Dockery v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., No. 4D00-2512.

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: TAYLOR, J.
• Citation: 796 So.2d 593
• Decision Date: 12 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 4D00-2512.
• Parties: David DOCKERY, Appellant, v. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellee.

796 So.2d 593

David DOCKERY, Appellant,
v.
ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellee

No. 4D00-2512.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

September 12, 2001.

Rehearing Denied October 25, 2001.

796 So.2d 594

Randall W. Henley of Randall W. Henley, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant

Esther E. Galicia and Jennifer P. Huber of George, Hartz, Lundeen & Fulmer, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

TAYLOR, J.

The plaintiff below sued Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company (Enterprise) for injuries resulting from an accident involving a vehicle owned by Enterprise. The trial court directed a verdict for Enterprise, because no evidence was available to show

796 So.2d 595

how the driver obtained possession of the rented vehicle. The issue we address in this appeal is who, under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, has the burden of proving that the rented vehicle was stolen or converted before the accident, once the plaintiff has established the owner's initial consent through its rental agreement. Based on Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959), we conclude that the owner has the burden of showing that "a species of conversion or theft" of the vehicle occurred in order to avoid liability for the accident. Because no proof was presented in this case to show that the vehicle was converted or stolen after the owner rented the vehicle, we reverse the directed verdict entered in favor of the rental company

On August 8, 1997, David Dockery, the plaintiff below, was riding his bicycle in the crosswalk at the intersection of Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard and Sapodilla in West Palm Beach, Florida when he was struck by a vehicle operated by George Anthony Brown (Brown). The vehicle was owned by Enterprise and had been rented to Barlington Blye (Blye) earlier on the day of the accident. The Enterprise rental agreement provided that Blye was the only authorized driver and that no other drivers were to use the vehicle without Enterprise's approval.

The plaintiff sued Enterprise and the driver, Brown, for injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of the accident.¹ At trial, the parties stipulated to the following: (1) Enterprise rented the subject vehicle to Barlington Blye; (2) George Brown was driving the vehicle that struck appellant; and (3) there was no evidence from either side as to how Brown obtained the Enterprise vehicle.²

After jury selection, the parties requested the trial court to determine the plaintiffs burden of proof under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Plaintiff argued that, although he was required to show consent from the owner, Enterprise, to the renter, he did not have to show consent from the renter of the vehicle to the driver. He contended that once he proved consent from Enterprise to the renter, Enterprise had to prove that the driver stole or converted the vehicle to escape liability.

Enterprise argued that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the driver had consent of the owner under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine; hence, the plaintiff had to prove not only that Enterprise consented to the renter's use of the vehicle but also that the renter gave consent to the driver. In support of this position, Enterprise pointed out that Florida Standard Jury Instruction 3.3 requires the jury to determine whether the driver, Brown, was operating the Enterprise vehicle at the time of the accident with Enterprise's express or implied consent.³ Because the

796 So.2d 596

plaintiff was unable to present any evidence as to how Brown obtained the vehicle, Enterprise argued that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of consent and, thus, the burden would not shift to Enterprise to prove that the vehicle was stolen or converted. The trial court agreed that the plaintiff could not show that the driver was operating the rented vehicle with consent "simply by showing that the rental car company rented to someone" and granted a directed verdict for Enterprise

Under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle is liable to third persons for injuries caused by the negligent operation or use of the motor vehicle by the person to whom the owner entrusted the vehicle. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 637 (1920). The doctrine is based upon the view that motor vehicles are dangerous instrumentalities when operated upon the public highways; consequently, the owners of motor vehicles are obligated to ensure that their vehicles are properly operated when on the public highway under their authority. See Barth v. Miami, 146 Fla. 542, 1 So.2d 574 (1941). Since adopting the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in 1920, Florida courts have repeatedly applied the doctrine, with very few exceptions.⁴ Recently, the Florida Supreme Court re-affirmed the important public policies underlying its adoption. See Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000)(quoting Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla.1990)). As Justice Grimes wrote in Kraemer:

The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent operation. If Florida's traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its adoption in 1920, there is all the more reasons for its application to today's high-speed travel upon crowded highways.

572 So.2d at 1365.

As explained above, liability attaches to the owner of a motor vehicle for damages caused by the vehicle's negligent operation because the owner who gives authority to another to operate the owner's vehicle, by either express or implied consent, has a nondelegable obligation to ensure that the vehicle is operated safely. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.1993). Public policy favors holding the owner liable, since the owner has the capacity to protect the safety of the public by not relinquishing control of his vehicle to another person. See Union Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Troxtell, 445 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Because the basis for holding the owner liable for damages is the owner's knowledge and consent in "entrusting the automobile to another," knowledge and consent of the owner are essential elements in establishing the owner's liability and must be proven before the owner can be held liable for damages proximately caused by the negligent driver. See Pearson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 187 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); see also Slitkin v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 382 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

796 So.2d 597

The plaintiff agreed that he had to prove the owner's consent in order to hold the owner vicariously liable, but, relying on Susco, he urged the trial court to find that he satisfied this burden of proof by showing Enterprise's initial consent to the renter's use of the vehicle. After showing Enterprise's original consent, he argued, the burden shifted to Enterprise to prove that a theft or conversion of the vehicle occurred before the accident.

The Florida Supreme Court broadly defined the "owner's consent" under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Susco. The court emphasized that, "while the rule governing liability of an owner of a dangerous agency who permits it to be used by another is based on consent, the essential authority or consent is simply consent to the use or operation of such an instrumentality beyond his own immediate control." Susco, 112 So.2d at 837. The court explained that "when control of [a rental automobile] is voluntarily relinquished to another only a breach of custody amounting to a specie of conversion or theft will relieve an owner of responsibility for its use or misuse." Id. Thus, for an owner to escape liability after putting a car in circulation, it must be shown that a breach of custody occurred which "deprived the owner of the incidents of ownership." Id.

In Susco, an individual named Salicetti rented an automobile from Susco Car Rental System of Florida, Inc. Under the rental contract, Salicetti agreed that no one other than himself would drive the automobile without the express consent of the rental agency. The automobile was involved in an accident while being driven by someone other than Salicetti. The issue before the Susco court was whether the rental agreement prohibiting additional drivers relieved the rental company of liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The court held that it did not. It determined that even though the rental company did not actually "consent" to the negligent driver's operation of its vehicle, it did voluntarily relinquish control of the automobile to...