Dodd v. Una
Decision Date | 30 November 1885 |
Citation | 5 A. 155,40 N.J.E. 672 |
Parties | DODD v. UNA and others. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Appeal from order advised by Vice-chancellor Van Fleet. See Una v. Dodd, 39 N. J. Eq. 173.
The Newark Savings Institution was incorporated by act of the legislature approved February 25, 1847, providing as follows:
A supplement enacted that "the said corporation, in addition to the power of investing money in public stock, given in the seventh section of the act to which this is a supplement, may invest money in the public stocks of the states of New York, Ohio, Kentucky, and Massachusetts, authorized by the respective laws of said states, and also in the stocks of the city of Newark, in this state, and of the cities of New York and Brooklyn, in the state of New York, authorized by the laws of said states, respectively." Act March 5, 1850, § 2.
Another supplement, approved February 9, 1859, repealed so much of the sixth section of the act as prohibited compensation to managers for actual services, and gave power to invest in the stocks and bonds of states, and in the bonds of counties and cities, and to make temporary loans on personal securities, with collateral securities.
By-laws regulating the mode by which depositors could demand and withdraw deposits, and providing that no deposit should be withdrawn at any time without three months' notice to the institution, and that each depositor was required to subscribe the by-laws, and signify an assent thereto, were adopted.
On December 12, 1877, the bank presented a petition to the chancellor alleging its incorporation, and the powers conferred and duties imposed thereby; that it had organized in 1847, received and invested deposits to a very large amount, and, at one time, accumulated a large surplus; that its managers had invested between $2,000,000 and $3,000,000 in railroad bonds, and loans secured thereby; that from 1873 the assets had so depreciated that the question whether any of the surplus would remain would depend on the ultimate value of its railroad securities, and its ability to realize on mortgages affected by a fall in the value of real estate; that deposits had been largely withdrawn, and increasing withdrawals were expected unless the 90-day notice clause of the by-laws should be enforced; that its enforcement would work greater distrust, and impair, if not wholly destroy, its usefulness; that although it had available securities, from the proceeds of which such withdrawn deposits could be paid for a long time, its managers were advised and believed that they could not allow such a course to be pursued without violating their duties; that they believed that, by a careful management of their trust under the direction of the court, the existence and usefulness of the institution could be maintained, and its depositors secured from ultimate loss; that they regarded the institution as an incorporated agency for receiving and loaning money intrusted to it, and themselves as trustees of the depositors; that the assets on hand at any time were the property of depositors, in proportion to their deposits, each depositor's right being diminished by losses or increased by gains in investments; that they were unwilling to proceed in the execution of their trust without the direction of the court of chancery, being satisfied that, without such direction, they could not maintain the institution in public confidence, or secure absolute equality among the owners of its assets; and praying as follows: "(1) That an order may be made requiring that only such dividends shall be paid to depositors on the first day of January next as shall be authorized by the order of the court; (2) that an order may be made restraining the institution from paying to any depositor and any depositor from demanding, more than eighteen per cent. of his deposit until the further order of the court, which amount may be required and paid at any time thereafter on demand; (3) that this institution be required, by the order of the court, to abstain from disposing of any of its assets beyond the said eighteen per cent., except with the approval of the court, or some master to be designated for that purpose; (4) that an order may be made permitting the said institution to provide that all deposits hereafter made, and until further order of the court, shall be treated as special deposits, and invested only in the bonds of this state or city of Newark, or of the United States, and that separate accounts thereof be kept, and the actual interest received from such investments, deducting necessary expenses, be paid as dividends on such deposits, and that such deposits shall not be subject to any restrictions as to payment except such as are imposed by the by-laws heretofore adopted; (5) that the future administration of the said trust shall be under the control of the court so long as shall be deemed necessary to promote the interests and insure the permanency and prosperity of the institution; (6) that concurrently therewith this honorable court will cause such examination to be made into the affairs of said institution, and the situation and nature of its assets, as your honor may deem necessary as a basis for the future action of the court."
The petition was sworn to by appellant, and the following was signed by the managers: "We, the undersigned, managers of the Newark Savings Institution, hereby signify our concurrence in the above petition, and request its immediate presentation to the chancellor."
The court made the following order:
On June 12, 1880, a further order permitting a portion of investments on mortgages of real estate was passed. On June 10, 1884, a petition was presented to the court of chancery, by William Una and others, respondents herein, representing that they were...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Board of Revenue of Covington County v. Merrill
... ... Sawyer, 124 U.S. 222, 8 Sup.Ct. 482, 31 L.Ed. 402; ... In re Terry, 128 U.S. 305, 9 Sup.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed ... 405; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 861; State ... v. Voorhies, 37 La.Ann. 605; Ex parte Hollis, 59 Cal ... 406; Ex parte Brown, 97 Cal. 83, 31 P. 840; Dodd v ... Una, 40 N.J.Eq. 672, 5 A. 155; Forrest v ... Price, 52 N.J.Eq. 16, 29 A. 215; Calvert v ... State, 34 Neb. 616, 52 N.W. 687; Bear v. Cohen, ... 65 N.C. 511; Commonwealth v. Perkins, 124 Pa. 36, 16 ... A. 525, 2 L.R.A. 223; Gilliam v. McJunkin, 2 S.C ... 442; State v ... ...
-
Elgart v. Mintz
...65 N.J.Eq. 730, 55 A. 997. "Jurisdiction" is "the right to adjudicate concerning the subject-matter in a given case." Dodd v. Una, 40 N.J.Eq. 672, 708, 5 A. 155, 161; Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418, 422. "There must be, therefore, a subject matter presented, which is within the jurisdiction.......
-
Price v. Edwards
...disclosed in their pleadings.' This position, so stated by Chief Justice Beasley in Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.Law, 418, affirmed in Dodd v. Una, 40 N.J.Eq. 672 , was approved and applied here in Hobgood v. Hobgood, 169 N.C. 485-491 , and, recognizing this as the true test, it is held in numero......
-
State v. Shumaker
... ... Dale v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 110, 121, ... 150 N.E. 781. [200 Ind. 694] It is a remedy inherent in the ... courts and evidence in the form of depositions of witnesses ... residing in foreign jurisdictions is not objectionable ... Una v. Dodd (1884), 38 N.J.Eq. 460 ... From ... the evidence, it appears that respondent exerted considerable ... activity in an attempt to have the Republican State Central ... Committee called together for the purpose of passing a ... resolution condemning the Attorney-General of the ... ...