Dodge Cnty. v. Kaiser

CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtMARTIN
CitationDodge Cnty. v. Kaiser, 243 Wis. 551, 11 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1943)
Decision Date12 October 1943
PartiesDODGE COUNTY v. KAISER.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dodge County; Otto H. Breidenbach, Judge, presiding.

Affirmed.

Action commenced May 22, 1942, by Dodge county, plaintiff, against Paul L. Kaiser, defendant, who at all times in question was the duly elected county superintendent of schools of Dodge county. The action was brought to recover certain sums of money paid defendant to reimburse him for traveling expenses incurred in attending national conventions of the National Educational Association, and monies paid defendant for acting as secretary of the Dodge county rural normal school board; and to recover the further sum of $25 paid defendant for delivering a commencement address to the graduating class of the county rural normal school in June, 1938. The total of such payments made to defendant through the period from March 20, 1929, to February 19, 1941, aggregates $1,356. Defendant answered, among other things alleging that all sums paid to him prior to May 12, 1936, were outlawed and barred by the provisions of sec. 330.19, Stats.

The case was tried to the court on stipulated facts as follows:

“That heretofore, in the year 1929, the defendant, Paul L. Kaiser, was elected to the office of county superintendent of schools in and for Dodge county, and thereafter was reelected to succeed himself in office every four years, up to and including the year of 1941.

“2. That the county superintendent, by virtue of said office, became the secretary of the Dodge county rural normal school board.

“3. That Paul L. Kaiser received sums of money from the county treasurer of Dodge county, at or about the dates, and in the amounts as set forth in the schedule annexed to the complaint and marked Exhibit ‘A’, as salary for services rendered as secretary of the Dodge county rural normal school board, and monies paid to him for expenses incurred by him in attending the national educational association convention.

“4. That the defendant made the following refunds: 1939, Cleveland convention-$20; 1940, St. Louis convention-$21.45, for which he is entitled to credit; that a demand has been made upon the defendant for the refund of the sums so paid to him, and he has refused and neglected so to do; that all sums paid to the defendant prior to May 12, 1936, were outlawed and barred by the provisions of sec. 330.19 of the Wisconsin Statutes.

“5. That the resolution, marked Exhibit ‘A’, and made a part of the answer, was duly passed and has never been rescinded. That the defendant did attend the conventions with the full expectations that he would be reimbursed for the expenses in accordance with the resolution, and otherwise would not have attended such convention; that the defendant was paid $25 for a commencement speech in June, 1938, and the same was not paid for services which he was legally bound to give to said normal school.”

The resolution referred to in paragraph five of the stipulated facts, adopted by the county board of Dodge county on the 20th day of November, 1929, so far as here material, provides: “* * * Resolved that we recognize the educational value, both material and inspirational, that comes from the attendance at the meetings of our superintendent's department of the National Educational Association and from the study of research reports and journals of that great organization that we hereby grant permission to the county superintendent of schools to attend each annual meeting of the said national superintendents' association with all expenses paid, it being understood that this expense shall not exceed one hundred dollars ($100) in any one year. * * *”

The court found that all payments made to defendant, except the sum of $806.55 were outlawed. The court further found that no resolution was ever passed authorizing the payment of any salary to the defendant as secretary of the rural normal school board.

As conclusions of law the court found that the county board had no authority to reimburse the county superintendent of schools for expenses incurred while attending the convention of the National Educational Association; that such payments were improper and that plaintiff was entitled to recover all such items not outlawed; that the annual salary of the county superintendent of schools covers all the duties of that office, including those performed as secretary of the rural normal school board, and that all additional payments made to the defendant as secretary of the rural normal school board were improper, and that plaintiff was entitled to recover all such payments not outlawed; that defendant, in his official capacity as county superintendent, is a member of the county rural normal school board and could not enter into a contract with the board for services in giving the commencement address referred to in the stipulated facts.

On the stipulated facts and the findings and conclusions of law, judgment was entered on December 15, 1942, in favor of the plaintiff against defendant in the sum of $806.55 damages, with costs. Defendant appeals.

George A. Hartman, of Juneau (Wilkie, Toebaas, Hart, Kraege & Jackman and W. E. Torkelson, all of Madison, of counsel), for appellant.

John A. Thiel, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Mayville (Lloyd Allan, of Mayville, of counsel), for respondent.

MARTIN, Justice.

Defendant contends that the payment of expenses incurred by him in attending conventionsof the National Educational Association is authorized by sec. 39.01(3), Stats., which, so far as here material, provides: “* * * The county superintendent shall be allowed and shall receive (in addition to his salary) his reasonable, actual and necessary expenses for travel, stationery, postage and printing incurred in or necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of the office. * * *”

The only statutory provision requiring county superintendents to attend conventions is section 39.04, Stats., which provides: “The county superintendent shall annually attend at least one convention called by the state superintendent for the purpose of consultation, advice and instruction pertaining to the public schools. His necessary and actual expenses for such attendance at the most accessible convention shall be paid by the county upon allowance by the county board of proper bills for such expense with the certificate of the state superintendent attached, showing that the claimant attended such convention for the number of days specified in the bill.”

The trial court held that the right to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in attending the convention of the National Educational Association is not expressly granted by statute and if such were the intention of the legislature it must arise by implication. The court further held that sec. 39.04, Stats., which specifically provides for reimbursing the superintendent of schools for expenses incurred while attending conventions, negatives any such right to payment by implication under the provisions of sec. 39.01(3), Stats.

Defendant argues that the travel expense of a county superintendent, as in the instant case, to attend national conventions of the national educational association, is covered entirely by sec. 39.01(3) and that the legislature by the enactment of sec. 39.04 did not intend any limitation on the expense of a county superintendent attending national conventions other than that the expense must be reasonable, actual and necessary and be incurred in and necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of the office; that there is no limitation on the place or scope of the travel.

The law imposes no duty on the county superintendent to attend any convention in his official capacity, except conventions called by the state superintendent pursuant to sec. 39.04, Stats. It should be noted that the attendance of the county superintendent at conventions called by the state superintendent shall be at the most accessible convention, obviously for the purpose of curtailing the expense of the county superintendent's attendance at such conventions. In view of the provisions of sec. 39.04, Stats., we think it clear that the legislature intended that the reimbursement for travel expense provided for in sec. 39.01(3), Stats., is for the expense incurred by a county superintendent in visiting the schools...

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5 cases
  • Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1974
    ...to declare what its intention was on a former occasion so as to affect past transactions. . . .' See also: Dodge County v. Kaiser (1943), 243 Wis. 551, 557, 11 N.W.2d 348, 350, this court holding: '. . . The power conferred upon the county board by ch. 392, Laws of 1943, can have no weight ......
  • Geyso v. City of Cudahy
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • April 11, 1967
    ...793.8 Supra, footnote 7, 332 S.W.2d at page 547.9 St. Croix County v. Webster (1901), 111 Wis. 270, 87 N.W. 302.10 Dodge County v. Kaiser (1943), 243 Wis. 551, 11 N.W.2d 348; Quaw v. Paff (1898), 98 Wis. 586, 74 N.W. 369; St. Croix County v. Webster, supra, footnote 9.11 Rooney v. Milwaukee......
  • Maus v. Bloss
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1954
    ...or affect the construction of a former act. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 241 Wis. 200, 5 N.W.2d 743; Dodge County v. Kaiser, 243 Wis. 551, 11 N.W.2d 348. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly held that the defendant at the time in question was in his operation......
  • Maier v. Racine County
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • June 26, 1957
    ...upon them by statute, expressly or by clear implication. Spaulding v. Wood County, 218 Wis. 224, 228, 260 N.W. 473; Dodge County v. Kaiser, 243 Wis. 551, 557, 11 N.W.2d 348. The appellant county would have us find sufficient authorization to adopt the ordinance under review, in the followin......
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