Dixon v. United States
| Docket Number | 2022-1564 |
| Decision Date | 10 May 2023 |
| Citation | 67 F.4th 1156 |
| Parties | Alan C. DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:20-cv-01258-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
Tiffany Michelle Hunt, Hunt Tax Law, PLLC, Dallas, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
Isaac B. Rosenberg, Tax Division, Appellate Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Bruce R. Ellisen, David A. Hubbert.
Keith Fogg, Federal Tax Clinic at Legal Services Center, Harvard Law School, Jamaica Plain, MA, for amicus curiae The Center for Taxpayer Rights. Also represented by Andrew Weiner, Beasley School of Law, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA.
Before Taranto, Clevenger, and Hughes, Circuit Judges.
Alan C. Dixon seeks a refund of taxes he paid to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In 2017, his tax preparer filed amended tax returns for him, within the time permitted by law, claiming a refund of amounts paid for tax years 2013 and 2014, but, after an audit, the IRS denied the refund claims and instead assessed additional taxes. Mr. Dixon then filed an action in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court), and during that litigation, it became clear that Mr. Dixon had not personally written the signatures of his name on the 2017 amended returns—the tax preparer had signed Mr. Dixon's name—and no authorizing power-of-attorney documentation accompanied the amended returns. Because 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) prevents a taxpayer from filing suit to claim a refund without having earlier submitted a "duly filed" refund claim to the IRS, and the 2017 amended returns were for the above reason not "duly filed," the Claims Court dismissed the case in February 2020. See Dixon v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 469, 472-75 (2020) (Dixon I).
Within days of that dismissal, Mr. Dixon filed with the IRS duly signed amended returns for the 2013 and 2014 tax years, though the time allowed for amended returns claiming a refund for 2013 and 2014 had long passed. He shortly proceeded to file a timely appeal of the dismissal to this court, but after briefing, he voluntarily dropped the appeal in September 2020. Then, only days later, he filed a second action in the Claims Court based on the IRS's failure to act on his duly signed 2020 amended returns. The Claims Court again dismissed Mr. Dixon's case, concluding that the 2020 amended returns were untimely and that the "informal claim" doctrine was inapplicable here to allow the untimely (but proper) 2020 filings to relate back in time to the timely (but defective) 2017 filings. See Dixon v. United States, 158 Fed. Cl. 69, 75-78, 80 (2022) (Dixon II).
Mr. Dixon appeals. For the reasons that follow, which are different from the reasons set forth by the Claims Court, we affirm.
If a taxpayer has filed a return as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6011(a) and paid taxes based on the return, and it later turns out that the amount paid was more than owed, then, as a "[g]eneral rule[,]" the IRS—more precisely, the Secretary of the Treasury—"within the applicable period of limitations, may credit the amount of such overpayment" against other tax liabilities of the taxpayer "and shall, subject to [certain limitations], refund any balance to such person." 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a).1 The "period of limitations" for securing a credit or refund is keyed to the previous tax return or payment: A "[c]laim for credit or refund . . . shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later." Id. § 6511(a). Generally, failure to timely file a refund claim forecloses recovery. See id. § 6511(b)(1) (); id. § 6514(a)(1)-(2) (). A taxpayer and the IRS may agree, however, to extend the time in which the IRS may assess taxes and in which the taxpayer may file a refund claim. See id. §§ 6501(c)(4)(A), 6511(c)(1).
Just as there are timing requirements for filing refund claims with the IRS, there are both timing and other requirements for filing refund claims in court. "Under 26 U.S.C. § 6532 and § 7422(a), a suit may be brought in [a] . . . [c]ourt after an administrative claim has been filed and either the taxpayer waited six months before filing suit or the IRS took final action on the claim." Brown v. United States, 22 F.4th 1008, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2022). A refund action may be brought "either in United States district court or in the [Claims Court]." United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4, 128 S.Ct. 1511, 170 L.Ed.2d 392 (2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1); EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 431 & n.2, 127 S.Ct. 1763, 167 L.Ed.2d 729 (2007)).
Section 6532(a) states two rules for the timing of the action in court. First, no such suit "shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time." 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1). Second, "nor [shall such suit be begun] after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates." Id. The latter limit may be extended by written agreement with the Secretary. Id. § 6532(a)(2).
Timeliness is not the only requirement for a judicial action for a refund. "No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of" a tax refund "until a claim for refund . . . has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof." Id. § 7422(a). Two statutes are noteworthy here for determining whether claims were "duly filed." Section 6061(a) says: "Except as otherwise provided . . . , any return, statement, or other document required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall be signed in accordance with forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary." Section 6065 says: "Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, any return, declaration, statement, or other document required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall contain or be verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury."
In Brown, we explained the effect of those provisions in light of existing regulations. We stated: "Sections 6061(a) and 6065 thus impose a default rule that individual taxpayers must personally sign and verify their income tax refund claims." Brown, 22 F.4th at 1012. "To be sure," we added, "§ 6061(a) gives the Secretary the authority to prescribe how individual taxpayers may satisfy the statute's requirement," and "[s]imilarly, § 6065 gives the Secretary discretion to suspend the verification requirement in certain cases." Id. at 1013. But those statutes' Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6012-1(a)(5), 1.6065-1(a), 301.6402(e)). As a result:
[A] taxpayer must satisfy the statutory default rule or else comply strictly with the implementing regulations. If they do neither, the document is effectively unsigned and unverified under §§ 6061(a) and 6065 and the taxpayer has not "duly filed" the refund claim.
Id.2 Based on that analysis, the court in Brown ruled that "[b]ecause the taxpayer signature and verification requirements derive from statute, the IRS cannot waive those requirements" under the waiver doctrine of Angelus Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 293, 296, 65 S.Ct. 1162, 89 L.Ed. 1619 (1945). Brown, 22 F.4th at 1013. "In the alternative," the court then held, the taxpayer did not meet the requirements of the waiver doctrine in any event. Id.
Finally, determining whether a judicial action is proper also requires looking at the taxpayer's compliance with the timing requirements that govern the administrative claim, i.e., the filing made to the IRS—requirements that, as noted, for refund claims like those at issue here, generally demand filing within three years of when the earlier return was filed or two years of when the tax was paid. See Computervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a)). The Supreme Court has ruled that failure to file with the IRS within the prescribed time deprives the court of "jurisdiction over [the] suit for refund." United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608-10, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). This court in Brown ruled that Dalm's jurisdictional characterization applies to "the fact of filing" in the time allowed, but not to § 7422(a)'s "duly filed" requirements governing "the adequacy of the filing" if timely made, and held the latter not to be jurisdictional in nature. Brown, 22 F.4th at 1011-12.3
As we have recognized, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances a taxpayer's claim" may or even must be addressed by the IRS...
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