Doan v. Wilkerson

• Decision Date: 26 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 56591.,56591.
• Parties: Craig A. DOAN, Appellant, v. Richard WILKERSON, Personal Representative, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

327 P.3d 498

130 Nev. Adv. Op. 48

Craig A. DOAN, Appellant,

v.Richard WILKERSON, Personal Representative, Respondent.

No. 56591.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

June 26, 2014.

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Christopher M. Rusby, Reno, for Appellant.

Willick Law Group and Marshal S. Willick, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

This case presents us with the opportunity to address whether and under what circumstances a marital asset omitted from the divorce decree may be partitioned through a motion for relief from judgment that is filed many years after the divorce was finalized. Because the time frame for filing a motion for relief from judgment under NRCP 60(b) is within six months after the decree is entered, we conclude that an ex-spouse who did not timely pursue a motion for relief from a divorce decree is not entitled to partition absent exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief. See Bonnell v. Lawrence, 128 Nev. ––––, ––––, 282 P.3d 712, 715 (2012). One such circumstance justifying equitable relief is when a community asset was not litigated and adjudicated in the divorce proceedings.

Here, the contested marital asset was disclosed and discussed during the course of the divorce proceedings and then left out of the divorce decree. The ex-spouse then waited more than six years after the final decree was entered to file a motion for relief from judgment, long after the applicable six-month period under NRCP 60(b) had expired. Furthermore, even if the motion were considered an independent action for equitable relief, the facts here do not warrant equitable relief because the asset was adjudicated in the divorce proceedings. Accordingly, we reversethe district court's order modifying the final decree of divorce.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Catherine Doan and appellant Craig Doan married in May 1985. During the course of their marriage, Craig was employed as an air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Craig retired from the FAA with more than 23 years of service. He received multiple retirement benefits as a federal employee.

Before Craig retired, the parties filed an action for divorce, seeking dissolution of the marriage and an equitable division of community debts and assets. Catherine and Craig exchanged affidavits of financial condition setting forth their respective monthly incomes, monthly expenses, and marital assets. Although not identifying any specific account by name, both Catherine and Craig indicated in their affidavits that they owned retirement accounts or pensions, or both. Craig also listed retirement contributions as a monthly expense.

In anticipation of trial, Catherine and Craig each filed pretrial memoranda. Catherine specified in her memorandum that there were federal retirement benefits accrued during the marriage. Craig attached statements of earnings and leave from the FAA, which indicated that he received retirement benefits. He also provided W–2 wage and tax statements, which indicated that he had a retirement plan, pension plan, and deferred compensation.

Although both Catherine and Craig were represented by counsel during most of the divorce proceedings, their respective counsel withdrew from representation shortly before trial. As a result, Catherine and Craig appeared in proper person for their scheduled trial. They agreed to participate in a pretrial settlement conference with the presiding judge. During the settlement conference, Catherine and Craig agreed to divide their property and debt. The district court awarded Catherine spousal support and ordered a final decree of divorce. The final decree of divorce, prepared by Craig and approved by Catherine, was entered in August 2003. The divorce decree did not include Craig's FAA retirement benefit. Another retirement benefit, a voluntary thrift savings plan, was distributed as part of the final decree.

Six years later, in June 2009, Catherine filed a motion for division of an omitted asset after her new counsel discovered that Catherine was not receiving Craig's FAA retirement benefits. She asserted that Craig's retirement benefits were omitted from the divorce decree and must be divided by the district court. She also requested that Craig reimburse her for her share of the retirement benefits that he had previously received.

After two hearings, the district court denied Catherine's motion to divide the omitted asset, ordering that Catherine was not entitled to Craig's retirement benefits. The district court found that the retirement benefits had been disclosed during discovery because there were references to Craig's retirement in his leave and earnings statements and W–2's. The district court also found that Catherine's first counsel knew about Craig's FAA retirement benefits. Citing Amie v. Amie, 106 Nev. 541, 796 P.2d 233 (1990), the district court concluded that there was full and fair disclosure of Craig's retirement and, thus, the retirement benefits could not be treated as an omitted asset.

Shortly thereafter, Catherine filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court granted. Although the district court maintained that there was full disclosure of Craig's retirement benefits, discussion of retirement, notice of the retirement, and that the retirement was considered in determining the length of alimony, the court found that Craig's retirement benefits were omitted from the divorce decree because of a mutual mistake by the parties. The district court further determined that the four-year residual statute of limitations for civil actions did not apply. The court divided Craig's retirement benefits in accordance with a fractional formula under United States Code, Title 5, § 8445 (2012).

This appeal followed.¹ This court has stayed enforcement of the partition pending resolution of this matter.

DISCUSSION

“This court reviews district court decisions concerning divorce proceedings for an abuse of discretion.” Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1998). District court rulings supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Devries v. Gallio, 128 Nev. ––––, ––––, 290 P.3d 260, 263 (2012). “However, ... the district court must apply the correct legal standard.” Williams v. Waldman, 108 Nev. 466, 471, 836 P.2d 614, 617–18 (1992).

NRS 125.090 requires that family law cases “conform to the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure as nearly as conveniently possible.” NRCP 60(b) places a six-month time limitation on motions for relief from judgment. In Kramer v. Kramer, 96 Nev. 759, 762, 616 P.2d 395, 397 (1980), we held that NRCP 60(b)'s time limitation applied to a motion to modify the property distribution in a divorce decree, where that decree did not reserve continuing jurisdiction. We reasoned that “[i]f the legislature had intended to vest the courts with continuing jurisdiction over property rights, it would have done so expressly, as it did in NRS 125.140(2) concerning child custody and support.” Kramer, 96 Nev. at 762, 616 P.2d at 397. The policy in favor of finality and certainty underlying NRCP 60(b) applies equally, and some might say especially, to a divorce proceeding. Therefore, in accordance with NRS 125.090 and Kramer, we hold that NRCP 60(b)'s time limitation applies to a motion for relief from or modification of a divorce decree.

Relief under NRCP 60(b)

Craig argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Catherine's motion for relief from judgment because her motion was filed more than six months after the divorce decree. Under NRCP 60(b), a motion for relief from judgment for mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be filed not more than six months after entry of final judgment. ² Although Catherine does not specifically argue which, if any, of these bases for relief applies, it would be irrelevant in any case. Where, as here, a motion for relief or modification premised on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud is filed more than six months after final judgment, the motion is untimely and must be denied. See Kramer, 96 Nev. at 761, 616 P.2d at 397.

Craig asserts that we must reverse the district court's ruling if Catherine's motion was untimely and she failed to file an independent action for relief. It is true that, after NRCP 60(b)'s time limitation has expired, Catherine's only means of relief is an independent action for relief on equitable grounds. See Bonnell, 128 Nev. at ––––, 282 P.3d at 715. Yet we do not agree that this procedural issue is dispositive. “ ‘A party is not bound by the label he puts on his papers. A motion may be treated as an independent action or vice versa.’ ” NC–DSH, Inc., v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 652, 218 P.3d 853, 857 (2009) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2868 (2d ed.1995)). Accordingly, we will consider Catherine's motion for relief as if it were an independent action and apply the standards pertinent to such actions.

Equitable relief as an independent action

Relief in equity by independent action may be granted when the claimant meets the traditional requirements of an equitable action, which are more demanding than the requirements of NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3). Bonnell, 128 Nev. at ––––, 282 P.3d at 715. An independent action for relief from a judgmentthat has become final or unreviewable “ ‘[is] available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998)).

Claim preclusion does not bar independent actions for equitable relief because the exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief also justify deviation from the doctrine of claim preclusion. Bonnell, 128 Nev. at ––––, 282 P.3d at 717 (adopting the reasoning of Beggerly that independent actions for relief must meet a demanding standard to...