Dixon v. Heckler
| Decision Date | 02 February 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2089,85-2089 |
| Citation | 811 F.2d 506 |
| Parties | Laura J. DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Paul F. McTighe, Jr., Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant.
Edwin L. Meese, U.S. Atty. Gen., Roger Hilfiger, U.S. Atty., Lynda C. Burris, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D. Okl., Gayla Fuller, Regional Atty., Gabriel Imperato, Deputy Regional Atty., Joseph B. Liken, Asst. Regional Atty., Thomas Stanton, Asst. Regional Atty., Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Before LOGAN, MOORE, and TACHA, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir.R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Laura J. Dixon appeals from a district court judgment affirming the denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. After the state agency in Oklahoma and the Social Security Administration denied her application initially and on reconsideration, Dixon requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ convened a hearing at which Dixon appeared without counsel, accompanied only by her sister. The ALJ subsequently issued a decision denying Dixon's claim for benefits, which became the Secretary's final administrative decision when the Appeals Council denied Dixon's request for review. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma affirmed the Secretary's denial of benefits, and this appeal followed.
On appeal Dixon asserts that the district court erred in affirming the Secretary's finding that Dixon was not disabled. Specifically, Dixon asserts that there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings that her medical impairment did not meet or equal a listed impairment, that she could perform light work, and that her nonexertional limitations did not preclude reference to the medical-vocational guidelines. Finally, Dixon asserts that the ALJ erred in categorizing her as literate under the grids.
In reviewing such findings of fact, we are not asked to reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo, but only to determine whether there was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the finding. Tillery v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 601, 603 (10th Cir.1983). Substantial evidence is more than a "mere scintilla," but less than a preponderance, and "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).
The record provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determinations that Dixon's diagnosed impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment, and that the Medical Vocational Guidelines relevant to a residual functional capacity for light work were applicable to her. Dixon claimed impairments including myasthenia gravis, carpal tunnel syndrome, hyperthyroidism, high blood pressure, arthritis, and heart disease. Medical examinations and tests indicate that the effects of these conditions were mild, and well-controlled by low dosages of medication without negative side effects. Although Dixon and her sister testified to her disabling pain, dizziness and muscle weakness, the medical reports provided little corroboration or support for her contention that her condition precluded light work. Dixon was able to perform to near-normal levels in cardiovascular exercise tests; other tests revealed only minor muscle weakness and nerve impairment. Examination reports over time did not indicate progressive deterioration of Dixon's condition.
On this medical record, we cannot reverse the ALJ's finding that Dixon was capable of performing a full range of light work, not significantly compromised by her nonexertional limitations or by restrictions against heights and working around dangerous moving machinery, and his consequent recourse to the Secretary's Medical Vocational Guidelines, the "grids." The crucial question on appeal is whether the ALJ erred in categorizing Dixon as literate under the grids. As we explain below, that finding is necessary to the ALJ's conclusion, adopted by the Secretary, that Dixon was not disabled. We reverse because there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Dixon is literate.
The Medical Vocational Guidelines, the "grids," are a classification scheme directing a finding of "disabled" or "not disabled" based on a claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity to perform work (e.g., sedentary, light, medium, or heavy work). It is not contested that, for purposes of the grids, Dixon at age fifty-one was closely approaching advanced age and had no previous work experience. As we note above, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Dixon could perform a full range of light work. Accordingly, the grid classifications at issue are Rules 202.09 and 202.10:
"TABLE NO. 2--RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY: MAXIMUM
SUSTAINED WORK CAPACITY LIMITED TO LIGHT WORK
AS A RESULT OF SEVERE MEDICALLY
DETERMINABLE IMPAIRMENT(S)
Rule Age Education Previous Work Decision
Experience
------------------------------------------------------------------
202.09 Closely Illiterate or Unskilled or Disabled
approaching unable to none
advanced communicate in
age. English
202.10 " " Limited or " " Not
less--At least disabled
literate and
able to communicate
in
English."
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Table 2
Under this pair of rules, a finding of literacy was necessary to the ALJ's determination that Dixon was not disabled. If Dixon is illiterate, then Rule 202.09 is applicable, directing the conclusion that Dixon is disabled. The ALJ found that Dixon had a "marginal education" and that Rule 202.10 "would direct a conclusion of 'not disabled.' " R. II, 24.
Although the issue of Dixon's literacy was raised in her petition for district court review and on appeal to this court, her educational level appears at no time to have been the focus of more than pro forma inquiry. The record of the administrative hearing includes this colloquy between Dixon and the ALJ:
"Q And you completed 6 grades in school and learned to read and write through basic calculations in arithmetic, adding, subtracting and that sort of thing? Correct?
A Not very well.
Q But some of it--
A Some of it.
Q Ok. Can you read a newspaper if you want to? Read the articles and understand them pretty well?
A No.
Q What sort of things do you read from time to time?
A I can--there's so many words that I can't pronounce.
Q Ok.
A That I don't--
Q Do you read letters and write letters?
A I can't write. I can't spell INAUDIBLE
Q Well, do you write letters sometimes?
A No, I can't spell enough words to write a letter.
Q Oh, so you don't even try?
A Well, I try--I write my name and write when I have to write--
Q Well, what--what kind of things do you have to write? Like grocery lists?
A Yes, I get the name off--
Q So you can read a little bit and write a little bit? Is that what you're saying?
A I can read a little bit and write a little bit.
Q Ok. Ok...."
R. II, 38-39.
Dixon's sister also testified:
"A ... she says, will you come by and--and take the--list for me and pick me up groceries or I do it in that way and it helps her out.
Q She makes out the list and--
A Un, hun.
Q --hands it to you?
A Well, she doesn't. Her husband writes it out. As she told you, she can't spell well enough to INAUDIBLE easy spelling words or INAUDIBLE."
R. II, 55. The only other evidence in the record, apart from several references to Dixon's years of formal schooling, is a passing comment in an October 1982 medical history and evaluation that Dixon "is unable to spell but can read." R. II, 313.
This record does not provide substantial evidence of Dixon's literacy. For purposes of applying the grids, illiteracy 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1564(b)...
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