Dixon v. Dist. of D.C., Civil Case No. 10–297(RJL).

Decision Date28 November 2010
Docket NumberCivil Case No. 10–297(RJL).
Citation753 F.Supp.2d 6
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
PartiesHenry DIXON, et al., Plaintiffs,v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Gregory L. Lattimer, Law Offices of Gregory L. Lattimer, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.Jacques P. Lerner, Office of the Attorney General for DC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Henry Dixon (Dixon) and Cuong Thanh Phung (“Phung”) (collectively, plaintiffs) filed this purported class-action complaint against the District of Columbia (“the District”) alleging denial of equal protection of the law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that motorists who are accused of driving at speeds in excess of 30 miles per hour over the speed limit receive disparate treatment when they are stopped by an officer as compared to when they are cited by the District's Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATE”). Now before the Court is the District's Motion to Dismiss. Upon consideration of the pleadings, relevant case law, and entire record, the District's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

General Order 303.1 of the District's Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) provides that motorists stopped by police officers and charged with speeding more than 30 mph over the speed limit are subject to automatic arrest, as well as possible criminal prosecution, a fine of $300, and imprisonment of not more than 90 days. Compl. ¶¶ 12–13. By contrast, however, when a vehicle is photographed traveling at such speeds by the District's Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATE”), the District merely mails a summons and notice of infraction to the registered owner of the vehicle. Compl. ¶ 11. The registered owner, in turn, may then request a hearing. Id. The maximum penalty for the alleged infraction in that situation is a civil penalty. Id. The District's ATE system was introduced in 1999 pursuant to D.C.Code § 50–2209.01. Compl. ¶ 10.

On February 15, 2008, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Dixon was stopped and arrested by an MPD officer for speeding more than 30 mph over the posted speed limit. Compl. ¶ 14. On November 27, 2009, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Phung was stopped and arrested by an MPD officer for speeding more than 30 mph over the posted speed limit and arrested. Compl. ¶ 15. Both were held at the Second District Headquarters in the District for several hours, and faced criminal penalties, including a possible fine of $300 and incarceration for up to 90 days. Compl. ¶¶ 14–15. Their offense, of course, was in no way unique: over the past three years, thousands of motorists in the District have been stopped for speeding more than 30 mph over the speed limit, arrested, and subject to criminal penalties. Compl. ¶ 16.

Plaintiffs filed this purported class action complaint on February 24, 2010, challenging, in essence, the District's practice of arresting motorists caught driving at speeds in excess of 30 mph over the speed limit by an MPD officer, while merely issuing a civil fine to those caught driving at such speeds by the ATE system.

DISCUSSION

A court may dismiss all or part of a complaint that “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “plead [ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must construe the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, the Court “need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[ ] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must the court accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Factual allegations, even though assumed to be true, must still “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 1 U.S. Const. amend. 14. The clause is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). “The Constitution, however, does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C.Cir.1996) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, [t]he threshold inquiry in evaluating an equal protection claim is, therefore, to determine whether a person is similarly situated to those persons who allegedly received favorable treatment.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The District argues that the complaint must be dismissed because it does not state an equal protection claim. Specifically, the District contends that the two groups of speeding motorists—i.e., those caught by an officer and those caught by the ATE system—are not similarly situated because the former may be arrested without a warrant while the latter may not. The distinction between...

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3 cases
  • Sheller–Paire v. Gray
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • August 27, 2012
    ...Amendment's Due Process clause. Brandon v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 60 (D.C.Cir.1984); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 753 F.Supp.2d 6, 9 n. 1 (D.D.C.2010). 5. Even if plaintiff had successfully demonstrated that a municipal policy or custom was in place here, plaintiff ......
  • Dixon v. Dist. of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • December 20, 2011
    ...Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that Appellants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dixon v. District of Columbia, 753 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.D.C.2010). In reaching this judgment, the District Court first acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth ......
  • State v. Arrington
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 25, 2012
    ...the United States District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of a speeding law in Dixon v. District of Columbia, 753 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.D.C.2010). There, two individuals challenged the District's “practice of arresting motorists caught driving at speeds in excess o......

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