informing him that he had been suspended by the school pending termination of his contract. The letter, authored by then-Superintendent of the Harlan County School System Grace Ann Tolliver, cited Dixon's having taken "topless" photographs of a student. This was deemed to be "conduct unbecoming a teacher" within the meaning of Ky.Rev. Stat. Ann. (KRS) § 161.790(1)(b).

B. Procedural background

A long and complex road of hearings, appeals, remands, and lawsuits ensued. Because Dixon's claims stem principally from alleged due process violations during his state proceedings, this procedural history is far more relevant than the factual background to the issues involved in this appeal. The district court's concise summary of the relevant state proceedings reads as follows:

To terminate Dixon's contract, a tribunal was convened by the Harlan County School Board to hear the charges against Dixon. Susan Lawson, the school board's attorney, presented evidence against Dixon, including several groups of photographs which showed S.C. without any clothing above the waist. Dixon admitted to taking some of the photographs, arguing they were not "nude" because the student's nipples and part of her breast were covered with either hair or a fishnet. Dixon adamantly denied taking other photographs which were more revealing, stating that the photographs were not his. The tribunal unanimously found Dixon guilty of conduct unbecoming a teacher and, by a 2-1 vote, upheld Tolliver's recommendation that Dixon be terminated. The tribunal based this decision on unanimous findings that Dixon participated in guiding S.C. in the poses in which she has no clothes above the waist, that S.C. never told Dixon she was 18, and that Dixon took all of the photographs and those photographs were unaltered. Dixon's own counsel at the hearing, JoEllen McComb, admitted that Dixon took photographs of S.C. without any clothing above the waist. Dixon appealed the decision to the Harlan Circuit Court. However, after an approximate eight year delay (the reasons for which are unclear), Judge R. Cletus Maricle ordered a re-sentencing of Dixon, finding that the instructions given by the hearing officer were erroneous and that additional mitigating factors should be considered. Judge Maricle determined that, under Kentucky law, the tribunal should have been explicitly informed that in addition to upholding or vacating Dixon's termination, the tribunal could have imposed a lesser punishment even with its finding of conduct unbecoming a teacher. The Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed, and clarified that "[t]he trial court upheld the finding of conduct unbecoming a teacher but remanded for additional findings that may or may not result in the imposition of a lesser sentence." The state appeals court further noted that no additional proof was to be taken.

On September 26-28, 2005, the re-sentencing was held with Michael Head serving as the hearing officer. The evidence from the previous hearing held eight [years] earlier ... was put into the record over the objections of Dixon's counsel. Head then instructed the new tribunal to make findings of fact as to S.C.'s age representation to Dixon and as to who suggested the poses, as per Judge Maricle's August 15th Order. The tribunal was then given the correct instructions, and upheld Dixon's termination. This action followed.

Dixon v. Clem, 404 F.Supp.2d 961, 963-64 (E.D.Ky.2005) (citations omitted).

Dixon's § 1983 complaint, initially filed prior to the second tribunal hearing but amended shortly thereafter in early October of 2005, named the following four individuals as defendants: (1) Edward G. Clem, the principal at Cumberland High School, (2) Susan C. Lawson, the school's attorney at the first hearing and for two years thereafter, (3) Timothy R. Saylor, the Superintendent of the Harlan County School System since 2000, and (4) Michael Head, the presiding officer at Dixon's second tribunal hearing. Dixon sued Clem and Lawson in their individual capacities only, whereas Saylor and Head were sued in both their individual and official capacities.

Although the district court declined to conclude that Dixon's claims were frivolous, it determined that they were "extremely close to the line," "largely specious," and "extremely unlikely to prevail," all as set forth in its subsequent order imposing sanctions on Dixon's attorney, Jeffrey Blum. Dixon v. Clem, No. Civ.A. 605-466-DCR, 2006 WL 751235, at *1-2 (E.D.Ky. Mar.21, 2006). The court noted that,

[a]t it[s] simplest, Dixon's claim was that Clem, Saylor and Lawson "had it in for him" and, as a result, they manufactured evidence to ensure that he would be fired from his position. Dixon viewed the use of the allegedly doctored photographs (both in his first and second tribunal hearing) as a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Id. at *1.

But the district court never reached the merits of Dixon's claims because it concluded that his complaint had been filed long after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. Specifically, the court determined that "[t]he record is clear that Dixon was aware of the existence of the forged and/or altered photographs as early as August of 1996," and that "[s]ince these photographs were the cause of Dixon's injury, the statute of limitations began to run from the pictures['] use at the first tribunal on August 1 and 2, 1996." Dixon, 404 F.Supp.2d at 965-66. His § 1983 complaint, filed in August of 2005, therefore came eight years too late. The court denied Dixon's subsequent motion to reconsider the judgment, reasoning that Dixon was simply "re-arguing" the issues that the court had resolved in its initial opinion.

Believing that these rulings made them the "prevailing parties" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the defendants filed a motion for costs and attorney fees. The district court agreed that the defendants were "the prevailing parties at this point in the litigation," but denied their motion on the ground that Dixon's claims, although "extremely unlikely to prevail," were not "frivolous or groundless." Dixon, 2006 WL 751235, at *2. Despite this determination, the court decided that sanctions were appropriate against Blum under the less onerous standard governing 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Finally, the district court denied as moot Dixon's last-ditch motion requesting that the district judge recuse himself from further participation in the case. Because Dixon had already filed his notice of appeal,...

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