Doctor v. State
| Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A01–1507–CR–844.,82A01–1507–CR–844. |
| Citation | 57 N.E.3d 846 |
| Parties | Clayton DOCTOR, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Mark K. Phillips, Boonville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jesse R. Drum, Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
[1] Appellant–Defendant, Clayton Doctor (Doctor), appeals the trial court's Order denying Doctor's motion to suppress the evidence seized during a traffic stop.
[2] We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
[3] Doctor presents one issue on interlocutory appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the course of a traffic stop.
[4] The State raises one issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether Doctor's interlocutory appeal should be dismissed because he did not timely file his Notice of Appeal.
[5] In February of 2014, Detective Cliff Simpson (Detective Simpson), a police officer with the Evansville Police Department's narcotics unit and “a federally deputized” officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration task force, received incriminating information about Doctor from an individual in federal custody. (Tr. p. 5). The source revealed to Detective Simpson that he had traveled to Dallas, Texas, with Doctor, where Doctor had “a hydraulic trap” installed “in the area of the front passenger's side compartment, airbag compartment” of a black Acura sedan. (Tr. p. 7). Then, in March of 2014, Detective Simpson received information from another confidential informant that Doctor was transporting large quantities of cocaine from Atlanta, Georgia, to Evansville, Vanderburgh County, Indiana, for distribution. As part of his investigation into Doctor, Detective Simpson located the black Acura and applied to the United States District Court in the Southern District of Indiana to place a GPS tracking device on the vehicle. On May 14, 2014, Detective Simpson's request was granted, and he placed the tracker on the underside of the Acura. On June 19, 2014, upon Detective Simpson's application, the federal district court approved a forty-five-day extension to continue monitoring Doctor's vehicle via GPS.
[6] On June 24, 2014, the GPS device indicated that the Acura had been driven to Atlanta. For five days, the vehicle remained in Atlanta. On June 29, 2014, it appeared from the GPS unit that the Acura was leaving Atlanta and heading north. Believing that Doctor was returning to Indiana, Detective Simpson and several other officers set up surveillance points along the Pennyrile Parkway and U.S. 41 in Kentucky and southern Indiana. Detective Simpson was stationed at the Double Dukes Bar in Henderson, Kentucky, and at approximately 11:00 p.m., he identified Doctor's Acura driving by. Detective Simpson observed that the Acura, which was driving “maybe [thirty] miles an hour” at the time, “had dark tinted windows,” and he “was unable to tell how many occupants were in the vehicle or who was driving the vehicle.” (Tr. pp. 11, 26). Detective Simpson radioed to Officer Aaron Fair (Officer Fair) of the Evansville Police Department, who was stationed in Evansville in a marked police vehicle, and advised that the Acura was approaching and that its windows were tinted too dark to identify the occupants. Once the Acura crossed the state line into Evansville, Officer Fair initiated a traffic stop based on a window tint violation.
[7] Officer Fair approached the vehicle and gathered information from the driver, who was identified as Doctor. Officer Fair subsequently returned to his vehicle to “conduct[ ] his normal business” for processing a traffic stop. (Tr. p. 47). Approximately “[a] minute” after Officer Fair initiated the stop, Motor Patrol Officer Fenny Reed (Officer Reed) and his K–9 partner, Willy (K–9 Willy), arrived on the scene. (Tr. p. 41). Officer Reed first observed the vehicle's window tint, noting that “[t]he occupants in the vehicle were not easily identifiable.” (Tr. p. 41). As Officer Fair was seated in his squad car, Officer Reed approached the driver-side window of the Acura and learned that there was a passenger in the vehicle, identified as Jamal Grayson (Grayson). Officer Reed walked over to the passenger-side window and spoke with Grayson. During his conversation with Grayson, Officer Reed noticed “multiple air freshener[ ]s inside the vents, all of the vents in the vehicle, ... multiple cell phones, ... a prepaid phone card, ... a hard travel appearance to the vehicle with multiple energy drinks and/or food wrappers strung throughout the vehicle.” (Tr. pp. 43–44). Based on his observations, Officer Reed requested Doctor's consent to search the vehicle. Doctor responded that the vehicle did not belong to him.1 After explaining to Doctor “that he was in control of the vehicle,” Officer Reed again asked for consent to search the vehicle, and Doctor refused. (Tr. pp. 46–47).
[8] At this point, approximately five or six minutes into the traffic stop, Officer Reed “decided to deploy K–9 Willy to the free air space” around the vehicle. (Tr. p. 47). Prior to Officer Reed even commanding K–9 Willy to “dope seek,” K–9 Willy “stopped to investigate” alongside the driver's door. (Tr. p. 48). K–9 Willy “stood on his hindquarters[ ] [and] tried to jump inside that driver's window.” (Tr. p. 48). Officer Reed “noticed a demeanor change in [K–9] Willy such as his breathing rate, his nose popping, his tail set changing, those are things that are indicative of K–9 Willy being in narcotic odor.” (Tr. p. 48). Officer Reed directed K–9 Willy to the front of the vehicle, near the passenger-side headlight, and gave him the “dope seek” command. (Tr. p. 49). The duo worked counter-clockwise around the vehicle, and K–9 Willy again stopped at the driver-side door and changed his demeanor to indicate the scent of narcotics. When they reached the passenger-side window, K–9 Willy, once again, rose up on his hindquarters with his nose up in the air and started scratching at the door. (Tr. p. 49). Officer Reed then “deployed [K–9] Willy to the interior of the vehicle.” (Tr. p. 50). K–9 Willy climbed over all the seats before providing “an indication on the floorboard of the passenger's seat, like a final indication where he's staring at and scratching at.” (Tr. p. 50). When redirected to the dashboard area, K–9 Willy nosed through the glovebox, which had been opened, and scratched at the passenger's seat, which indicated to Officer Reed that he was “smelling drugs.” (Tr. p. 51).
[9] As Officer Reed returned K–9 Willy to his patrol vehicle, he stopped by Officer Fair's vehicle to inform Officer Fair that K–9 Willy had indicated the presence of narcotics. Officer Fair advised that he was writing out a warning citation for Doctor's window tint violation. K–9 Willy's indications were relayed to Detective Simpson, who applied for and obtained a warrant to search Doctor's vehicle. The Acura was transported to a crime scene garage so that the search could be conducted in a better-lit and less hazardous environment than alongside a highway. The search revealed a hydraulic trap (i.e., a “hidden compartment”) “in the front passenger's side airbag.” (Tr. p. 14). After breaching the trap, the officers discovered “two heat sealed bags containing a white powdery substance,” both of which “field tested positive for cocaine.” (Tr. pp. 14–15).
[10] On July 1, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Doctor with Count 1, dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, Ind.Code § 35–48–4–1(a)(2)(C), (b)(1) (2013) ; and Count II, conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, I.C. §§ 35–48–4–1(a)(2), (b)(1) ; –41–5–2 (2013). On November 12, 2014, Doctor filed a motion to suppress (Appellant's App. p. 16). Doctor argued that “[t]he traffic stop exceeded the parameters set forth in Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ]; ... the basis for making the traffic stop was pretextual; ... [t]he search warrant obtained in his cause was not based on probable cause; and ... [Doctor] was not advised of his constitutional rights.” (Appellant's App. p. 16). On June 4, 2015, the trial court issued its Order, denying Doctor's motion to suppress except to the extent “that any statements made by [Doctor] while in custody prior to the advisement of Miranda warnings and in response to interrogation are suppressed.” (Appellant's App. p. 12).
[11] On July 1, 2015, Doctor filed a motion to certify the trial court's Order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted the same day. On July 31, 2015, our court accepted jurisdiction over this appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[12] On February 23, 2016, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, claiming that Doctor's September 30, 2015 Notice of Appeal was filed after the deadline. On March 2, 2016, Doctor filed his response to the State's motion for dismissal. Doctor argued that his Notice of Appeal was timely ” (Appellant's Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal p. 1). Doctor contended that on September 30, 2015, his attorney communicated with the clerk's office “and was advised to file another Notice of Appeal[,]” which he did the same day. (Appellant's Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal p. 1). On March 17, 2016, having reviewed the matter, our court's motions panel denied the State's motion to dismiss.
[13] On cross-appeal, the State now claims that Doctor's appeal should be dismissed because he did not timely file a Notice of...
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