Dobry v. Lucero
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-00598-JCH-LF |
| Decision Date | 01 November 2023 |
| Parties | BRIAN L. DOBRY Plaintiff, v. ALISHA TAFOYA LUCERO, and MICHAEL CHAVEZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on defendants Alisha Tafoya Lucero and Michael Chavez's Motion to Dismiss, filed April 13, 2023. Doc. 17.[1] Plaintiff Brian L. Dobry did not file a response. Accordingly, defendants filed a notice of completion of briefing on September 13, 2023. Doc. 19. District Judge Judith C. Herrera referred this case to me “to conduct hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to perform any legal analysis required to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case.” Doc. 12. Having read the motion and the relevant law, the Court finds that the motion is well taken and recommends that the Court GRANT it.
On June 21, 2018, Mr. Dobry pled guilty to two counts of battery on a household member. Doc. 10 at 1, 3. In New Mexico, whoever commits battery against a household member is guilty of a misdemeanor. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-15(B) (1978). That same day, Sierra County Magistrate Court Judge Alan Brown sentenced Mr. Dobry to serve 364 days in a New Mexico state prison. Doc. 10 at 1-4. Mr. Dobry was transported to the Central New Mexico Correctional Facility. Id. at 8-9, 11. On June 22, 2018, during the booking process, intake officer Michael Chavez took a DNA sample from Mr. Dobry. Id. at 1, 14. In taking the DNA sample Officer Chavez violated the New Mexico DNA Identification Act because Mr. Dobry was not a “covered offender.”[3] Id. at 1. Mr. Dobry's DNA was then entered into a statewide database. Id.
On June 29, 2021, Mr. Dobry initiated this lawsuit alleging a violation of his civil rights “by unlawfully taking his DNA.” Doc. 1 at 1. This Court ordered Mr. Dobry to cure certain deficiencies in his complaint. Doc. 3. Mr. Dobry filed an amended complaint on July 27, 2021.
Doc. 4. On May 10, 2022, Judge Herrera dismissed Mr. Dobry's amended complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim and granted Mr. Dobry leave to file a second amended complaint. Doc. 6.
Mr. Dobry filed his second amended complaint on July 15, 2022. Doc. 10. In his second amended complaint, Mr. Dobry alleges that the New Mexico Department of Corrections violated his Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches and seizures and defamed his character. Id. He alleges that he suffered stress, anguish, PTSD, and flashbacks, and he seeks both punitive and compensatory damages. Id. Mr. Dobry brings claims under federal law for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and under New Mexico tort law for defamation.
Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Dobry's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 18 at 4. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible when the complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1282 (10th Cir. 2019). However, a Court must “disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining[ ] factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain “more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, if factual allegations in a complaint are “so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191 (internal citation and quotations omitted). “The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted).
The Court will liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's pleadings. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Thus, if the Court “can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Id. The Court will not, however, “assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Id.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is generally decided on the face of the pleadings themselves, and consideration of matters outside the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2005). However, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that “facts subject to judicial notice may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Tal, 453 F.3d at 1264-65 n.24. “This includes another court's publicly filed records ‘concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.'” Hodgson v. Farmington City, 675 Fed.Appx. 838, 840-41 (10th Cir. 2017); see also Hernandez, 499 F.Supp.3d at 1046 ().
II. Discussion
The defendants contend that Mr. Dobry's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant. Fernandez v. Clean House, LLC, 883 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2018). Typically, the parties must develop the facts that support dismissing a case based on the statute of limitations. Id. “But a statute of limitations defense may be appropriately resolved on a Rule 12(b) motion when the dates given in the complaint make clear that the right sued upon has been extinguished.” Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Furthermore, “if the dates on which the pertinent acts occurred are not in dispute, then the date a statute of limitations accrues is a question of law suitable for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” Id.
A plaintiff cannot sue for damages directly pursuant to the articles and amendments of the U.S. Constitution, but instead must bring any claim for damages based on a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is the exclusive vehicle for vindication of substantive rights under the U.S. Constitution. May v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Dona Ana County, 426 F.Supp.3d 1013, 1017-18 (D.N.M. 2019) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but merely provides the mechanism for the enforcement of existing constitutional and federal statutory rights. Nelson v. Geringer, 295 F.3d 1082, 1097 (10th Cir. 2002). To assert a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) a violation of rights protected by the federal Constitution or created by a federal statute or regulation, (2) that was proximately caused (3) by the conduct of a “person” (4) who acted under color of any state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 2002).
“Congress did not provide a statute of limitations for actions brought under § 1983.” Herrera, 32 F.4th at 989. The statute of limitations for claims under § 1983 “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Id. New Mexico provides for a three-year limitations period for claims for personal injuries. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978). Accordingly, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is three years. Herrera, 32 F.4th at 989.
“Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations period, federal law governs the particular point in time at which a claim accrues.” Kripp v. Luton, 466 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006). “A civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998). In other words, § 1983 ...
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