Dixon v. State
| Decision Date | 10 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2324,2324 |
| Parties | RONALD EUGENE DIXON v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Frederick County
UNREPORTED
Wright, Kehoe, Alpert, Paul E. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Alpert, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
A jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Fredrick County convicted Ronald Eugene Dixon, appellant, of constructive criminal contempt, non-support of a minor child, forging a private document, possessing a forged private document, and issuing a forged private document. The court imposed a total of 28 years of imprisonment, all but five years suspended, and three years of probation upon his release from prison.1 Appellant raises the following five questions on appeal, which we have rephrased for clarity:
For the following reasons, we shall reverse appellant's three forged document convictions and vacate those sentences. We shall affirm the judgments in all other respects.
The State accused appellant of crimes related to violating a child support order and forging a document that he then presented to the Motor Vehicles Administration ("MVA") that advised the MVA to reinstate his driving privileges, which had been revoked because of his failure to pay child support. Because of the nature of the questions asked on appeal, we shall provide only a brief overview of the facts elicited at appellant's trial.
Appellant and Beth Dixon married in 2007, and a child, T., was born to them in 2010. They divorced and in September 2014, Ms. Dixon obtained a child support order giving her sole legal and physical custody of T. with visitation with appellant every other weekend and every Wednesday evening. The order also directed appellant to pay Ms. Dixon $1,483 a month in child support. Ms. Dixon testified that appellant never paid any child support under the order and had sent her text messages stating that he did not intend to pay. At the time the underlying charges were filed against appellant, he was $44,490 in arrears.
Near the end of 2017, the MVA suspended appellant's driver's license for failure to pay his child support obligation.2 On December 8, 2017 appellant presented a typed "statement of compliance" to the MVA that was purportedly signed by a child support enforcement agent for the Department of Social Services. The agent whose name was onthe document testified, however, that she neither created nor signed the document, and she did not authorize appellant to sign on her behalf. She testified she would not have authorized the document because appellant had not made any child support payments.
Appellant's first argument on appeal is not a paradigm of clarity but we discern that he is making two claims of error by an administrative judge on August 2, 2018, based on the same underlying factual allegation. First, appellant argues that the administrative judge erroneously denied his postponement request by relying on his representation that the Office of the Public Defender ("OPD") advised him that he was ineligible for OPD services, when only a District Court Commissioner ("DCC") can make a determination regarding eligibility for OPD services. Second, appellant argues that the administrative judge erred when she failed to comply with the requirements of Md. Rule 4-215(d) governing waiver of counsel by inaction, because the administrative judge never explicitly found that he had an unmeritorious reason for appearing without counsel, and, even if the judge made an implicit finding, the judge's finding was premised on the belief that the OPD advised appellant that he was ineligible for its services when only a DCC can make that determination. The State disagrees that the administrative judge erred, positing that there is no evidence to support appellant's factual allegation that he had advised the administrative judge that the OPD found him ineligible for OPD services, and the administrative judge properly, albeit implicitly, found appellant had waived his right to counsel by inaction. We agree with the State and shall address each argument in turn.
"The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." Jones v. State, 175 Md. App. 58, 74 (2007) (), aff'd, 403 Md. 267 (2008) (footnote omitted). A defendant in a criminal prosecution therefore has a constitutional right to have effective assistance of counsel and the corresponding right to reject that assistance and represent himself. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) () and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (). See also Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 123 (1979) (). Effective October 1, 2017, the Maryland General Assembly enacted legislation that changed who determines whether an individual qualifies as indigent for OPD legal services from the OPD to a DCC. See Laws of 2017, Chapter 606, § 1 and Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. Art. § 16-210(d).
Although appellant's arguments focus on the administrative judge's ruling on August 2, 2018, we shall relate the procedural events leading up to that hearing to place appellant's arguments in context. Appellant made his initial appearance on March 30, 2018, in circuit court pursuant to a summons issued by that court when the State filed a criminal information. See Md. Rule 4-213(c) (). Because he appeared without counsel, the court advised him of his rights pursuant to Md. Rule 4-215(a), including making certain that he had a copy of the charging document; advising him of the nature of the charges against himand allowable penalties; and informing him of his right to, and the importance of, counsel. As to his right to counsel, the court advised appellant:
A month later, on April 30, 2018, appellant appeared again without counsel at a pretrial conference. During the conference, appellant informed the court, among other things, that he believed he should e-file his motions rather than raise his motions orally, to which the court agreed. When asked by the court whether he intended to proceed to trial without counsel, appellant answered that it "would depend on the outcome" of his motions. The judge "cautioned" appellant not to wait too long or he "might not be able to have counsel available" on his trial date. Appellant said he understood.
About two months later, on June 27, 2018, appellant appeared for a third time without counsel at a motions hearing. While discussing what motions were pending, the court asked appellant whether he had talked to a lawyer, and he responded: "Yes, I have, Your Honor, and I've had several lawyers represent me in these proceedings as they have continued throughout the past five years[.] The court reminded appellant that at his initial appearance, the judge had:
advised you of your rights to have a lawyer. She advised you of the nature of the charges that you were facing. She advised you that if you could not afford a lawyer, you could go to the Office of the Public Defender, that if you qualified for the services of the Public Defender, the Public Defender would provide a lawyer for you.
Later during the hearing, the court advised appellant again about his right to counsel, stating:
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