Dobson v. Ford Motor Co.
| Docket Number | 1:22-CV-03190 |
| Decision Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Parties | MELINDA DOBSON, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 29] (“Motion”). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff Melinda Dobson (“Plaintiff” or “Dobson”) is a Black woman who was employed by Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford” or “Defendant”) from 1995 through July 2022. Complaint [ECF No. 1] at ¶¶ 5, 8. Plaintiff alleges she was “a competent and dedicated worker” who was “on track for promotion to Quality Manager or a Final Chassis Manager.” [Id. ] at ¶¶ 9-10.
In September 2019, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant alleging racial and gender discrimination and retaliation. [Id. ] at ¶ 11. The parties entered into a confidential Settlement Agreement on April 1, 2021 (“Settlement Agreement”). [Id. ] at ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges the settlement included Defendant's agreement “to resolve any disputes that could exist between it and Plaintiff”' and “that any claims Ford had against Dobson would not survive the settlement agreement.” [Id. ] She alleges she relied on “Ford's agreement and promises” in dismissing her 2019 lawsuit. [Id. ] at ¶ 25.
Following the settlement, Plaintiff continued her employment with Ford as Government Regulations Coordinator. [Id. ] at ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of her leadership, Ford's Chicago Assembly Plant passed an ISO audit in Oct. 2021. [Id. ] at ¶ 14. Plaintiff also received a “Top Achiever” ranking in her January 2022 performance review. [Id. ] at ¶ 15; Answer [ECF No. 18] at ¶ 15. As of the beginning of 2022, Plaintiff would have been eligible for full retirement (as opposed to partial retirement) from Ford in three years, when she reached thirty years of service. [ECF No. 1] at ¶ 20.
On February 4, 2022, Defendant suspended Plaintiff without pay for four weeks based on “events occurring in the year 2019 and 2020” where Defendant “determined that she ‘violated Company policy'” (Plaintiff refers to this as the “2019 Dispute”). [ECF No. 1] at ¶¶ 16-17. Defendant “admits it suspended Dobson for violating its Standards of Corporate Conduct / Unprofessional Behavior for multiple complaints against Dobson reported from late 2019 through 2020 regarding Dobson's interactions with hourly and salaried coworkers.” [ECF No. 18] at ¶ 17. Plaintiff claims this suspension was in breach of the Settlement Agreement where “Ford contracted away its right to hold the 2019 Dispute against Plaintiff.” [ECF No.1] at ¶ 28]. Defendant entered a notice of discipline related to her suspension in her personnel file which remains active on her record for two years. [Id. ] at ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges this notice prevents her promotion to certain Ford LL5 management positions (and Defendant admits “discipline may impact promotional decisions”). [ECF No. 18] at ¶ 19. As a result of the “mental anguish” Plaintiff suffered from Ford's suspension and other wrongful acts, as well as “Ford's interference with her prospects for promotion,” she retired effective July 1, 2022, three years earlier than she had planned. [ECF No. 1] at ¶¶ 21-23.
Counts I and III of Plaintiff's Complaint allege discrimination based on Plaintiff's race and gender under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. Plaintiff's discrimination claims are based on Ford's breach of the Settlement Agreement and its “promises” to Plaintiff. [ECF No. 1] at ¶¶ 31-32, 35, 44-47, 49-50; see also [id.] at ¶¶ 26, 29. Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached the Settlement Agreement because she is a Black female, any other reason is pretext, and Ford does not similarly “breach the agreements made with its White employees nor hold disputes against them that have been waived.” [Id. ] at ¶¶ 35, 49. The discrimination counts also allege that Plaintiff's February 2022 suspension was “without good cause and for no other reason than because she is a Black female.” [Id. ] at ¶¶ 33, 48. Plaintiff claims Defendant “maintained an impermissibly dual system of discipline in that it imposed more severe disciplinary sanctions on Black employees for minor deviations from the work rules that [sic] it has on other non-Black employees” and its “reprimand procedures and investigations were more harshly carried out against Plaintiff than other White or male employees.” [Id. ] at ¶¶ 4, 27.
Counts II and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint allege retaliation for Plaintiff's protected activity of filing the 2019 discrimination lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The retaliation counts identify as adverse employment actions (1) Ford's breach of the Settlement Agreement [ id. ] at ¶¶ 40, 56, and (2) the February 2022 suspension. [Id. ] at ¶¶ 39-41, 53-55. Plaintiff also alleges that in August 2021, she “warned Ford of the consequence for carrying out this wrongful act” of suspending her for the 2019 and 2020 conduct. [Id. ] at ¶ 24. As a result of Defendant's alleged wrongful conduct, Plaintiff generally claims she lost four weeks of pay and benefits, promotion eligibility, and “was forced to retire early due to Ford cutting her off from future opportunities.” [Id. ] at ¶¶ 36-38, 42, 51, 57.[1]
Count V, for breach of the Settlement Agreement, alleges Defendant promised “any rights or claims it might have against Plaintiff would not survive the settlement agreement” and Defendant breached the Settlement Agreement by suspending Plaintiff in February 2022 based on 2019 and 2020 conduct, thus “failing to relieve her of any liability for anything she did wrong to Ford before the date of the settlement agreement.” [Id. ] at ¶¶ 58, 62. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant violated an “implied covenant of good faith” by abusing its discretion in suspending Plaintiff and making misleading representations. [Id.] at ¶¶ 63-67. Plaintiff also claims Defendant breached the Settlement Agreement by suspending her “without good cause” and “solely because she is a Black woman.” [Id. ] at ¶ 68.
In its Motion, Defendant argues that Count V, for breach of the Settlement Agreement, fails under Illinois law[2]because Defendant did not agree to release or waive any disciplinary action against Plaintiff based on pre-settlement conduct. With respect to Counts I - IV, Defendant argues that these counts fail as a matter of law because they rely on the alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement as the underlying discriminatory and retaliatory conduct.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017). In considering the Motion, the Court must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must take all uncontested allegations to which the parties had an opportunity to respond as true. Flora v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 685 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1982); National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1987). The motion must be based “only on the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 745; see also Northern Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 1998). “[T]he court ‘may take into consideration documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings'. . .” Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991)). “[T]his is a narrow exception aimed at cases interpreting, for example, a contract.” See Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted when it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.” Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2004)). The plaintiff's complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See, e.g., St. John v. Cach, LLC, 822 F.3d 388, 389 (7th Cir. 2016). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Plaintiff did not attach the Settlement Agreement to the Complaint. In support of its Motion, however, Defendant filed a copy of the Settlement Agreement. [ECF No. 31]. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement is referenced throughout Plaintiff's Complaint and is central to her claims. Plaintiff does not object to the Court considering the Settlement Agreement and relies on its terms in her Response. Response [ECF No. 35]. Accordingly, the Court considers the Settlement Agreement in deciding this Motion. See Milwaukee Police Ass'n, 863 F.3d at 640; Levenstein, 164 F.3d at 347.
The Settlement Agreement is, of course, a contract. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss “the meaning of the contract ‘must be determined from the words or language used, and a court cannot place a construction on the contract which is contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of the language.'” INEOS Polymers Inc. v. BASF Catalysts, 553...
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