Dixon v. Williams
| Decision Date | 20 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-176 |
| Parties | TYRONE DIXON, Plaintiff, v. JOHN M. WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Bowman, M.J.
On March 5, 2019, Plaintiff Tyrone Dixon, presently incarcerated at the Southeastern Correctional Institution in Lancaster, Ohio, tendered a civil rights complaint together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to local practice, the case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge. The case is now before the undersigned on multiple motions filed by both Plaintiff and Defendants. For the reasons that follow, I now recommend that this case be DISMISSED.
On April 16, 2019, the undersigned granted Plaintiff's application to commence his case in forma pauperis, while directing Plaintiff to pay the full filing fee of $350.00 through periodic payments calculated from the income credited to Plaintiff's prison account, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). (Doc. 6). On the same date, the undersigned issued an order noting that the complaint was subject to initial screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Unlike most prisoner-litigants who seek to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff here does not proceed pro se, but is represented by an attorney who appears frequently in this Court.1 Without discussion of any specific claims, the § 1915(e) screening Order states simply: "At this stage in the proceedings...the undersigned concludes that the complaint is deserving of further development and may proceed at this juncture." (Doc. 8 at 1). A more detailed summary of Plaintiff's allegations appears below, but Plaintiff generally invokes this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and invokes supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims alleged under state law. After concluding that Plaintiff's claims were sufficient to proceed "at this juncture," the Court ordered service on Plaintiff's behalf by the United States Marshal, with the costs of service to be advanced by the United States.
Five motions are currently pending before the Court, including one motion relating to service issues. Despite the grant of in forma pauperis status and the Court's Order directing service on Plaintiff's behalf by the U.S. Marshal, Plaintiff's counsel made a request of the Clerk of Court for the issuance of summons forms. (Doc. 4). The record reflects that Plaintiff's counsel attempted to serve the Defendants, and filed "executed" copies of summons forms addressed to various Defendants on April 18, 2019, June 22, 2019, and June 24, 2019. (Docs. 9, 10, 11). In the meantime, the U.S. Marshal complied with the Court's order and separately served the various Defendants on Plaintiff's behalf. The U.S. Marshal filed executed summons forms on August 1, 2019. (Doc. 30).
On July 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the entry of a default judgmentagainst Defendant Benjamin Peterson. (Doc. 17). The next day, Defendant Peterson filed both a response in opposition to the application for entry of default, and a motion to dismiss all claims against him based upon insufficiency of service of process. (Docs. 20, 21). On July 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to dismissal and in support of the entry of default. (Doc. 26).
In addition to motions related to service on Defendant Peterson, other Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). On June 25, 2019, Defendants Denise Driehaus, Chris Monzel, and Todd Portune, all members of the Hamilton County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter "the Board"), filed a motion to dismiss all claims against them for failure to state a claim, to which Plaintiff filed a response, and Defendants filed a reply. (Docs. 14, 16, 22). On July 15, 2019, Defendant John M. Williams filed a separate motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 25). Plaintiff has filed no timely response to Defendant Williams' motion. Last, Plaintiff recently filed a motion to amend the complaint.2 (Doc. 29). Although the time for filing a response has not yet expired, judicial economy favors addressing Plaintiff's motion to amend in this R&R.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and to accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) and Lewis v. ACB Business Services, 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998).A court, however, will not accept conclusions of law or unwarranted inferences which are presented as factual allegations. Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1974). Instead, a complaint must contain either direct or reasonable inferential allegations that support all material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Lewis v. ACB, 135 F.3d at 405 (internal citations omitted). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted); Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). A complaint will generally survive under Rule 12(b)(6) standards if it contains sufficient factual content "that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcraft v. Iqbal, 29 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). By contrast, if a defendant has filed a well-supported and meritorious motion to dismiss that clearly illustrates that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the motion will be granted.
Here, the Defendants' well-supported motions should be granted. It is worth noting that the legal standard of review for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is technically the same as the standard of review for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) or 1915A. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-471 (6th Cir.2010). However, the frame of reference differs significantly. Screening under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) is extremely liberal.3 The perspective of this Court, examining the complaint on a superficial level without benefit of briefing, differs from that of an opposing party who has an incentive to thoroughly explore all possible legal arguments in a subsequent motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings. Necessarily constrained by limitations of time and resources in the course of its initial sua sponte examination, this Court frequently will permit "further development" of a weak legal claim by requiring a defendant to file an answer or response.
At this time, however, in addition to granting Defendants' motions, the undersigned concludes that additional claims should be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Notwithstanding the undersigned's initial screening order permitting all claims to proceed, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) expressly permits dismissal "at any time if the court determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the statute itself allows dismissal based upon a subsequent redetermination that no claim has been stated, even if the court's initial inclination was to let the claim proceed. In the case presented, Defendants' well-reasoned motions, in combination with Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint, have caused the undersigned to take a fresh look at the pleading.
Both the Board and Defendant Williams argue that Plaintiff has failed to state anyclaim against them. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff resided at the Hamilton County Juvenile Detention Center from an unspecified date in January 2018 through May 7, 2018.4 (Doc. 2 at ¶7). Plaintiff alleges that on two days in May 2018, Defendant Correctional Officer Peterson verbally threatened to break Plaintiff's arm. (Id. at ¶9). Either on one of the same days or on some other date, Defendant Peterson also allegedly threatened to place Plaintiff in isolation in a "dirty, bad room" "because Dixon was wrapping around 'my birthday' which is May 7th." (Id. at ¶11).5 Plaintiff alleges that, two months earlier in March 2018, Peterson was involved in an incident with someone named "Hoskins," and that Peterson "broke Hoskins['] arm in three places." (Id. at ¶13).
Plaintiff asserts five causes of action against the entire group of Defendants: (1) Freedom of Speech; (2) Failure to Train, Instruct and Supervise; (3) Ohio Constitution and Laws of Ohio Assault; (4) Common Law Negligence; and (5) Ohio Constitution and Laws of Ohio Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.6 The first two causes of action purport to allege violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, whereas the remaining three causes of action rely on state law.
The only reference to either the Board or Judge Williams contained in the entire complaint states in relevant part:
Judge Williams is responsible for the Juvenile Detention Center and appoints Superintendent of the Detention Center.... [T]he Hamilton County Board of Commissioners and Judge Williams are responsible for regulating and supervising Hamilton County Ohio Juvenile Court Detention Center.
The undersigned takes judicial notice that both the Board and Judge Williams recently filed motions to dismiss or for judgment as a matter of law in another case in which a different inmate...
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