Dixon v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 03 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 8:20-cv-490-MSS-CPT |
| Parties | ROLAND LORENZO DIXON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Dixon petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges his state court convictions for aggravated assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and carrying a concealed firearm. (Docs. 1 at 1 and 9-2 at 1235-36) After reviewing the petition (Doc 1), the response and the appendix containing the relevant state court record (Doc. 14), and the reply (Doc. 15), the Court DENIES the petition.
A jury found Dixon guilty of aggravated assault with a firearm and carrying a concealed firearm (Doc. 14-2 at 18-19), and Dixon pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (Doc. 14-2 at 30-35) The jury found that, during the commission of the aggravated assault, Dixon “did carry display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use a firearm,” and “did discharge a firearm.” (Doc. 14-2 at 18) The trial court sentenced Dixon to twenty years of prison with a twenty-year mandatory minimum term for a firearm enhancement for the aggravated assault conviction a consecutive five years of prison for the carrying a concealed firearm conviction, and a concurrent five years of prison with a three- year mandatory minimum term for a firearm enhancement for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. (Doc. 14-2 at 21-28, 37-43) Dixon appealed (Doc. 14-2 at 45), and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 14-2 at 47)
Dixon moved for post-conviction relief in state court (Doc. 14-2 at 51-52, 59-60, 81-101, 106-24, 172-73, 185-92), the post-conviction court denied relief (Doc. 14-2 at 57, 63, 104, 127-28, 178, 215), and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 14-2 at 77, 168, 231) Dixon's federal petition follows.
Evidence at trial proved that Dixon committed aggravated assault and carried a concealed firearm.[1] Samuel Mitchell, Jr. testified that his ex-girlfriend was the sister of Elizabeth Cody, Dixon's girlfriend. (Doc. 14-2 at 449-50) Dixon became angry at Mitchell because of a disagreement between the two sisters. (Doc. 14-2 at 449-50) While visiting an apartment complex, Mitchell saw Dixon, Dixon waved at Mitchell, and Mitchell approached Dixon. (Doc. 14-2 at 452) Mitchell told Dixon that he was not involved in the disagreement between the sisters. (Doc. 14-2 at 452) Mitchell directed his attention to Dixon's girlfriend, who was also present, and Dixon responded by punching Mitchell. (Doc. 14-2 at 452-53) Dixon ran past Mitchell, stumbled, and pulled out a gun. (Doc. 14-2 at 453-54) Mitchell saw the gun, started running away, and heard three gunshots behind him. (Doc. 14-2 at 454-57) Surveillance video showed Dixon raise his arm and point the gun towards Mitchell twice. (Doc. 14-2 at 458-59, 527)
A witness testified that a short male with dreads walked over to a bald male, punched him, stumbled, dropped a gun, picked up the gun, and fired two or three shots. (Doc. 14-2 at 438-40) The witness observed the male with dreads fire the gun when the bald male started to run away. (Doc. 14-2 at 440) Police secured an arrest warrant for Dixon and found him hiding in the bathroom of his girlfriend's apartment. (Doc. 14-2 at 471-72) When police first arrived, Dixon's girlfriend denied that she knew Dixon and denied that he was at her home. (Doc. 14-2 at 471-72)
During a recorded interrogation, Dixon claimed that Mitchell confronted him about the disagreement between the sisters. (Doc. 14-2 at 513) Dixon's girlfriend started talking to Mitchell, Mitchell threatened Dixon's girlfriend, and Dixon tried to punch Mitchell in the face but missed. (Doc. 14-2 at 513-14) Dixon admitted that he had a gun in his pocket. (Doc. 14-2 at 515-17) Dixon claimed that, when he pulled the gun out, the gun accidentally fired once. (Doc. 14-2 at 523-25) After the shooting, Dixon threw away the gun. (Doc. 14-2 at 522) After admitting that he wrongly possessed the gun, Dixon lamented, “I'm going to roast.” (Doc. 14-2 at 524)
During the defense's case-in-chief, Elizabeth Cody denied that she was Dixon's girlfriend and claimed that she was only his friend. (Doc. 14-2 at 537) She testified that Mitchell came to her apartment and attacked her because she had beat up her sister, who was Mitchell's girlfriend. (Doc. 14-2 at 538-39) Cody had armed herself with a gun for protection and defended herselfby firing the gun once in the air. (Doc. 14-2 at 539-41, 543) Cody denied that Dixon was present. (Doc. 14-2 at 539, 541) She claimed that Dixon told her that he would “take the rap” for the crime. (Doc. 14-2 at 556)
Because Dixon filed his federal petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA governs his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to require:
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Clearly established federal law refers to the holding of an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
“[AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
Dixon asserts ineffective assistance of counsel - a difficult claim to sustain. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 687 (1984) explains:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
“There is no reason for a court . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. A defendant cannot meet his burden by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel was unsuccessful. White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992).
Because the standards under Strickland and AEDPA are both highly deferential, “when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly' so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “Given the double deference due, it is a ‘rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.'” Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
In decisions without a written opinion, the state appellate court affirmed the orders denying Dixon post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14-2 at 77, 168, 231) A federal court “‘look[s] through' the unexplained decision...
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