Docherty v. Cape May Cnty.
| Decision Date | 29 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-8785 (RMB) |
| Parties | EMILY DOCHERTY, JOSEPH SMALL, JERMAINE MILLS, AND FREDERICK SCHARTNER individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. CAPE MAY COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APPEARANCES:
SURINDER K. AGGARWAL
Law Offices Of Surinder K. Aggarwal
HOBOKEN, NJ 07030
On behalf of Plaintiffs
RICHARD GOLDSTEIN, Esq.
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
Woodland Falls Corporate Park
200 Lake Drive East, Suite 300
On behalf of Defendants Cape May County, Cape May County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Gary Schaffer, and Warden Donald J. Lombardo
This matter comes before the Court upon the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint1 ("Defs' Mot. to Dismiss," ECF No. 42); Plaintiffs' brief in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss ("Pls' Brief," ECF No. 52); Defendants' reply brief ("Defs' Reply", ECF No. 54); and Plaintiff Schartner's Sur-reply. ("Pl's Sur-reply," ECF No. 62.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part, and deny in part, Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff Emily Docherty was an inmate at Cape May County Correctional Center ("CMCCC") at the time she filed this putative class action on December 21, 2015. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶2.) On October 7, 2016, Plaintiffs Emily Docherty, Joseph Small, Jermaine Mills, and Frederick Schartner filed a Second Amended Putative Class Action Complaint against Cape May County, Cape May County Sheriff's Dept., Cape May County Sheriff Gary Schaffer, Warden Donald J. Lombardo, Commissioner Gary M. Lanigan, and unknown Corrections Officers. (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.)
Plaintiffs alleged that overcrowded and unsanitary conditions at Cape May County Correctional Center ("CMCCC") violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of pretrial detainees (Count I) and the Eighth Amendment rights of sentenced inmates (Count II). (Id., ¶¶23-47.) The alleged conditions include, among others, routinely housing over 300 inmates, male and female, in a facility that was built to accommodate 188 inmates; three inmates housed in a two-inmate cell, causing one inmate to sleep on the floor next to the toilet; overflowing toilets and inoperable drains in the showers; insect infestation; black mold and bacteria exposure, causing illness; rainwater entering the cells; and an unsanitary ventilation system, causing respiratory problems. (Id.)
On behalf of female sentenced inmates and pretrial detainees, Plaintiff Emily Docherty alleges inmates are not provided adequate feminine hygiene products or toilet paper, resulting in the inmates being forced to wear dirty clothing until clean laundry is provided (Count III). (Second Am. Compl., ¶¶48-52.)
On behalf of sentenced inmates and pretrial detainees who are Muslims, Plaintiff Jermaine Mills alleges denial of their First Amendment right to practice the essential elements of their religion (Count IV), and denial of their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law (Count V). (Id., ¶54.) The Koran mandates that Jumu'ah, (Friday Prayer) must be held congregationally. (Id., ¶54.) Defendants allegedly forced Muslim inmates to congregate during Jumu'ah in an entrance to the yard near the dog cages. (Id., ¶¶55-56.) Inmates urinate and defecate in the dog cages when they are held there during lockdowns or searches of their cells, and the area is not cleaned. (Id.) Allegedly, no other religious groups are forced to congregate in this area. (Id., ¶58.) There are vacant rooms where Muslims could congregate for Jumu'ah. (Id., ¶59.) Due to the conditions in the area provided, Muslim inmates are unwilling to participate in Jumu'ah as a collective group, as required by the tenets of Islam. (Id., ¶60.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege, Defendants refuse to provide Muslims with study time [Taleem], and no other religious groups are prohibited from studying scripture. (Id., ¶61.)
Plaintiffs allege violations of their right of access to courts due to the unavailability of the grievance procedure in CMCCC. (Id., ¶¶80-85.) If an inmate cannot file a grievance, he or she is unable to challenge the conditions of confinement in court because exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. (Id., ¶84.) Inmates allegedly are prevented from filing grievances in several ways: (1) corrections officers refuse to honor requests for grievance forms; (2) corrections officers tell inmates that issues related to conditions of confinement cannot be grieved; and (3) corrections officers discard request slips for grievances. (Id., ¶¶81-83.)
Plaintiff Frank Schartner alleges a pattern of indifference by Defendants toward Plaintiffs' medical issues and disabilities. (Id., ¶¶63-79.) For example, Schartner is an insulin-dependent diabetic, and a corrections officer refused to allow him to see a medical professional for insulin treatment when requested. (Id., ¶¶64-66.) Defendants refuse to allow inmates with diabetes to test their blood sugar on a regular basis; and they do not provide the diet prescribed by the prison doctors. (Id., ¶76.) Long delays in seeing outside medical specialists are common. (Id., ¶¶69-70.)
Plaintiff Schartner is vision-impaired. (Id., ¶74.) Defendants allegedly do not document that written materials were read aloud or otherwise communicated to vision-impaired inmates. (Id., ¶77.) also, Defendants do not provide a visible means for corrections officers to identify the vision-impaired in the event of an emergency. (Id., ¶78.) On behalf of similarly situated sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees, Plaintiff Schartner alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count VII), and the Rehabilitation Act (Count VIII). (Id., ¶¶112-23.)
All Plaintiffs allege violations of the New Jersey State Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act on behalf of all similarly situated inmates (Count IX), based on their allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. (Id., ¶¶124-26.) Plaintiff Jermaine Mills also alleges violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons (Count X). (Id., ¶¶127-32.) For relief, Plaintiffs seek damages, costs, attorney's fees, injunctive and equitable relief. (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 30 at 26-27.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A plaintiff need only present a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. A complaint must "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219 (3d Cir. 2017)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (alteration in original)).
"'[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible if the factual content "'allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. Courts assessing the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) should first determine the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, and second identify allegations that are no more than conclusions, which are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 220 (quoting Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). Third, courts should assume well-pleaded factual allegations are true and "then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'" Id.
Defendants contend the Court must dismiss the Second Amended Complaint because the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires Plaintiffs to exhaust any claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 before filing suit in federal court. Defendants assert "there are no references in the Second Amended Complaint to show that exhaustion of the administrative remedies afforded to pretrial detainees could not have been utilized or would have been an exercise in futility." (Id. at 13.) They acknowledge Plaintiffs alleged that corrections officers hindered their efforts to file grievances, but they contend the allegations were not specific enough. (Id.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and they are not required to demonstrate exhaustion in their complaint. (Pls' Brief, ECF No. 52 at 11.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend they pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that no remedies were available for them to exhaust. (Id. at 12.)
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
"[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and [] inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies.
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