Dodge v. Gen. Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 June 1948
• Docket Number: No. 23.,23.
• Citation: Dodge v. Gen. Motors Corp., 321 Mich. 503, 32 N.W.2d 726 (Mich. 1948)
• Parties: DODGE v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, BUICK MOTOR DIVISION.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

321 Mich. 503

32 N.W.2d 726

DODGE

v.GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, BUICK MOTOR DIVISION.

No. 23.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 14, 1948.

Appeal in Nature of Certiorari from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Harold A. Dodge, claimant, opposed by General Motors Corporation, Buick Motor Division, employer.From an award in favor of claimant following the granting of an extension of time in which to appeal from an award of a department deputy, the employer appeals in the nature of certiorari.

Award ordered vacated.

Before the Entire Bench, except BUTZEL, J.

Warner & Hart, of Lansing, for appellee.

Henry M. Hogan, of Detroit (G. W. Gloster, E. H. Reynolds and R. V. Hackett, all of Detroit of counsel), for appellant.

CARR, Justice.

Plaintiff herein, claiming that in the month of September, 1943, he sustained a compensable injury while in the employ of defendant, filed a petition with the department of labor and industry for compensation under the provisions of ActNo. 10, Pub.Acts 1912 (1st Ex.Sess.), as amended(2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq.,Stat.Ann. § 17.141 et seq.).Defendant filed an answer to the petition, denying that plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought.A hearing was duly held before a deputy of the department, who denied compensation.The deputy's award was filed and copies mailed to the parties on May 21, 1945.On August 13 following, a petition was filed for an extension of time in which to appeal to the compensation commission.This action was taken in accordance with 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 8447, as amended byActNo. 245, Pub.Acts 1943 (Comp.Laws 1945 Supp. § 8447, Stat.Ann.1947 Cum.Supp. § 17.182), which provides in part as follows:

‘Unless a claim for a review is filed by either party within 10 days, the decision shall stand as the decision of the compensation commission.Provided, That said commission may, for sufficient cause shown, grant further time in which to claim such review.’

Plaintiff's petition was granted over the objections of the defendant, a hearing had, the decision of the deputy reversed, and compensation awarded do the plaintiff.From such award defendant, on leave granted, appealed to this Court.The case is reported as Dodge v. General Motors Corporation, 316 Mich. 425, 25 N.W.2d 579, 580.The award of the compensation commission was reversed and vacated on the ground that the commission had abused its discretion in granting leave for an extension of time in which to appeal on the basis of the showing made by plaintiff in support of his application.Summarizing the conclusions reached, it was said:

‘Sufficient cause for delayed appeal was not shown.The appeal was too late.The Commission had no jurisdiction to hear it.The decision of the Deputy Commissioner stands as the decision of the Commission and remains in force.’

The decision of the case was rendered on January 6, 1947.Subsequent thereto and under date of February 11, 1947, plaintiff filed a second petition to the compensation commission for leave to take a delayed appeal.The commission entertained such petition, determined that it made a sufficient showing of fact to justify favorable action thereon, and granted the leave sought.An award in plaintiff's favor followed.Defendant has again appealed, contending that the commission had no authority under the statute to take action on the petition, that the decision of this Court above cited was a final disposition of the matter, and that the commission, if it actually had jurisdiction to consider the petition, abused its discretion in granting the request for an extension of time to appeal.It is also urged that the proofs taken on the hearing before the deputy failed to substantiate plaintiff's claim that he had suffered a compensable injury in the course of, and arising out of, his employment.

On behalf of plaintiff it is insisted that the holding of this Court that the commission abused its discretion in granting the original application for an extension of time in which to appeal did not preclude plaintiff from making a second application setting forth further and additional facts to those contained in the affidavit on which the application as first filed was based.It is further contended that the petition and supporting affidavit filed on February 11, 1947, set forth facts sufficient to justify the granting of the relief sought.It may be said in this regard that the showing as made was analogous to that held sufficient to justify an order for an extension of time in ...