Dodd v. United States, Civil Action No. 749.

Decision Date01 April 1948
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 749.
Citation76 F. Supp. 991
PartiesDODD v. UNITED STATES (DODD et al., Third-Party Defendants).
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

Franklin Wilder and Mr. Edgar E. Bethell, both of Fort Smith, Ark., for plaintiff.

Hugh M. Bland, of Fort Smith, Ark., for third-party defendants.

JOHN E. MILLER, District Judge.

This action was filed on December 26, 1947, by Virgie Dodd, stepmother of the insured, Leroy V. Dodd, to recover from the defendant, United States of America, the remaining installments due under the policy of National Service Life Insurance issued to the said Leroy V. Dodd.

As appears from the complaint, Virgie Dodd, plaintiff, married R. B. Dodd in Fort Smith, Arkansas, on November 16, 1938. Leroy V. Dodd, insured, was the son of R. B. Dodd, by the latter's first wife, and was living in the home of the said R. B. Dodd at the time of his marriage to the plaintiff. The insured remained in the home of R. B. Dodd and this plaintiff until leaving the same to accept employment in Washington, D. C. On or about January 7, 1942, the insured, Leroy V. Dodd, enlisted in the Armed Forces of the United States, and thereafter applied for and received a policy of insurance in the principal sum of $10,000 under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, as amended. He named his father, R. B. Dodd, as principal beneficiary and his brother, James R. Dodd, as alternate beneficiary.

On April 15, 1943, the insured, Leroy V. Dodd, was killed in action, and thereafter monthly payments under the policy were made to R. B. Dodd, principal beneficiary, in the sum of $73.20 per month. On September 3, 1944, the said R. B. Dodd died, whereupon his right to the proceeds of the policy ceased, and the alternate beneficiary, James R. Dodd, became entitled to and received monthly payments under said policy. James R. Dodd was killed in action in January, 1945, whereupon his right to the proceeds of the policy ceased.

Subsequent to the death of the said James R. Dodd, the plaintiff, Virgie Dodd, filed her claim with the Veterans Administration, alleging that she was the next qualified person within the classes designated by law to receive the proceeds of this policy. By letter of October 27, 1947, the plaintiff was notified by the Life Insurance Claims Division, Veterans Administration, that her claim was disallowed.

Following that disallowance the plaintiff, as stated above, filed her cause of action in this court to recover the unpaid installments under said policy of insurance.

On February 16, 1948, the defendant, United States of America, filed its answer and counterclaim for interpleader, denying that plaintiff has any right to the proceeds of the policy of insurance, and alleging that the five surviving brothers of the insured, to wit: Clyde W., Earl P., Gordon C., Glenn R., and Carl B. Dodd, are claiming an interest in said insurance benefits and are necessary and indispensable parties to this action. The defendant, United States of America, admitted liability under the policy of insurance, and prayed that the above named brothers be made parties to the action and that the court determine the party or parties entitled to said proceeds and direct payment in accordance with such determination.

By order of February 18, 1948, the court made the above named brothers of Leroy V. Dodd parties to this action and directed that they respond to the complaint and counterclaim.

In response to a motion for more definite statement filed by the third-party defendants on February 23, 1948, the attorneys for plaintiff and third-party defendants stipulated on March 4, 1948, that the complaint of plaintiff be amended to show that the policy of insurance was issued by the Government to Leroy V. Dodd on January 15, 1942, and that the plaintiff, Virgie Dodd, was not designated as a beneficiary.

On March 4, 1948, the third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff. This motion is now before the court.

The material dates may be recapitulated as follows:

Policy issued to Leroy V. DoddJanuary 15, 1942.

Leroy V. Dodd killed in action — April 15, 1943.

R. B. Dodd, principal beneficiary, died— September 3, 1944.

James R. Dodd, alternate beneficiary, died — January, 1945.

Claim of Virgie Dodd disallowed by letter — October 27, 1947.

This Suit filed — December 26, 1947.

Section 602(g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, Section 802(g) of Title 38 U.S.C.A., provides as follows:

"The insurance shall be payable only to a widow, widower, child (including a stepchild or an illegitimate child if designated as beneficiary by the insured), parent (including person in loco parents if designated as beneficiary by the insured), brother or sister of the insured. The insured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance, but only within the classes herein provided, and shall, subject to regulations, at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries of such insurance without the consent of such beneficiary or beneficiaries but only within the classes herein provided."

Section 602(h) (3) of the same Act, Section 802(h) (3) of Title 38 U.S.C.A., provides:

"Any installments certain of insurance remaining unpaid at the death of any beneficiary shall be paid in equal monthly installments in an amount equal to the monthly installments paid to the first beneficiary, to the person or persons then in being within the classes hereinafter specified and in the order named, unless designated by the insured in a different order —

"(A) to the widow or widower of the insured, if living;

"(B) if no widow or widower, to the child or children of the insured if living, in equal shares;

"(C) if no widow, widower, or child, to the parent or parents of the insured, if living, in equal shares;

"(D) if no widow, widower, child, or parent, to the brothers and sisters of the insured, if living, in equal shares."

By the Act of July 11, 1942, Section 601 of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, Section 801 of Title 38 U.S.C.A., was amended by adding at the end thereof the following subsection:

"(f) The terms `parent', and `mother' include a father, mother, father through adoption, mother through adoption, persons who have stood in loco parentis to a member of the military or naval forces at any time prior to entry into active service for a period of not less than one year."

On that date, July 11, 1942, Section 602 (g) of the 1940 Act, Section 802(g) of Title 38 U.S.C.A., was amended by striking therefrom the following: "(including person in loco parentis if designated as beneficiary by the insured)."

Section 602(h) (3), Section 802(h) (3) of Title 38 U.S.C.A., was amended to read as follows:

"(C) if no widow, widower, or child, to the parent or parents of the insured who last bore that relationship, if living, in equal shares."

By the Insurance Act of 1946, August 1, 1946, Section 601(f) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, Section 801(f) of Title 38 U.S.C.A., was amended effective as of October 8, 1940, to read as follows:

"(f) The terms `parent', `father', and `mother' include a father, mother, father through adoption, mother through adoption, persons who have stood in loco parentis to a member of the military or naval forces at anytime prior to entry into active service for a period of not less than one year, and a stepparent, if designated as beneficiary by the insured." (Italics added to show the words added by this amendment.)

In this case both the principal and alternate beneficiaries are deceased and the unpaid installments of this policy of insurance now go to the person or persons within the classes specified and in the order named by Section 602(h) (3), since the insured did not designate a different order. That order is (A) widow or widower, (B) child or children, (C) parent or parents, and (D) brothers and sisters. Involved in this controversy are persons in classes (C) and (D). It is the position of the plaintiff that she comes under the classification of "parent" and therefore is next in line to receive the proceeds of this policy. The third-party defendants, brothers of the insured, contend that the plaintiff may not be so classified, and therefore, they are next in line to receive the proceeds, since there are no living persons in classes (A), (B), and (C).

As hereinbefore set out, Section 602(h) (3) (C) reads as follows:

"(C) if no widow, widower, or child, to the parent or parents of the insured who last bore that relationship, if living, in equal...

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9 cases
  • Maddox v. Queen
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 4 Septiembre 1979
    ...its existence is normally a factual question, to be determined on the trial." 59 Am.Jur.2d 185, Parent & Child, § 88; Dodd v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 991 (D.C.Ark.1948). Georgia cases on establishment of this relationship usually deal only with the particular factual predicate in that cas......
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 27 Septiembre 1972
    ...the existence vel non of such a relationship is usually a factual question to be determined on a trial of the case. Dodd v. United States, W.D.Ark., 76 F.Supp. 991, 995(2). The position a stepparent assumes for himself determines if he stands in loco parentis to the child (Dix v. Martin, 17......
  • Standridge v. Standridge
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 28 Enero 1991
    ...We noted that the step daughter in question lived in the home with her step mother "as mother and daughter," citing Dodd v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 991 (W.D.Ark.1948), and Miller v. United States, 123 F.2d 715 (8th Cir.1942) (reversed on other grounds), 317 U.S. 192, 63 S.Ct. 187, 87 L.Ed......
  • Golden v. Golden
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 23 Abril 1997
    ...two live in the same home as mother and daughter. Moon Distrib. v. White, 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W.2d 56 (1968) (citing Dodd v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 991 (W.D.Ark.1948) and Miller v. United States, 123 F.2d 715 (8th The circumstances in this case warrant a finding of in loco parentis. Appe......
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