Dixon v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 27 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 59761,59761
• Citation: 402 Mich. 315,262 N.W.2d 666
• Parties: , 22 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1184, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8258 Robert DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 666

262 N.W.2d 666

402 Mich. 315, 22 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1184,

16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8258

Robert DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 59761

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 27, 1978.

Philip Green, Sp. Counsel for Civil Rights Commission, Colista, Green, Green & Adams, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

James R. Jackson and Theodore C. Miloch, Dearborn, for the Ford Motor co.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Robert Dixon was employed by the defendant Ford Motor Company as a probationary employee when, on November 19, 1968, he was discovered by his supervisor urinating at his work station. Plaintiff was given the option of being fired outright or signing a "quit slip". Plaintiff signed the "quit slip".

Two days later, however, plaintiff went to the plant's employment office and was hired to work in another department of the defendant. Plaintiff's new position was soon discovered, and he was fired.

On November 26, 1968, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, alleging that his discharge was the result of racial discrimination. A hearing was held which resulted in a finding by the hearing officer of no discrimination. The Civil Rights Commission, however, did find discrimination and ordered that plaintiff be reinstated to his former position with back pay.

Thereafter, defendant appealed to the Ingham Circuit Court. The matter was heard de novo in that court, though no new witnesses or evidence were introduced. On August 25, the circuit court issued an oral opinion in which it found:

"This court finds, based upon the record, total record I've reviewed de novo, Mr. Vaughn's protestations aside, that the record supports the inference that an employee or employees of Ford Motor Company did more likely than not consider the claimant's race or color in making their determination to discharge him and to redischarge him after he was rehired. This decision is based upon the totality of the record, including the fact that two white men allegedly guilty of the same infraction were not so disciplined, the court recognizing again that racial discrimination is not subject to direct, positive and uncontroverted proof in all instances, that at the same time recognizing that the actions taken by subordinate personnel within the Ford Motor Company are not necessarily policies of the Ford Motor Company but the doctrine of respondeat superior."

Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the scope of its review of the circuit court judgment was to ascertain whether the decision below was "supported by competent, material and substantial evidence". 75 Mich.App. 59, 62, 254 N.W.2d 652, 653 (1977). The Court found that it was not.

"By demonstrating that white employees were treated differently, plaintiff raised facts sufficient to support an inference of racial discrimination. However, by showing that both white employees were also seniority workers, plaintiff made facts of record which rationally justify the differing treatment afforded plaintiff."

We conclude that the Court of Appeals, in reviewing the decision of the circuit court, applied the wrong standard of review.

An appeal to the circuit court from a final order of the commission is a trial de novo. ¹ The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that although it was reviewing the case on appeal from the circuit court since Const.1963, art. 6, § 28, ² and M.C.L.A. § 24.306; M.S.A. § 3.560(206) ³ require a determination whether the judgment of the circuit court was "supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record", its review was not governed by the "clearly erroneous" standard contained in GCR 1963, 517.1. ⁴

The constitutional standard for judicial review of agency action competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record is not a higher standard than the "clearly erroneous" standard of rule 517.1. Rule 517.1 requires that the reviewing court substitute its own appraisal of the record where, on review of the "whole record", it is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Tuttle v. State Highway Department, 397 Mich. 44, 46, 243 N.W.2d 244, 245 (1976). If the reviewing court, the Court of Appeals, concludes on its examination of the record that the judgment on appeal is not supported by "competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record", then it should have a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."

We conclude that when the circuit court, on appeal from a final order of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, tries the matter de novo, and then issues a judgment, that judgment is a final one from which a claim of appeal as a matter of right may be filed in the Court of Appeals. Jones v. Chrysler Corp., 394 Mich. 432, 231 N.W.2d 642 (1975). Since it is a final judgment of the circuit court, GCR 1963, 517.1 is applicable.

The circuit court in this case specifically found that the defendant, in discharging plaintiff, had done so on the basis of racial discrimination. The Court of Appeals must make an independent review of the whole record but cannot substitute its own judgment...