Dixon v. Manier

Decision Date21 July 1976
Citation545 S.W.2d 948
PartiesGeneva DIXON, Appellee, v. Allen MANIER and Artiste School of Cosmetology, Appellants.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Charles T. Herndon IV of Herndon, Coleman, Brading & McKee, Johnson City, for appellants.

James T. Milliken, Thomas E. Mitchell, Johnson City, for appellee.

OPINION

PARROTT, Presiding Judge (E.S.).

Geneva Dixon filed in the circuit court a suit for damages against Allen Manier and Artiste School of Cosmetology alleging defendants negligently applied to her hair a straightener so as to cause plaintiff to lose her hair. In the circuit court action defendants pleaded as a bar to recovery a release agreement 1 plaintiff signed prior to application of the hair straightening chemical.

Prior to any determination in the circuit court action, plaintiff filed this complaint in the chancery court seeking to set aside the release agreement on the grounds the instrument was against public policy in that it attempted to release the defendants of future negligence. The complaint also alleges the release was void because of a lack of consideration.

After a hearing of the cause, the chancellor made a finding of fact that plaintiff had been 'overreached' and 'misled' into signing the release. Upon these grounds the chancellor set aside the release agreement and held same to be null and void. From the chancellor's degree defendants have appealed.

We reverse and dismiss the complaint.

It is neither pleaded nor proven the defendant obtained the release agreement by any fraudulent or overreaching means. Thus, there is no basis of fact pleaded or proven to sustain the chancellor's finding or the decree as entered.

Only two witnesses testified--Geneva Dixon and defendant's employee, Zella Mainer. We find no discrepancies in these witnesses' testimony to any material point.

On January 8, 1974, plaintiff went to the defendants for the purpose of having her hair straightened. At this time she had been going to the defendants every other week for about three months. On one prior occasion she had had her hair straightened by the defendant. The record is not clear whether the same procedure was used on that occasion as on January 8. Plaintiff says she does not remember signing a release or paper on the first occasion, but on January 8, shortly after defendants had begun to wash her hair, she was presented with a release which she signed. She did not read the instrument because she did not have her glasses. She testified they did not make her sign it but told her to, and that she had confidence and trusted them.

Defendants' witness, Zella Manier, was present on January 8, but did not have any personal contact with plaintiff. However, she testified that some three months prior, when plaintiff had her hair straightened, she personally explained to her the dangers and risks involved and obtained from her a release. The substance used is a chemical which should not be applied to hair if it is dry, brittle, or fragile. The substance goes into the cortex of the hair and causes the fibers to soften. The reaction is the reverse of the ordinary usual permanent wave.

Under these facts, we find no evidence to support a finding the release agreement was obtained by overreaching means.

Standing alone, the fact plaintiff did not read the agreement is not a valid ground to declare it void. In the absence of fraud or duress, the failure of a person to read or learn the contents of a written agreement in no way relieves the binding obligations of the agreement. We said in Hardin v. Combined Insurance Company of American, 528 S.W.2d 31 (Tenn.App.1975), that a person is under a duty to learn the contents of a written contract before signing it. To permit a party to deny the obligations imposed by a signed written contract on the sole ground he had not read the contract would destroy the value of all contracts.

Written instruments may be reformed or voided on the ground of fraud or mistake only where such is shown by clear, cogent, convincing evidence. Napier v. Stone, 21 Tenn.App. 626, 114 S.W.2d 57 (1938); Jones v. Jones, 150 Tenn. 554, 266 S.W. 110 (1925). In Exum v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 41 Tenn.App. 610, 297 S.W.2d 805 (1957), the Court applied the rule to releases and found the release invalid on ground of duress.

The proof here simply does not meet the requirements of clear and convincing evidence necessary to void a written instrument.

In the chancellor's memorandum rendered from the bench, but not included in the decree, the release agreement was held void and unenforceable because there was no consideration and that the instrument was against public policy. These conclusions are incorrect.

In Johnson v. Central National Insurance Co., 210 Tenn. 24, 356 S.W.2d 277 (1962), the classical and accepted definition of consideration is stated: 'A valuable consideration is either a benefit to the party...

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29 cases
  • Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist Rehab. Hosp., LP
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • December 20, 2018
    ...1960).6 These prior cases included Empress , 503 S.W.2d 188 ; Trailmobile , 51 Tenn.App. 576, 370 S.W.2d 840 ; and Dixon v. Manier , 545 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).7 This Court later expressly overruled Schratter in Crawford v. Buckner , 839 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tenn. 1992).8 The Parton c......
  • Crawford v. Buckner
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • August 31, 1992
    ...207 Tenn. 426, 340 S.W.2d 902 (1960) (renter assumed the risk incident to injury from the hiring and riding of a horse); Dixon v. Manier, 545 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn.App.1976) (cosmetology customer assumed the risk of injury of a hair-straightening treatment). One exception, for example, is that a......
  • Middendorf v. Middendorf
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • June 27, 2019
    ...be shown by "clear, cogent, convincing evidence." Lane v. Spriggs, 71 S.W.3d 286, 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Dixon v. Manier, 545 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976)).No. M2006-01870-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2827051, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2007). "The equitable remedy of resciss......
  • Childress By and Through Childress v. Madison County
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • January 24, 1989
    ...Co., 142 Tenn. 20, 215 S.W. 274 (1919), a party's failure to read does not constitute a lack of notice to that party, Dixon v. Manier, 545 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tenn.App.1976). Of the plaintiffs, only Mrs. Childress, Todd's mother signed the release form. The language, quoted above, is clear and......
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