Dodd v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 11 August 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 819.
• Citation: 279 F. Supp. 291
• Parties: Russell DODD et al., Plaintiffs, v. L. H. BARNES et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

279 F. Supp. 291

Russell DODD et al., Plaintiffs, v. L. H. BARNES et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 819.

United States District Court E. D. Tennessee, Winchester Division.

August 11, 1967.

Harry W. Camp, McMinnville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Paul E. Jennings, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for defendant McCanless.

Edwin F. Hunt, Nashville, Tenn., for balance of defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NEESE, District Judge.

This is an action by certain voters of Warren County, Tennessee, claiming that their federally-protected rights have been, and are being, circumvented by the malfeasance and current nonfeasance of the General Assembly of Tennessee and the Quarterly County Court of that county by the continuing malapportionment of the membership of the County Board of School Commissioners of that county. The plaintiffs seek equitable relief therefrom if invidious discrimination against such voters is decreed to be extant.

The Attorney General of Tennessee was joined as a party defendant herein and moved that this action be dismissed as to him on the ground that he is not an indispensable party. This motion was overruled. T.C.A. § 23-1107, construed in Cummings v. Beeler (1949), 189 Tenn. 151, 158, 223 S.W.2d 913, 914 4, Buena Vista Special School Dist. et al. v. Board of Election Com'rs of Carroll County et al. (1938), 173 Tenn. 198, 116 S.W.2d 1008, 1108, 1109 4, 5 and Peters v. O'Brien (1925), 152 Tenn. 466, 278 S.W. 660; see also the distinguishing opinion in Shelby County Board of Commrs. v. Shelby County Quarterly Court (1965), 216 Tenn. 470, 392 S.W.2d 935. Memorandum opinion and order of this Court of February 2, 1967.

The Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit designated the then active district judges of this District as a three-judge court to hear and determine this action on March 7, 1967, but on March 13, 1967, the said Chief Judge reconstituted the Court with a circuit judge and two district judges, as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Upon consideration, the reconstituted three-judge court was of the opinion that 28 U.S.C. § 2284 was without application and that a three-judge court lacked jurisdiction, Moody v. Flowers (1967),¹ 387 U.S. 97, 87 S.Ct. 1544, 18 L.Ed.2d 643; Ex Parte Public National Bank of New York (1928), 278 U.S. 101, 104, 49 S.Ct. 43, 44, 73 L.Ed. 202; Ex Parte Collins (1928), 277 U.S. 565, 567-569, 48 S.Ct. 585, 586, 72 L.Ed. 990; Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, D.C.Md. (1964), 234 F.Supp. 945, 946 fn. 1; Johnson v. Genessee County, Michigan, D.C.Mich, (1964), 232 F.Supp. 563, 565-566 1, 2, and the three-judge court was thereupon dissolved and the action remanded to this single-judge District Court for further proceedings.

It appeared to this judge, after remand, that the equity jurisdiction of this Court appeared to have been properly invoked by the plaintiffs, but the Court considered, on its own motion, whether it should abstain at this time, in the discretionary exercise of such equity powers, from the determination sought. The Court noticed judicially that representatives to the Tennessee Legislature, who represent Warren County, are chosen in elections in which all eligible voters of that county are entitled to cast their respective ballots; that, primarily, "* * * `for protection against abuses by legislatures the people should resort to the polls, not to the courts.' * * *" Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563, 572 (headnote 5); that the Tennessee Legislature will resume its sessions next Spring; that the members of that body as well as the members of the Warren County Quarterly Court are under no less an oath to uphold the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Tennessee and laws enacted pursuant thereto, cf. Hill v. County Board of Education of Franklin County, Tenn., D.C.Tenn. (1964), 232 F.Supp. 671, 675 1, than is a judge of this Court, if, in fact, invidious discrimination is being practiced against any Warren County voters, as charged by the plaintiffs.

This Court observed that the respective members of those respective bodies have the obligation under their respective oaths of office to see that any invidious discrimination extant is corrected, in which event it would be unnecessary for a federal court to interfere in the internal affairs of Warren County for the purpose of protecting the federally-guaranteed rights of its citizens. It was pointed out that those who contend so urgently for states' rights must exercise unhesitatingly those rights, especially where the rights involved are also federally-guaranteed.

It was also stated that this Court, now being asked to invade an area of purely local concern in Warren County, "* * * is loathe to interfere in the internal affairs of a State. The sovereignty of the States, within the boundaries reserved to them by the federal Constitution, is one of the keystones upon which our government was founded and is of vital importance to its preservation. * * *" N. A. A. C. P. v. Thompson, C.A. 5th (1966), 357 F.2d 831, 832-833 1; see also Baker v. Carr, D.C.Tenn. (1962), 206 F.Supp. 341, 348 8 and Lisco v. McNichols, D.C.Colo. (1962), 208 F.Supp. 471, 476 11. "* * * When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right. * * * `Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end.' * * *" Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), 364 U.S. 339, 347, 81 S.Ct. 125, 130, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, 117 (headnotes 14, 15), cited and quoted from in part Gray v. Sanders (1963), 372 U.S. 368, 380, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821, 830 (headnote 18), and again in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 566, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 530 (headnote 16).

"* * * The abstension doctrine is not an automatic rule * * *; it rather involves a discretionary exercise of a court's equity powers. Ascertainment of whether there exists the `special circumstances' * * * prerequisite to its application must be made on a case-to-case basis. * * *" Baggett v. Bullitt (1964), 377 U.S. 360, 375, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1324, 11 L.Ed.2d 377, 387 (headnote 9).

The plaintiffs herein insist that the Warren County Board of School Commissioners is a legislative agency which must be apportioned on the one man-one vote principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, supra. The defendants, on the other hand, are equally insistent that the members of that board are of the nonlegislative character who may be appointed by the governor, appointed by the legislature, elected by the people, or selected by a combination of the elective and appointive systems, and thus, that the one-man-one-vote doctrine has no relevancy. Cf. Sailors v. Kent County Bd. of Education (1967), 387 U.S. 105, 87 S.Ct. 1549, 18 L.Ed.2d 650. Neither adversary counsel nor the Court are aware of any expression from the courts of Tennessee determinative of this issue.

"* * * The principle is well established and without dispute that under the rule of comity under our dual federal and state system of Government in cases involving state laws * * * equitable considerations will under certain circumstances require federal courts to stay their hands where the parties have an adequate, speedy and complete determination of the controversy available to them in a state tribunal. * * * The Supreme Court has held that where there is pending in the federal court a case involving the construction of a state law and if one construction will remove the federal question a federal court should stay its hand, retain jurisdiction and relegate the parties to the state courts to first seek a construction of the statute. * * *" General Investment & Serv. Corp. v. Wichita Water Co., C.A. 10th (1956), 236 F.2d 464, 468 4, citing Meredith v. City of Winter Haven (1943), 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed. 9. It is only when "* * *...