Doak v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 15 January 1968
• Citation: 65 Cal.Rptr. 193,27 A.L.R.3d 1362,257 Cal.App.2d 825
• Parties: , 27 A.L.R.3d 1362 William Chambers DOAK, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent, Ann Barbara DOBIESZ and Henry Edward Dobiesz, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 32084.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 193

65 Cal.Rptr. 193

257 Cal.App.2d 825, 27 A.L.R.3d 1362

William Chambers DOAK, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent Ann Barbara DOBIESZ and Henry Edward Dobiesz, Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 32084.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Jan. 15, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1968.

Hearing Denied March 13, 1968.

Parker, Stanbury, McGee, Peckham & Garrett, and Thomas Waddell and White McGee, Jr., Los Angeles, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Fred Miller, John D. Miller and Norvell F. Woods, Jr., by John D. Miller, Long Beach, for real parties in interest.

McCOY, Associate Justice. ^*

This is a proceeding for a writ of prohibition restraining the Superior Court for Los Angeles County from enforcing an order requiring petitioner to answer certain interrogatories. The order was made in an action now pending in that court entitled Dobiesz v. Doak, number SOC 13976, in which plaintiffs seek to recover general damages for the wrongful death of their son, allegedly caused by wanton, reckless and negligent acts of the defendant, petitioner here, in the operation of his automobile on August 10, 1966. Upon the issuance of our alternative writ, the real parties in interest filed their answer and a demurrer to the petition as permitted by rule 56, California Rules of Court.

At the taking of his deposition by plaintiffs' attorneys in December 1966, defendant refused to answer several questions. Plaintiffs thereupon noticed a motion pursuant to section 2034, subdivision (a), of the Code of Civil Procedure for an order requiring him, among other things, to answer some fourteen questions about his ability to respond in damages, should plaintiffs recover judgment. ¹ At the conclusion of the hearing on July 5, 1967, the court made the order here under review. That order reads: 'Motion is granted as follows: Such disclosure to be given, to be given at time of deposition re examination in general shall be a limited way; that is, net worth of all real property and net worth of all personal property owned and held by defendant Doak, without inquiring into personal debts, debtors, etc. * * *' The remaining portions of the minute order of that day are not material here, nor are we concerned with the other questions which were the subject of plaintiffs' motion.

The question here is whether, under the law of this state governing discovery in civil actions, a defendant in an action for damages for wrongful death can be required in a pretrial discovery proceeding to answer questions relating to his present financial responsibility and his ability to respond in damages in the event the plaintiffs obtain a judgment against him. Defendant contends that, in making the order requiring him to answer such questions, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, in that there is no authority in this state for such discovery. Plaintiffs contend that the answers to such questions 'are relevant to the subject matter in a wrongful death action and may be compelled, in the exercise of the broad discretion conferred upon the trial judge, at the defendant's pretrial deposition concerning his financial responsibility: (1) as an aid to pending pretrial settlement negotiations; or (2) as an aid in obtaining satisfaction of any judgment plaintiffs may receive in this action.' ² The question thus raised is one of first impression in this state.

We have concluded that the question before us must be answered in the negative, and that the making of the order here under review constitutes an abuse of the discretion vested in the trial court. In reaching this conclusion we are well aware of the rule stated in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 355, 375--376 15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 99, 364 P.2d 266, 275, that the new discovery act was intended, among other things, '(4) to educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements; (5) to expedite litigation; (and) (6) to safeguard against surprise; * * *.' We are also mindful of the rule stated in the same case (p. 377, 15 Cal.Rptr. p. 100, 364 P.2d p. 276) that 'In order to accomplish the various legislative purposes set forth above, the several statutes must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial. As we stated in the Chronicle case (Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court) (supra, 54 Cal.2d (548) at p. 572, 7 Cal.Rptr. 109, 354 P.2d 637), 'Only strong public policies weigh against disclosure."

The basic question here is whether the information as to the defendant's financial condition here sought by plaintiffs is discoverable under the circumstances of this case. While defendant concedes that plaintiffs may have pretrial discovery with respect to the existence and amount of defendant's public liability insurance under Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal.App.2d 391, 334 P.2d 638, and Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal.App.2d 680, 3 Cal.Rptr. 267, he contends that the rule of those cases should not be extended to permit discovery of a defendant's other assets. We agree.

In Laddon v. Superior Court, supra, an action for general damages for malpractice, it was held that the plaintiff has a discoverable interest in defendant's liability insurance which arises with the very pendency of the action against the assured. The insurance policy, said the court (pp. 395--396, 334 P.2d p. 640), 'is relevant to the subject matter involved in the personal injury action, although not strictly within the issues raised by the pleadings.' This decision is based in large part on Demaree v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 99, 73 P.2d 605, and Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833, in which the court held that the plaintiff in a personal injury action is entitled, in a collateral proceeding to perpetuate testimony, to examine defendant's public liability insurance policy.

Petitioner in Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal.App.2d 680, 3 Cal.Rptr. 267, was the plaintiff in an action for general damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendant in the operation of his automobile. The decision in that case that plaintiff was entitled to pretrial discovery of information concerning defendant's public liability insurance, is based primarily on Demaree, Superior Insurance and Laddon.

These cases are significant here in several respects. In the first place, as pointed out in Pettie (pp. 684--685, 3 Cal.Rptr. p. 269), the holdings in all four cases are based essentially on the determination 'that, under Insurance Code, section 11580, ³ a contractual relation is created between the insurer under an automobile liability policy and third persons who may be negligently injured by the insured; that the provisions of such a policy are not, therefore, a matter for the sole knowledge of the named assured to the exclusion of the injured person; and that 'the very pendency of an action by the injured person brought in good faith against the named insured person gives the former a discoverable interest in the policy.' (Italics ours.) (Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 754, 235 P.2d 833.)' It is clear, said the court (p. 686, 3 Cal.Rptr. p. 270), 'that inquiry as to the existence and policy limits of liability insurance was primarily permitted under former sections 2083--2090 Code of Civil Procedure, upon the grounds that Insurance Code, section 11580, created a contractual relation between the insurer under a liability insurance policy and third persons who are negligently injured by the assured, and that plaintiff in a personal injury action has a discoverable interest in defendant's liability insurance which arises with the pendency of the action against the assured.'

It was also held in Pettie (p. 687, 3 Cal.Rptr. p. 271), that, 'In view of the statutory and case law in California establishing that a contractual relation exists between the insurer and such a person as petitioner herein and that petitioner has a discoverable interest in the assured's liability insurance arising with the very pendency of his personal injury action against the assured, we are of opinion that, in this state, the matter of liability policy limits is clearly relevant to the Subject matter involved in petitioner's pending personal injury action against the assured.'

Finally, in deciding the Pettie case (pp. 688--689, 3 Cal.Rptr. p. 272), the court was 'not persuaded that there is any substantial reason for not allowing such discovery to be had in the pending personal injury action against the assured. It being the established public policy in California that the provisions of a liability insurance policy are not a matter for the sole knowledge of the name assured and the insurance carrier to the exclusion of the injured person, it may well follow that the revelation of the liability limits of such insurance policy will tend to promote the efficacious disposition of negligence litigation by settlement or by trial.' This is so, said the court (p. 689, 3 Cal.Rptr. p. 272) in view of the primary purpose of pretrial discovery 'to further the efficient, economical disposition of cases according to right and justice on the merits,' and 'the policy of the law to discourage litigation and to favor compromises of doubtful rights and controversies, made either in or out of court.' ⁴

Plaintiffs would have us hold under the rationale of these cases that they should be permitted pretrial discovery with respect to the financial condition of the defendant here on two grounds: first, that knowledge of the defendant's financial condition would lead to more purposeful discussions of settlement, and thereby effectuate the dispatch of court business; and second, that evidence of financial responsibility of a defendant is admissible in a case...