Dixon v. Stone Truck Line, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:19-CV-000945-JCH-GJF,2:19-CV-000945-JCH-GJF |
| Parties | WALTER N. DIXON, Plaintiff, v. STONE TRUCK LINE, INC., a foreign corporation, ISMAIL Y. TAWIL, RUSSELL STOVER CHOCOLATES, LLC, a foreign corporation, and RYAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions: (1) Defendant Russell Stover Chocolates, LLC's Motion to Dismiss the Claims against it in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [Doc. 20] (ECF No. 23); (2) Defendant Ryan Transportation Service, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) and Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 31); (3) Plaintiff Walter N. Dixon's ("Plaintiff's") Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Opposition to Defendant Ryan Transportation Service, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48); and (4) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 49).
On February 21, 2020, Defendant Ryan Transportation Service, Inc. ("Ryan Transportation") filed its motion to dismiss (ECF No. 31), asserting that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, the amended complaint fails to state a claim against it, and Plaintiff's negligent hiring claims are preempted by federal law. In response, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery and to Stay Ruling on Defendant Ryan Transportation Service, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, or Alternatively, Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant Ryan Transportation Service, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34). Plaintiff asked the Court to deny the motion to dismiss and for a stay to obtain jurisdictional discovery to prepare a response to the Rule 12(b)(2) motion. Ryan Transportation filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss and a response to Plaintiff's request for discovery, asserting that the request should be denied because further discovery would not unearth facts allowing for the imposition of personal jurisdiction over it. Def.'s Reply 1, ECF No. 37. On April 21, 2020, the Honorable Gregory J. Fouratt, after a hearing on the matter, denied Plaintiff's requests for jurisdictional discovery and a stay of a ruling on the motion to dismiss. See Order, ECF No. 42; Clerk's Minutes, ECF No. 41. Plaintiff filed no objections to Judge Fouratt's ruling. The decision on jurisdictional discovery and a stay has thus been resolved in favor of Ryan Transportation and this Court need not consider that issue.
On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Opposition to Defendant Ryan Transportation Service, Inc.,'s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48), seeking to present the Court with two documents as exhibits and additional argument related to the evidence as it pertains to the Rule 12(b)(2) portion of the motion to dismiss. Those documents are the Bill of Lading for Ryan Transportation to ship freight for Defendant Russell Stover Chocolates, LLC ("Russell Stover") and the Contract for Truckload Transportation between Ryan Transportation and Lindt & Sprüngli North America, Inc. See Pl.'s Ex. A & B, ECF No. 48-1 at 16- of 31.1 The same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 49) to add factual allegations and attach the Bill of Lading and Contract for Truckload Transportation.
The Court, having considered the motions, briefs, pleadings, evidence, and applicable law,concludes as follows: (1) the motion to file a sur-reply should be granted only to the extent that the Court will consider the cited exhibits and certain enumerated pages discussed herein, but will otherwise be denied; (2) Defendant Russell Stover's motion to dismiss will be granted; (3) Defendant Ryan Transportation's motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction will be denied, but its motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted; and (4) Plaintiff's motion to amend will be denied. The Court will dismiss Defendants Russell Stover and Ryan Transportation from the case.
The personal jurisdiction requirement flows from the Due Process Clause, protecting an individual's liberty interest in avoiding the burdens of litigating in an unfair or unreasonable forum. Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a party to assert by motion the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. XMission, L.C. v. Fluent LLC, 955 F.3d 833, 839 (10th Cir. 2020). Where no evidentiary hearing is held, a plaintiff only needs to make a prima-facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006). The court may consider all factual pleadings, as well as affidavits and other evidence, but must resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor. See id. at 1229; Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984). The court should accept as true well pled facts, unless they are controverted by sworn statements. XMission, 955 F.3d at 836. Well-pled facts are plausible, not conclusory, and not speculative. Id. A plaintiff may defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction "by presenting evidence (either uncontested allegations in its complaint or other materials, or an affidavit or declaration) that if true would support jurisdictionover the defendant." Id. at 839 (internal quotations omitted).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is insufficient to state a claim for relief. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). When reviewing a plaintiff's complaint in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). A court "will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable." Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).
On October 28, 2018, Plaintiff Walter N. Dixon was operating his motorcycle with the right-of-way in Deming, New Mexico, when a commercial semi-truck operated by Defendant Ismail Y. Tawil, acting in the course of his employment with Defendant Stone Truck Line, Inc. ("Stone Truck"), failed to yield to Mr. Dixon, made an unsafe left turn, drove into Mr. Dixon's line of traffic, and collided with Mr. Dixon. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 25, ECF No. 20. Stone Truck was the owner of the semi-truck driven by Mr. Tawil and was Mr. Tawil's statutory employer. Id. ¶¶ 8, 58. At the time, Mr. Tawil was pulling a trailer loaded with goods being shipped by Defendant Russell Stover. Id. ¶ 27. Following the collision, the New Mexico State Police cited Mr. Tawil for careless driving in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-114(A). Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Dixon suffered severeinjuries as a result of the accident. Id. ¶¶ 30-35.
Stone Truck is a licensed DOT2 motor carrier engaged in the business of transporting goods in interstate commerce and was the owner of the 2014 Blue Freightliner Cascadia semi-truck driven by Mr. Tawil that collided with Mr. Dixon. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 54. Stone Truck was the statutory employer of Mr. Tawil. Id. ¶ 58.
Russell Stover was the shipper that hired Stone Truck and Mr. Tawil to transport Russell Stover's goods within and across New Mexico. Id. ¶ 15. Russell Stover "is engaged in the business of shipping its goods across the United States, including across the State of New Mexico, and meets the statutory definition of a motor carrier under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act, and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations." Id. ¶ 14. See also id. ¶¶ 79-80. According to the complaint, Russell Stover was a statutory employer of Mr. Tawil under the Federal Motor Carrier Act. Id. ¶ 83.
Ryan Transportation is in the business of brokering the transportation and shipment of goods across the United States. See id. ¶ 18. Ryan Transportation is a for-profit Kansas corporation with its principal office and headquarters located in Overland Park, Kansas. Emison Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 31-6. Ryan Transportation is not registered to do business in New Mexico, has no agent designated for service of process with the New Mexico Secretary of State, and has no office, property, employees, tax payments, or vehicles in New Mexico. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. From Kansas, Ryan Transportation brokers the transportation of tens of thousands of shipments of goods across the United States, Mexico, and Canada, but the shipments are transported by contract carriers. Id. ¶ 7. Ryan Transportation is not involved in choosing specific routes of travel for its carriers, including Stone Truck. Id.
Effective February 1, 2018, Ryan Transportation entered a Contract for Truckload Transportation with Lindt & Sprüngli North America, Inc. Pl.'s Ex. B, ECF No. 48-1 at 17 of 31. In this form contract, Ryan Transportation is listed as the "CARRIER," although on the title page of the contract "Motor Carrier" is crossed out and "Broker" substituted, and in the Notice provision "CARRIER" is crossed out with "Broker" substituted. Id. at 17-18, 29 of 31. The contract applied to all traffic in interstate, foreign, or intrastate commerce in the 48 contiguous states, id. ¶ 1, ECF No. 48-1 at 18 of 31, and Ryan...
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