Dixon v. State

Decision Date16 August 1991
Citation588 So.2d 903
PartiesEx parte State of Alabama. (Re Dana Lamark DIXON v. STATE). 1900347.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Andrew J. Segal, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Dennis R. Pierson and George L. Beck, Jr., Montgomery, for respondent.

KENNEDY, Justice.

We granted certiorari review in this case in order to determine whether probable cause for arrest existed.

Dana Lamark Dixon pleaded guilty to first degree burglary and first degree rape while reserving his right to appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that there was no probable cause for arrest, and, therefore, that the motion to suppress should have been granted. 588 So.2d 891. We reverse and remand.

The facts are as follows: Officer Echols of the Montgomery Police Department was on routine patrol on Wednesday, March 22, 1989. At about 9:20 a.m., Echols saw Dixon, age 15, standing on a sidewalk at the rear of a residence. Echols knew that this particular neighborhood had recently experienced a series of burglaries. Due to Dixon's demeanor and the fact that there had been recent burglaries in the neighborhood, Echols thought that Dixon was a possible lookout for a burglary taking place or about to take place. Echols stopped for a few minutes and observed Dixon, who was standing on the sidewalk looking around. Echols then approached Dixon. When Dixon saw Echols, Dixon tried to walk away. Echols stopped Dixon and questioned him.

Echols asked Dixon what he was doing. Dixon said that he was "just standing there." Echols asked Dixon his age, and Dixon said he was 15 years old. Echols then asked Dixon why he was not in school. Dixon said that he had been expelled. Echols then asked Dixon if he had ever committed any burglaries. Dixon said that he had committed one burglary before, but that "he had already done what he was supposed to have done for it." 1 Echols then patted down Dixon and found a three-inch box cutter.

Echols noticed that Dixon was wearing a green baseball cap with white letters on it, a green-colored jacket with the style and logo of the Miami Dolphins football team, tan pants, and white tennis shoes and had a medium complexion. Echols then realized that Dixon matched the description of a rape suspect. The rape had occurred three blocks away and three days earlier. The victim had described the suspect as a black male with a medium complexion, approximately 5' 8"' tall, weighing approximately 130 pounds, and wearing a green baseball cap with white letters, tan or khaki pants, and a light colored shirt. 2 The victim also described the rapist as 17 or 18 years of age. Echols then contacted an officer in the police department's sex crimes division. This officer requested that Echols bring Dixon to police headquarters, because Dixon generally fit the description of the rapist. Echols did not arrest Dixon, but asked Dixon to accompany him to police headquarters and Dixon agreed to do so.

Dixon was taken to police headquarters around 9:30 a.m. At headquarters, Corporal Locklar asked Dixon for his mother's name and place of employment. Locklar then called Dixon's mother and explained to her that Dixon was at police headquarters and that she could come to the station if she desired to do so. This conversation took place between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m.

Around 10:15 a.m. Echols took Dixon to the juvenile division of police headquarters and left Dixon with two juvenile officers, Corporal Fuentez and Investigator Livingston.

Livingston read Dixon his rights from the juvenile rights form, pursuant to Rule 11(A), A.R.Juv.P. Dixon said that he understood his rights, signed the form, and stated that he wanted to speak to his mother. Livingston telephoned Dixon's mother and told her that she needed to come to police headquarters as soon as possible.

Fuentez told Dixon that he was at police headquarters because he matched the description of a rapist and was basically wearing the same clothing as the rapist. Fuentez told Dixon that there was going to be a lineup at the Montgomery Youth Facility located on Air Base Boulevard.

Fuentez drove Dixon to the Youth Facility around 11:30 a.m. Fuentez placed Dixon in the visitation room of the Youth Facility. The personnel at the Youth Facility told Fuentez that the lineup could not be held until 12:30. Fuentez then left Dixon in the visitation room and went to lunch.

When Fuentez returned from lunch, he saw Dixon talking to his parents in the visitation room. Approximately 10 or 15 minutes later, Fuentez went into the visitation room and introduced himself to Dixon's parents. Fuentez took Dixon's parents into the in-take office, where he informed them that Dixon was to participate in a lineup.

At the lineup, the victim tentatively identified Dixon as the rapist. Fuentez went back to the visitation room and advised Dixon of his rights as a juvenile. Dixon then waived his rights and confessed to breaking into the victim's house and raping her. Detective Scott, the homicide detective originally assigned to the case, was also present when Dixon waived his rights and confessed.

After obtaining Dixon's confession, Fuentez informed Dixon's parents that the victim had tentatively identified Dixon as the rapist. Fuentez also told them that Dixon had admitted to committing the crimes and that he was being taken to police headquarters to make a tape-recorded statement.

Dixon was again informed of his rights; he again waived his rights and admitted to breaking into the victim's house and raping her.

Dixon filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the lineup and the confessions. After the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court entered the following order:

"This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress a lineup and two statements given to a police officer in which defendant admitted his guilt of rape. The central issue to be decided by the Court is:

"Whether or not it's mandatory that a juvenile's parents be present at all times while law enforcement [personnel] talk to and/or interrogate the juvenile about a crime after the juvenile has initially advised law enforcement that he wants to talk to his parents.

"The defendant, 15 years old, was arrested and held as a suspect in a rape case. Three (3) days after the alleged rape the defendant was observed by Sgt. Echols, Montgomery Police Department, standing on a street approximately three (3) blocks from the scene of the rape. Sgt. Echols states that he approached the defendant and questioned him about standing on the corner because he suspected him of being a lookout in a burglary. The surrounding community is considered a high crime area and several burglaries have recently been committed in the area. Moreover, the defendant was wearing a baseball cap and pants that fit the description of the cap and pants the assailant was wearing at the time of the rape. The defendant further fit the physical description of the rapist, including sex, race, age and general size.

"After confirming the rape lookout, Sgt. Echols took the defendant to police headquarters and met with Detective Livingston. Detective Livingston read him his juvenile rights and the defendant told him he wanted to talk to his parents. Detective Livingston ceased the interview and called defendant's mother at work and advised her of the incident, but she said she was too busy to come down at that time. She was called a second time by Detective Locklar and stated that she would leave work and meet the officers and her son.

"The defendant's father and mother arrived at the Youth Facility and the three of them were placed in the visitation room where they were allowed to talk. The Defendant was placed in a lineup and tentatively identified by the victim as the assailant. The Defendant was returned to the visitation room where he was again advised of his juvenile rights. He waived them and orally confessed. The defendant was returned to the Montgomery Police Department, and again advised of his juvenile rights, which he waived by signing a waiver of rights form. He was then questioned by Investigator Fuentez and confessed to the crime in a taped statement.

"The appellate courts of Alabama have held that the totality of circumstances approach is used in determining whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation of a [juvenile] are admissible. Whisenant v. State, 466 So.2d 995 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). This Court has viewed the facts most favorably to the defendant and finds that based on the totality of the circumstances here, nothing impermissible occurred, and, further, it is not a constitutional requirement that a juvenile's parents be actually present during the time of interrogation. Whisenant, supra.

"Based on the above, defendant's Motion for Suppression is hereby DENIED."

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, at some point, Dixon's voluntary trip to police headquarters escalated into an arrest. Although the court did not find it necessary to determine the exact moment that Dixon was arrested, it held that he was arrested at some time prior to the lineup. The court then held that no probable cause existed for the arrest. The court also found that no intervening circumstances occurred between the arrest and the confession that would sufficiently attenuate the taint of the arrest. The court stated that even if the arrest had been sufficiently attenuated from the confession, the confession was not voluntary.

Even if we should agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' determination that Dixon was arrested at some point prior to the lineup, we do not agree that there was no probable cause to arrest. Instead, we find that there was probable cause for arrest.

Probable cause to support a warrantless arrest must...

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