Dixon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
| Decision Date | 10 April 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2033,85-2033 |
| Citation | 787 F.2d 943 |
| Parties | 40 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 793, 39 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,082, 54 USLW 2559 Patricia A. DIXON, Appellant, v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Appellee. and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae,/A and Equal Employment Advisory Council, Amicus Curiae,/E. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Mark E. Herman, Baltimore, Md., for appellant.
Leonard E. Cohen (Monte Fried, Mark Santangelo, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.
Peggy R. Mastroianni, Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n (Johnny J. Butler, Acting Gen. Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Acting Associate Gen. Counsel, Susan Buckingham Reilly, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, William S. Franklin, McGuiness & Williams, Washington, D.C., on brief), for amicus curiae.
Before WIDENER and HALL, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Patricia A. Dixon appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment to her employer, Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse"), in her action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, et seq. We affirm.
Dixon was employed by Westinghouse in its engineering and drafting department for more than ten years. On December 18, 1981, she received a mailgram from her supervisor notifying her that she was terminated from her employment.
Thereafter, Dixon filed a grievance concerning her termination with the Salaried Employees Association ("SEA"), of which she was a member. SEA attempted to resolve the dispute concerning Dixon's termination through its collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures. The matter was grieved at a third step meeting under the local grievance procedure on March 15, 1982, and Westinghouse denied the grievance in writing. The grievance was not advanced to the next step of the grievance procedure-- the national appeal level. Thus, under the collective bargaining agreement, Westinghouse's written denial of the grievance was final and the matter was closed. Subsequently, on August 4, 1982, 230 days after her termination, Dixon filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
In accordance with the Worksharing Agreement between EEOC and the Maryland Commission on Human Relations ("MCHR"), 1 EEOC transmitted a Charge and Transmittal Form 212-A to MCHR on August 6, 1982. On August 11, 1982, MCHR returned the Form 212-A to EEOC after checking the box which indicated that it would not process the charge. By letter dated August 11, 1982, MCHR informed Dixon that, because EEOC could better process her charge, MCHR had terminated its proceedings.
On November 2, 1982, following discussions between SEA, Westinghouse, and EEOC representatives, Westinghouse offered to reinstate Dixon. She was reinstated to her position as of January 3, 1983, at a salary she would have received had she been continuously employed between December 18, 1981, and January 3, 1983.
EEOC made no finding on Dixon's charge of discrimination but issued her a right to sue letter on June 16, 1983. Dixon then filed this action, alleging that Westinghouse had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, in violation of Title VII, and that the alleged conduct of Westinghouse constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress, in violation of Maryland law. Westinghouse filed a motion for summary judgment and a supplemental motion for summary judgment.
The district court granted both Westinghouse's motion for summary judgment and its supplemental motion for summary judgment, 615 F.Supp. 538, and dismissed the complaint. In doing so, the court held that Dixon's EEOC charge was untimely because she did not file it within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, as required under section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). The district court found that Dixon was not entitled to the extended 300-day charge-filing period provided in section 706(e), because she had not initially instituted proceedings with MCHR. The district court further held that under the terms of the Worksharing Agreement between MCHR and EEOC, MCHR had waived the right to initially process the charge and it was, therefore, not authorized to process the charge before EEOC had resolved the claim. In addition, the district court held that Dixon's state tort claim was barred for failure to exhaust the grievance-arbitration procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement to which she was subject at the time of her termination.
This appeal followed.
Dixon's primary contention on appeal is that the district court erred in holding that her EEOC charge was barred for failure to file it within 180 days of her discharge. She further claims that the district court erred in determining that her state tort claim was barred for failure to exhaust the grievance-arbitration procedures. In addition, Dixon alleges that the district court erred in concluding that Westinghouse did not waive any challenge to EEOC's jurisdiction by failing to first raise the issue with EEOC. Finally, she argues that, even if her EEOC charge was untimely filed, Westinghouse is equitably estopped from asserting the late filing as a defense. We reject all of appellant's contentions as meritless.
With respect to her allegation that the district court erred in holding that her EEOC charge was barred because it was not filed within 180 days of her discharge, Dixon maintains that the sending of the Charge and Transmittal Form 212-A to MCHR constituted a referral of the charge to the state agency within the meaning of section 706(e). She contends that MCHR processed the charge and, as evidenced by its notation on the Form 212-A, elected not to proceed on it. Appellant argues that because the charge was referred to the state agency, the extended 300-day time limit for filing provided for in section 706(e), and not the 180-day limit, applied here. She asserts that the fact that EEOC did not refer the charge to MCHR within the state's statute of limitations did not make the filing of the charge untimely. 2 Dixon relies upon an EEOC regulation which states that "[c]harges arising in jurisdictions having a 706 agency but which charges are apparently untimely under the applicable state ... statute of limitations ... are timely filed if received by the Commission within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation." 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1601.13(a).
We are unconvinced by appellant's arguments. Section 706(e) provides, in pertinent part, the following:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ..., except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice ..., such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e) (emphasis added). The plain and unambiguous meaning of section 706(e) is that a Title VII charge is timely only if filed with EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. The only exception is when there is a state or local deferral agency and the charging party has initially instituted proceedings before that deferral agency. In such a situation, the charge is deferred to that agency for "only one reason"--to give the state the opportunity to act and to "avoid federal...
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