Doc v. Warden La. State Penitentiary
| Decision Date | 30 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:14-cv-0997 SECTION P |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
| Parties | JAMES STUBBLEFIELD LA. DOC #88977 v. WARDEN LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY |
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 14, 2014 by pro se petitioner James Stubblefield. Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. Petitioner attacks his 2011 conviction for aggravated rape entered by the Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court for St. Landry Parish, Louisiana, for which petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of the court. For the following reasons, it is recommended that this habeas corpus petition be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In 2009, a St. Landry Parish grand jury charged petitioner with the August 18, 1994 aggravated rape of J.S., who at that time was a juvenile. The rape occurred whilethe victim and her brother, also a juvenile at the time, were left alone in an Opelousas hotel room where they were living, while their mother was at work. The perpetrator was permitted by the children to enter the hotel room after telling the children that their mother had sent him to see if they needed anything from the store. The perpetrator then took J.S. into the bathroom and raped her.
Petitioner was found guilty of the aggravated rape of J.S. on March 3, 2011, following a trial by jury. On April 21, 2011, petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On December 7, 2011, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. Petitioner raised the following grounds on direct appeal: (1) Petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 8 into evidence (a drawing showing where cuttings were taken from the victim's pants presented during the testimony of George Schiro); and (2) insufficiency of the evidence. [Doc. 1-3, pg. 2-21 (Appellant's Brief on Appeal); Doc. 1-3, pg. 57-72 through 1-4, pg. 1-3, State of Louisiana v. James Stubblefield, 2011-00579, 2011 WL 6077822, 81 So.3d 1013 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2011)]. The Third Circuit did not reach the merits of petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim under La. C. Crim. P. art. 841(A) and La. C. Ev. art. 103 because counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection at trial based on the Confrontation Clause, but rather objected for failure to lay a proper foundation for introduction of the exhibit, and a new basis for an objection maynot be urged for the first time on appeal. Stubblefield, 2011 WL 6077822 at *9-10.
On December 27, 2011, petitioner filed a writ application in the Louisiana Supreme Court; on April 20, 2012, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs without comment. [Doc. 1-4, pg. 5-23 and pg. 25, State of Louisiana v. James Stubblefield, 2012-KO-0019, 85 So.3d 1267 (La. 2012)].
On February 11, 2013, petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief in the Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, which was denied by the trial court on April 26, 2013. [Doc. 1-4, pg. 27-49, and pg. 51-52]. Petitioner asserted (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel (a) failed to investigate the allegations against petitioner and (b) failed to take a writ based on Confrontation Clause grounds when the court ruled in favor of allowing the testimony of George Schiro regarding a forensic lab report (a drawing showing where cuttings were taken from the victim's pants), and (2) that petitioner was prejudiced by the testimony of Sergeant Kenneth Edwards, a "compromised" police officer. [Id.].
On May 30, 2013, petitioner applied for writs in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit denied writs on August 15, 2013, finding "no error in the trial court's April 26, 2013 ruling", and Judgment was mailed that same date. [Doc. 6, pg. 1, State of Louisiana v. James Stubblefield, KH 13-0621 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2013)].
Petitioner filed an original writ application in the Louisiana Supreme Court which was signed by petitioner on September 12, 2013 and post-marked by the Louisiana StatePenitentiary on September 13, 2013. That writ application, however, did not address any of the claims made be petitioner in the lower courts during post-conviction proceedings. Rather, the writ application improperly presented the claims made by petitioner on direct appeal.
By letter dated October 1, 2013, inmate counsel wrote to the Clerk of the Louisiana Supreme Court advising the Clerk that, in his original writ application, petitioner had "inadvertently addressed the issues which were raised during the course of his direct review. . . ." Accordingly, petitioner enclosed for filing a supplemental writ application, in which he addressed his post-conviction claims.
Because petitioner had only provided this court with a copy of his supplemental writ application [Doc. 1-5, pg. 23-43], which was not timely filed within 30 days after the August 15, 2013 mailing of the Third Circuit's Notice of Judgment, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation finding this federal habeas corpus petition time-barred by the one-year limitation provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). [rec. doc. 7].
However, after receiving the entire record from the Louisiana Supreme Court and discovering of the original timely filed writ application which did not address petitioner's post-conviction claims, the undersigned vacated that Report and Recommendation, reserving the State's right to raise any timeliness, exhaustion and procedural default issues by response herein.
On April 25, 2014, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs without comment. State of Louisiana ex rel. James Stubblefield v. State of Louisiana, 2013-2224, 138 So.3d 637 (La. 2014). [Doc. 1-5, pg. 45].
Petitioner filed the instant petition on May 14, 2014. He asserts the following claims for relief: (1) Petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 8 into evidence (a drawing showing where cuttings were taken from the victim's pants presented during the testimony of George Schiro); (2) insufficiency of the evidence; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel (a) failed to investigate the allegations against petitioner and (b) failed to take a writ based on Confrontation Clause grounds when the court ruled in favor of allowing State Exhibit 8, a drawing showing where cuttings were taken from the victim's pants, into evidence during the testimony of DNA analysis expert George Schiro; and (4) that petitioner was prejudiced by the testimony of Sergeant Kenneth Edwards, a "compromised" police officer. The State has filed an Answer and Memorandum in Opposition to federal habeas corpus relief [rec. doc. 23]. No Reply has been filed by petitioner. This Report and Recommendation follows.
I. Procedural Default
The State contends that petitioner's first claim for relief, that petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the trial court admitted State's Exhibit8 into evidence, is traditionally procedurally defaulted. In light of the above procedural history, the Court agrees. On direct appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal did not reach the merits of petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim. Instead, the Third Circuit expressly relied on the contemporaneous objection rules set forth in La. C. Cr. P. article 841 and La. C. Ev. art. 103 to deny merits review of this claim, because counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection at trial based on the Confrontation Clause, but rather objected for failure to lay a proper foundation for introduction of the exhibit, and a new basis for an objection may not be urged for the first time on appeal. Stubblefield, 2011 WL 6077822 at *9-10. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs without comment. State of Louisiana v. Joseph Thomas Savoie, 992 So.2d 1011 (La. 10/3/2008). Accordingly, the last reasoned decision on petitioner's claims, that of the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal, clearly and expressly relied on these state procedural rules as the basis for its Judgment.1
The scope of federal habeas review is limited by the intertwined doctrines of procedural default and exhaustion. Procedural default exists where (1) a state court clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of a claim on a state procedural rule, and that procedural rule provides an independent and adequate ground for the dismissal,("traditional" procedural default), or (2) the petitioner fails to properly exhaust all available state remedies, and the state court to which he would be required to petition would now find the claims procedurally barred, ("technical" procedural default). In either instance, the petitioner is deemed to have forfeited his federal habeas claim. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 254-55 (5th Cir.1999) citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986) and O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
The "traditional" procedural default doctrine applies to bar federal habeas corpus review when a state court declines to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner failed to follow a state procedural rule. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).
Federal courts typically refuse to reach the merits of questions of federal law if the state courts have expressly relied on an "adequate and independent" state procedural ground in refusing to review the claim. "An 'adequate' rule is one that state courts strictly or regularly follow, and one that is applied evenhandedly to the...
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