Dixon v. Love 1977

Citation431 U.S. 105,52 L.Ed.2d 172,97 S.Ct. 1723
Decision Date16 May 1977
Docket NumberNo. 75-1513,75-1513
PartiesAlan J. DIXON, Secretary of State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Dennis N. LOVE, etc. Argued March 1-2, 1977
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

The Illinois Driver Licensing Law authorizes the Secretary of State of Illinois to suspend or revoke a driver's license without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or other sufficient evidence that the driver's conduct falls into any of 18 enumerated categories, one of which is that the driver has been repeatedly convicted of offenses against traffic laws to a degree indicating "lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of other persons upon the highway." (§ 6-206(a)(3)). Pursuant to this provision the Secretary issued a regulation requiring revocation in the event a driver's license is otherwise suspended three times within a 10-year period. Under the statutory scheme the Secretary must provide immediate written notice of a discretionary suspension or revocation and within 20 days of his receiving a written request from the licensee must schedule a full evidentiary hearing for a date "as early as practical," and his final decision is subject to judicial review. After the license of appellee, a truckdriver, became subject to suspension under another section of the statute, the Secretary ordered the license revoked under § 6-206(a)(3) and the corresponding rule. Without requesting an administrative hearing, appellee brought this action challenging the constitutionality of § 6-206(a)(3). A three-judge District Court, relying on Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, granted appellee relief on the ground that a license cannot constitutionally be revoked under the challenged statute until after a hearing is held to determine whether the licensee meets the statutory criteria. Held : The Illinois statute, as implemented by the Secretary's regulations, is constitutionally adequate under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as analyzed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18. Pp. 112-116.

(a) The nature of the private interest involved here (the granted license to operate a motor vehicle) is not so great as to require a departure from "the ordinary principle . . . that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action," Eldridge, supra, at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 907, particularly in light of statutory provisions for

hardship and for holders of commercial licenses, who are those most likely to be affected by the deprival of driving privileges. Pp. 113.

(b) The risk of an erroneous deprivation absent a prior hearing is not great and additional procedures would not significantly reduce the number of erroneous deprivations. Here the Secretary's regulations make suspension and revocation decisions largely automatic, and appellee is asserting the right to appear at a prerevocation hearing merely to argue for leniency. Pp. 113-114.

(c) The requirement of a pretermination hearing in every case would impede the public interest of administrative efficiency as well as highway safety, which is promoted by the prompt removal of hazardous drivers. Bell v. Burson, supra, distinguished. Pp. 114-115.

Reversed.

James O. Latturner, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Patricia Rosen, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether Illinois has provided constitutionally adequate procedures for suspending or revoking the license of a driver who repeatedly has been convicted of traffic offenses. The statute and administrative regulations provide for an initial summary decision based on official records, with a full administrative hearing available only after the suspension or revocation has taken effect.

I

The case centers on § 6-206 of the Illinois Driver Licensing Law (c. 6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code). The section is entitled "Discretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit." It empowers the Secretary of State to act "without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or other sufficient evidence" that a driver's conduct falls into any one of 18 enumerated categories. Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 951/2, § 6-206(a) (1975). Pursuant to his rulemaking authority under this law, § 6-211(a),1 the Secretary has adopted administrative regulations that further define the bases and procedures for discretionary suspensions. These regulations generally provide for an initial summary determination based on the individual's driving record.2 The Secretary has established a comprehensive system of assigning "points" for various kinds of traffic offenses, depending on severity, to provide an objective means of evaluating driving records.

One of the statutorily enumerated circumstances justifying license suspension or revocation is conviction of three moving traffic offenses within a 12-month period. § 6-206(a)(2).3 This is one of the instances where the Secretary, by regulation, has provided a method for determining the sanction according to the driver's accumulated "points." 4

Another circumstance, specified in the statute, supporting suspension or revocation is where a licensee

"(h)as been repeatedly involved as a driver in motor vehicle collisions or has been repeatedly convicted of

Page 109 offenses against laws and ordinances regulating the movement of traffic, to a degree which indicates lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of other persons upon the highway." § 6-206(a)(3). Here again the Secretary has limited his broad statutory discretion by an administrative regulation. This regulation allows suspension or revocation, where sufficient points have been accumulated to warrant a second suspension within a 5-year period.5 The regulation concludes flatly: "A person who has been suspended thrice within a 10 year period shall be revoked." Section 6-206(c)(1) 6 requires the Secretary "immediately" to provide written notice of a discretionary suspension or revocation under this statute, but no prior hearing is required. Within 20 days of his receiving a written request from the licensee, the Secretary must schedule a full evidentiary hear-

Page 110 ing for a date "as early as practical" in either Sangamon County or Cook County, as the licensee may specify. § 2-118(a). The final decision of the Secretary after such hearing is subject to judicial review in the Illinois courts. § 2-118(e). In addition, a person whose license is suspended or revoked may obtain a restricted permit for commercial use or in case of hardship. §§ 6-206(c)(2) and (3).7 II Appellee Love, a resident of Chicago, is employed as a truck-driver. His license was suspended in November 1969, under § 6-206(a)(2), for three convictions within a 12-month period. He was then convicted of a charge of driving while his license was suspended, and consequently another suspension was imposed in March 1970 pursuant to § 6-303(b). Appellee received no further citation until August 1974, when he was arrested twice for speeding. He was convicted of both charges and then received a third speeding citation in February 1975. On March 27, he was notified by letter that he would lose his driving privileges if convicted of a third offense. On March 31 appellee was convicted of the third speeding charge.

Page 111 On June 3, appellee received a notice that his license was revoked effective June 6.8 The stated authority for the revocation was § 6-206(a)(3); the explanation, following the language of the statute, was: "This action has been taken as a result of: Your having been repeatedly convicted of offenses against laws and ordinances regulating the movement of traffic, to a degree which indicates disrespect for the traffic laws." App. 13. Appellee, then aged 25, made no request for an administrative hearing. Instead, he filed this purported class action 9 on June 5 against the Illinois Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. His complaint sought a declaratory judgment that § 6-206(a)(3) was unconstitutional, an injunction against enforcement of the statute, and damages. Appellee's application for a temporary restraining order was granted on condition that he apply for a hardship driving permit. He applied for that permit on June 10, and it was issued on July 25. A three-judge District Court was convened to consider appellee's claim that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that a license cannot constitutionally be suspended or revoked under § 6-206(a)(3) until after a hearing is held to determine whether the licensee meets the statutory criteria of "lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws

Page 112 and the safety of other persons upon the highway." The court regarded such a prior hearing as mandated by this Court's decision in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). Accordingly, the court granted judgment for appellee and enjoined the Secretary of State from enforcing § 6-206(a)(3). The Secretary appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Howlett v. Love, 429 U.S. 813, 97 S.Ct. 52, 50 L.Ed.2d 72 (1976). III (1) It is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver's license by the State: "Suspension of issued licenses . . . involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Bell v. Burson, 402...

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