Dobbins v. Crain Brothers, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 75-99. |
| Citation | 432 F. Supp. 1060 |
| Parties | Chester DOBBINS v. CRAIN BROTHERS, INC. v. PITTSBURGH & LAKE ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Paul L. Hammer, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.
John R. McGinley, Jr., G. Edward Yurcon, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.
The facts of this case are simple. The plaintiff slipped and fell upon ice and snow on the deck of the defendant's barge sustaining serious injuries. However, careful consideration of the legal issues arising from this injury leads the court to agree with Judge Friendly's observation that admiralty law constitutes a "wonderland"1 and with the observation of Judge Teitelbaum of this court that this area of the law is riddled with a "byzantine maze of exceptions and fine distinctions".2 The court initially notes that most of the discussion in this opinion will not apply to accidents occurring after the effective date of the 1972 amendments to the longshoreman's and harbor workers compensation act which eliminated the doctrines of unseaworthiness and indemnity in admiralty cases. (33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. as amended 1972).
The plaintiff in this case was an employee of the third party defendant, the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company (hereinafter R&LE). The P&LE was under contract with the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company to unload coal at the Colonna dock, in the Ohio River near Monaco, Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
At about 7:30 a. m. on February 6, 1972, the plaintiff, a member of the P&LE's labor crew, was instructed by a superior to round two barges at the Colonna dock. "Rounding" is a process of manually shifting the positions of barges by letting the current take them around. It had been snowing since early that morning and several inches of snow had accumulated on the deck of the barge. Mr. Dobbins slipped and fell on the "gunnel" while in the process of rounding the barges.
On January 18, 1974, plaintiff filed suit against P&LE under the Jones Act at Civil Action Number 74-50 in this court. This lawsuit was settled on January 20, 1975, for $85,000. The release signed by the plaintiff and the P&LE is appended hereto as Appendix A and its effect will be discussed at length in parts one and two of this opinion, infra.
The present, the second lawsuit, was filed by the plaintiff on January 21, 1975, on the basis of unseaworthiness and the Jones Act. On May 13, 1975, a third party claim was filed against the P&LE by Crain Brothers seeking indemnification and/or contribution.
A four-day jury trial was held on plaintiff's second lawsuit on May 10 through 13, 1976. The court directed a verdict for Crain Brothers on the Jones Act issue because the record disclosed no evidence that the plaintiff was an employee of Crain Brothers. The rest of the case was submitted to the jury on the basis of a special verdict and the jury's findings have been appended hereto as Appendix B.
On May 14, 1976, in accordance with the verdict a judgment order was entered against the defendant in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $240,000. (The $320,000 verdict minus $80,000 for the plaintiff's 25% contributory fault.) Motions for a new trial, for judgment NOV and to amend judgment were subsequently filed by Crain Brothers on May 21, 1976, and a motion to amend judgment as filed by the plaintiff on May 21, 1976. Different counsel now represents Crain Brothers.
The motions require the court to consider ten issues:
(1) Does the settlement of Civil Action No. 74-50 bar the present suit?
(2) If not a bar, should the settlement of Civil Action Number 74-50 offset the recovery in this case? If so, to what extent?
(3) Should the jury's finding that Crain Brothers breached a duty owed to the plaintiff to maintain a seaworthy vessel be upheld?
(4) If the plaintiff can recover against Crain Brothers pursuant to the foregoing questions, is Crain Brothers entitled to contribution from the P&LE?
(5) If the plaintiff can recover against Crain Brothers pursuant to the foregoing questions, is Crain Brothers entitled to indemnity from the P&LE?
(6) If Crain Brothers can recover from P&LE under Question 4 or 5, what is the proper amount of this recovery?
(7) Was the verdict of $320,000 excessive?
(8) Did the court err in admitting evidence of Crain Brothers insurance?
(9) What effect, if any, does the plaintiff's contributory negligence have on his total recovery?
(10) Finally, sorting out the answers to the above questions, what sums of money are due from Crain Brothers to the plaintiff and from the P&LE to Crain Brothers?
(1) Bar by Previous Settlement.
In the case of Leach v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 363 F.Supp. 637 (W.D.Pa.1973), Judge Snyder held that the effect of releases in the field of admiralty law must be governed by federal law. Judge Snyder further held that:
"While there are no Supreme Court cases dealing specifically with the application to seamen, the court has expressed its views on this subject in other types of cases, such as in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 84 S.Ct. 1526, 12 L.Ed.2d 457 (1964), (patent infringement), to the effect that the release of one tortfeasor releases all unless the release expressly reserves the right against the other joint tortfeasor." 363 F.Supp. at 644.
The other major Supreme Court case in this area, other than Aro, discussed by Judge Snyder, is Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1970). In Zenith, the Supreme Court discussed three possible methods of interpreting releases. The "ancient common law rule, which was grounded upon a formalistic doctrine that a release extinguished the cause of action to which it related, was that a release of one joint tortfeasor released all other parties jointly liable, regardless of the intent of the parties." 401 U.S. at 343, 91 S.Ct. at 808, 28 L.Ed.2d at 95. The Supreme Court rejected this rule in Aro finding it to have "been repudiated by statute or decision in many if not most states . . . and by the overwhelming weight of scholarly authority". 377 U.S. at 501, 84 S.Ct. at 1540, 12 L.Ed.2d at 477.
The two more modern approaches are that a release normally extinguishes the underlying cause of action unless the plaintiff expressly reserves his rights against others3 or the viewpoint expressed by Judge Snyder in the Leach case that the intention of the parties governs without any presumptions as to the effect of a release.4 401 U.S. at 343, 91 S.Ct. at 808, 28 L.Ed.2d at 95. The Supreme Court applied the intention of the parties rule in Zenith, 401 U.S. at 345, 91 S.Ct. at 809, 28 L.Ed.2d at 96 to civil antitrust cases. See also the opinion of this court in Baughman v. Cooper Jarrett, 391 F.Supp. 671 (W.D.Pa.1975).
The court has determined, as did Judge Snyder in Leach, that the more modern approach to determining the effect of releases, reflected in Aro and in Zenith, should be applied to admiralty cases. The court notes that injured seamen such as the plaintiff often suffer from a lack of education and may be unaware of their legal rights. Thus, there is even more reason to construe admiralty releases to protect the plaintiffs' rights than there is in the fields of antitrust and patent infringement, where the parties are more likely to possess equal bargaining power. The court also notes that while there are no Third Circuit cases on point, the Fifth Circuit has adhered to the intention of the parties' rule in construing admiralty releases in Billiot v. Stewart Seacraft, Inc., 382 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1967).
The terms of the release in Civil Action No. 74-50, appended hereto as Appendix A, clearly preserved the plaintiff's right to sue Crain Brothers. Thus, under either of the modern tests, discussed in Zenith, supra, the present suit should proceed in spite of the settlement of Civil Action 74-50. In addition, the right to sue Crain Brothers was discussed at the settlement hearing.5 The intention of the parties on this point is therefore crystal clear, will be respected by the court and the defendant's motion for judgment on this ground denied.
(2) Set Off of Prior Settlement.
A corollary to the two modern viewpoints about the effect of releases, discussed in Zenith, supra is that the plaintiff cannot receive a double recovery for the same injuries even if he is permitted to maintain more than one lawsuit. In the Aro case, the Supreme Court stated that:
In Zenith, the Supreme Court stated the rule to be that:
"It is settled that, entirely apart from any release, a plaintiff who has recovered any item of damage from one coconspirator may not again recover the same item from another conspirator; the law, that is, does not permit a plaintiff to recover double payment." 401 U.S. at 348, 91 S.Ct. at 811, 28 L.Ed.2d at 97.
The release, see underlined portion in Appendix A, discusses the matter of a set off in the suit against Crain Brothers but the intent of the parties as to its amount is ambiguous. The court interprets this portion of the release to mean that the parties intended for there to be an offset and listed two possible tests of the amount — either the amount of consideration, $85,000, or P&LE's pro rata share of any recovery against Crain Brothers under a joint tortfeasor theory.
In Parts 4 and 5 of this memorandum, infra, the court determines that P&LE is liable to Crain Brothers for ¾ of the total verdict. The two standards outlined in the release thus lead to different results under...
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Dobbins v. Crain Bros., Inc., s. 77-1213
...He fell on ice and snow which had accumulated on the deck of the barge, and was injured. See the district court's opinion, 432 F.Supp. 1060 (W.D.Pa.1976). II. Dobbins thereafter collected $560 in Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' compensation from PLE. He then filed suit against PLE in the......