Doan v. Mauzey

• Decision Date: 31 January 1864
• Citation: 33 Ill. 227,1864 WL 2912
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: DOAN, KING & CO.v.HENRY G. MAUZEY.

33 Ill. 227

1864 WL 2912 (Ill.)

DOAN, KING & CO.

v.HENRY G. MAUZEY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1864.

APPEAL from Circuit Court of Adams County.

Bill in chancery filed by appellee against Doan, King & Company, and their grantees, and other subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers, who are alleged to have taken with notice, praying for the specific performance, and, if that cannot be had, then for damages for the non-performance of a certain alleged agreement, which is as follows:

“We hereby agree that H. G. Mauzey shall have the privilege of purchasing the property on lot seven, block nine, in city of Quincy, this day sold and conveyed by him to Wyllys King, at the price of $5,000, if purchased within one year from this date; and that we will allow him the privilege of taking the same at that price, with interest from this day, at any time within five years, in preference to any other person, hereby giving him the refusal: This agreement is not intended to cover any part of the ground, which we may hereafter purchase.

DOAN, KING & CO.

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                ¦January 6, 1854.¦Per STEPHENS & WAGLEY.”¦
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The remaining facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Buckley, Wentworth & Marcy, for appellants.

Grimshaw & Williams, for appellee.

BREESE, J.

It is very manifest from the proofs in this case, that the appellee knew, when he filed his bill for a specific performance, that the appellants had disabled themselves from performing the contract to convey, if one existed. He knew the contract he took from Stephens & Wagley was not recorded, and had no reason to believe the purchasers from his grantors, the appellants, had any notice whatever of his alleged equities. The object of the bill, then, was not for a specific performance, but was for the purpose of obtaining compensation in damages for the nonperformance of the alleged contract by appellants. The bill cannot be supposed to have been filed in good faith for a specific performance on the supposition that the appellants were able to perform the contract made by Stephens & Wagley, as their agents, specifically. The complainant knew better, and his allegation of notice was introduced merely to give color of jurisdiction to a court of chancery. This being so, the bill should have been dismissed. Unless in very special cases, and this is not one, a court of chancery will not sustain a bill for damages on a...