Doberrentz v. Gregory
| Decision Date | 08 May 1942 |
| Citation | 129 Conn. 57,26 A.2d 475 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | DOBERRENTZ v. GREGORY et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Edwin C. Dickenson, Judge.
Action by Bertha Doberrentz against Edwin Gregory and others to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by the defendant, John Gregory. From a judgment for plaintiff against the defendant John Gregory only, he appeals.
No error.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.
Arthur T. Keefe, of New London, and L. Horatio Biglow, of Deep River, for appellant John Gregory.
Charles V. James, of Norwich (Morris H. Broder, of Colchester, and Arthur M. Brown, of Norwich, on the brief), for appellee.
On the evening of January 12, 1940, the plaintiff upon the invitation of John Gregory, herein referred to as the defendant, accompanied him in a Chevrolet coupe, which he had borrowed from his brother, on a trip from Colchester to Norwich. It snowed while they were there and when they were about to start back it was raining and freezing. As a result the highway was in a slippery condition which the plaintiff observed, and she entered the car knowing the hazardous and dangerous condition of the road they were to travel and that the conditions were getting worse. Before she got in, however, the defendant assured her that the conditions were all right for travel, and after they had started he told her that he could handle the car all right and not to worry. The plaintiff, who could only see out through the part of the windshield cleared by the single wiper in front of the defendant driver, observed that it was sleeting and that other cars were going along all right. The defendant again assured her that the road conditions were all right and that she had no need to worry. She believed this and relied upon it and, being unfamiliar with the operation of motor vehicles, left the operation of the car entirely to him and dozed off, resting her head on the back of the seat. As the defendant drove toward Colchester he proceeded northerly around several sharp curves just before he came to a point in front of the Samuel Huntington School in Norwich Town. He was driving along a part of West Town Street where state highway reflector signs indicated thirty miles per hour as the maximum speed for vehicles going in that direction. He was familiar with the road. This portion of the highway is macadam with a four-inch crown and at the time was covered with snow and ice, with the conditions rapidly becoming more hazardous, all of which the defendant knew and appreciated. He drove over this stretch of highway at the rate of about thirty-five miles per hour and just before reaching a point in front of the school applied his brakes for the purpose of checking his speed, causing the car to skid into a telephone pole on the southwesterly edge of the road. Serious injuries resulted to the plaintiff who was asleep and oblivious of the operation of the car immediately preceding the collision. The defendant applied his brakes so that he might have the car under better control due to the increasingly hazardous conditions. Before applying them he had throttled down the motor, and when he felt the car slipping sideways he immediately released the brakes and tried to control its speed and course to prevent the collision, but was unable to do so. The brakes and tires were in good condition.
The court found these material facts, and concluded that: (1) the defendant was proceeding at an unreasonable rate of speed, in view of the circumstances, which required him to brake his car at the time and place when a skid might be expected, and he was operating the car in a way to endanger the life and limb of the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's negligent operation of the car was the sole and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; (3) the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence and assumed no risk of the injuries received. The defendant has assigned error in each of these conclusions.
The court's determination that the defendant was negligent in the manner stated in its first conclusion is amply warranted by the facts found. It is manifest that the court could properly find as it did in deciding the question of fact whether, in view of the speed limit signs, the...
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Howard I. Huestis, Admr. Estate of Rojeanne R. Huestis v. Estate of Horace J. Lapham
... ... risk of traveling in the course taken within the rule above ... set forth. This is well illustrated in Doberrentz v ... Gregory, 129 Conn. 57, 26 A.2d 475. Nor does the ... record, taken most favorably to the plaintiff, show, as ... claimed by the defendant, ... ...
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Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman
...So. 674, it was said where the road was slippery the duty to keep the vehicle under control was even greater. Also in Doberrentz v. Gregory, 129 Conn. 57, 26 A.2d 475, where defendant was driving at a speed of 35 miles per hour over a road covered with ice and snow and skidded, a finding th......
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Huestis v. Lapham's Estate., 78.
...that she assumed the risk of traveling in the course taken within the rule above set forth. This is well illustrated in Doberrentz v. Gregory, 129 Conn. 57, 26 A.2d 475. Nor does the record, taken most favorably to the plaintiff, show, as claimed by the defendant, an opportunity for Mrs. Hu......
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Zullo v. Zullo
...v. Somers Motor Lines, Inc., 134 Conn. 35, 41, 54 A.2d 592; Stein v. Nashner, 129 Conn. 317, 320, 27 A.2d 801; Doberrentz v. Gregory, 129 Conn. 57, 61, 26 A.2d 475; Freedman v. Hurwitz, In his appeal from the judgment the defendant assigns error in one ruling on evidence and in the finding.......