Dixon v. United States

• Decision Date: 17 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-13780,17-13780
• Parties: Marla DIXON and Earl Reese-Thornton, Sr., Individually and as parents and natural guardians of E.R.T., Jr., a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

900 F.3d 1257

Marla DIXON and Earl Reese-Thornton, Sr., Individually and as parents and natural guardians of E.R.T., Jr., a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

No. 17-13780

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

August 17, 2018

Lauri Waldman Ross, Ross & Girten, Vidian Mallard, Richard Sharp, Mallard & Sharp, PA, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants.

Edward Himmelfarb, U.S. Attorney General's Office, Dana Joan Martin, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney Service—Southern District of Florida, Charles S. White, U.S. Attorney Service—SFL, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

Before TJOFLAT and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and URSULA UNGARO,^* District Judge.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:

The fictional Angus MacGyver’s defining talent is his ability to cobble together a solution when the precise tools he needs to solve a problem are not available.¹ As "Mac" has explained, "If you don’t have the right equipment for the job, you just have to make it yourself." MacGyver: Out in the Cold (ABC television broadcast Feb. 16, 1987). So synonymous with improvising has the name "MacGyver" become that the Oxford Dictionaries added the name to their collection as a verb meaning to "[m]ake or repair (an object) in an improvised or inventive way, making use of whatever items are at hand." https://premium.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/macgyver.

The Federal Tort Claims Act’s ("FTCA") directive making the federal government liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," 28 U.S.C. § 2674, requires courts to MacGyver a remedy in fashioning tort-damages awards against the United States, where the unique aspects of the federal government make it difficult or impossible to strictly apply a state damages statute to the government. In those situations, courts must approximate the statutory remedy as closely as they can to achieve the ends required by the FTCA.

Here, we review the district court’s efforts in improvising application of Florida’s medical-malpractice-damages statute, section 768.78(2) of the Florida Statutes, to Appellant-Cross-Appellee United States. Following a bench trial, the United States was held liable upon the district court’s finding that a doctor at a federal health facility caused Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants’ son E.R.T., Jr. ("E.R.T."), to suffer severe and life-altering injuries at the time of his birth. On appeal, the government challenges the district court’s application of section 768.78(2) to the method of payment the district court chose for the government to satisfy the judgment against it. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, cross-appeal the district court’s jerry-rigging of section 768.78(2) ’s bond requirement as the court found it pertains to the United States. The district court did an admirable job of MacGyvering a solution in this case, and we affirm much of what it did. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we must reverse discrete portions of the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

E.R.T. was born at the North Shore Medical Center. Dr. Ata Atogho, an employee of a federally supported community health center, delivered him.

Unfortunately, the birth was a difficult one. During the process, Dr. Atogho violated the requisite standard of care and caused E.R.T. to experience profound brain damage. As a result, E.R.T. is in "a near persistent vegetative state." He will need round-the-clock care for the rest of his life, and his condition is not expected to ever significantly improve. E.R.T. has a life expectancy of 30 years.

Faced with this reality, E.R.T.’s parents, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants Marla Dixon and Earl Reese-Thornton, Sr., filed suit against the United States under the FTCA and Florida law. In their complaint, they asserted two FTCA claims against the United States: one for Dr. Atogho’s medical negligence and one for the vicarious liability of the community health center for Dr. Atogho’s medical negligence.

Following a bench trial, the district court found the United States liable to Dixon and Reese-Thornton, Sr., for Dr. Atogho’s negligence. Among other damages, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs would suffer a total of $20,965,146 in future economic damages, consisting of E.R.T.’s future medical expenses and the loss of E.R.T.’s future earnings, with a present money value of $13,860,943.91.

The district court then had to decide how any damages awarded should be paid. Section 768.78(2) of the Florida Statutes allows a defendant in a medical-malpractice case to make payment of future economic damages either by lump-sum payment for all damages, with future economic damages and expenses reduced to present value, or by periodic payments. Fla. Stat. § 768.78(2). If a party chooses to make periodic payments, the amount of the payments "shall equal the dollar amount of all future damages before any reduction to present value." Fla. Stat. § 768.78(2)(b)(1). A party who wishes to make periodic payments must post a bond or other security to ensure full payment of the damages awarded. Id. at § 768.78(2)(b)(2).

Invoking this statute, the United States requested that any future-economic-damages award to Plaintiff be paid in periodic payments, rather than a lump-sum payment. But it asserted that, unlike a private party, the United States cannot be subject to continuing obligations under the FTCA.² For this reason, the United States requested to pay the entire amount of future economic damages, not reduced to present money value, into the district court’s registry for distribution to Plaintiffs on a periodic basis. And in the case that E.R.T. died before turning 30 years old, the United States sought for the district court to order any remaining funds in the court’s registry to revert to the United States. Finally, the United States posited that though it advocated for periodic payments to be made from the funds in the court’s registry, the deposit of the full funds would itself act as the security ensuring payment of the full award in the future. So, the government reasoned, no separate bond was necessary.

The district court granted the government’s request to make a single payment into a trust³ for periodic disbursement to Plaintiffs. But it denied the government’s plea for a reversionary interest in the monies the government deposited. Nevertheless, the district court agreed that the government’s deposit of the total award in the trust served the purpose of section 768.78 ’s bond requirement, so it did not require the United States to pay a bond.

But the United States later suggested that its agreement to pay the full award was qualified, based on the availability of government funds for that purpose.⁴ So Plaintiffs urged the district court to require the United States to pay a bond to secure the full payment of the damages award. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request, based on "the good faith and credit of the United States."

With respect to the loss-of-future-earnings component of the future-economic-damages award, the district court directed that $1 million of it be paid when E.R.T. reaches the age of 17 1/2 years and the balance be paid on a yearly basis beginning when E.R.T. turns 20. Finally, as relevant to this appeal, the district court ordered payment of future economic damages into the trust within 30 days of the entry of a decision on appeal.

On appeal, the government does not challenge the district court’s liability determination or the total amount of damages awarded. Instead, the United States raises the following three issues: (1) it contends the district court should have granted its request for a reversionary interest for the United States in the trust, should E.R.T. meet an untimely demise; (2) it asserts the district court abused its discretion in requiring a lump-sum payment of $1 million in lost-future-earnings-capacity damages to Plaintiffs when E.R.T. becomes 17 1/2 years old; and (3) it argues the district court erred when it required payment within 30 days after we issue a decision on appeal in this case, without regard to whether the United States may seek further review.

Plaintiffs cross-appeal. They take issue with the district court’s decision to authorize periodic payments in the absence of "a bond, security or adequate assurance of ‘full payment’ " and where the government did not make "full payment" of economic damages immediately in trust, following the entry of judgment.

II.

A.

This case raises four questions of law: (1) whether the district court erred in allowing the United States to pay the future-economic-damages award into a trust to be dispensed periodically; (2) whether the district court erred in determining that the United States has no reversionary interest in such a damages award; (3) whether the district court erred in concluding that the United States has no right to interest in the case of E.R.T.’s premature death; (4) and whether the district court erred in requiring the government to pay the judgment within thirty days of the entry of a decision on appeal. We conduct de novo review of questions of law, see Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Graham , 823 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2016), and address each issue in turn below.

1. The district court did not err in allowing the United States to pay the full damages award into a trust for E.R.T. to be dispensed periodically without requiring the United States to make a security payment for the full amount of damages.

We first address Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal. As we have noted, Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s decision to authorize periodic payments in the absence of "a bond, security or adequate assurance of ‘full payment,’ " Fla. Stat. § 768.78, and where the government did not...