Dodge v. PRECISION CONST. PRODUCTS, INC.

• Decision Date: 14 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-525.,2001-525.
• Citation: 820 A.2d 207
• Parties: Harold DODGE v. PRECISION CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS, INC.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

820 A.2d 207

Harold DODGE v. PRECISION CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS, INC.

No. 2001-525.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

February 14, 2003.

Karl C. Anderson of Anderson & Eaton, P.C., Rutland, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Eric A. Johnson, Fairfield, and Nicole Reuschel-Vincent of McCormick, Fitzpatrick, Kasper & Burchard, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Present: AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE,¹ JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ.

DOOLEY, J.

¶ 1. The main issue raised by this appeal is whether an action brought under the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 601-711, that is awaiting a formal hearing, survives the death of the claimant who had no dependents and whose death was unrelated to work. Precision Construction Products, Inc. (Precision) appeals from a decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry (commissioner) granting a motion to substitute parties made by the coadministrators of the estate of claimant Harold Dodge, Jr. (administrators) and denying Precision's motion to dismiss. Precision argues that claimant's workers' compensation claim does not survive his death. We agree with the commissioner that the claim survives, and affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss.

¶ 2. Claimant was employed by Precision from April 4, 1995, until he was terminated for performance issues on or about September 19, 2000. In October 2000, he filed a workers' compensation claim for an alleged work-related injury that occurred on or before September 1, 2000. Hartford Insurance Company, Precision's workers' compensation insurer, denied the claim on the ground that claimant had not alleged any injuries prior to being terminated. Claimant appealed the denial, see 21 V.S.A. § 663, and requested interim benefits pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 662(b). The request for interim benefits, and a later request for reconsideration, were denied.

¶ 3. On April 29, 2001, while the workers' compensation claim awaited hearing pursuant to § 663, claimant died from causes unrelated to his alleged work-related injury.² At the time of his death, claimant was not married and was without children or other dependents. The administrators of claimant's estate moved pursuant to V.R.C.P. 25(a)(1) to substitute as claimants in the workers' compensation proceeding before the commissioner. Precision opposed the motion and moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it did not survive claimant's death. The commissioner denied Precision's motion to dismiss and granted the administrators' motion to substitute parties. Precision appeals these decisions.

¶ 4. The precise issue on appeal, as expressed by the commissioner in her certified question to this Court, is as follows: "Does the contested workers' compensation action survive the death of the claimant who had no dependants and whose death was unrelated to work?" Precision argues that claimant's claim is abated, and thus the administrators' claim for substitution fails, because neither the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"), nor the general survival statutes, provide for the survival of a claim when a claimant with no dependents dies of nonwork-related causes prior to the adjudication of his claim. We conclude that the Act does provide for the survival of the claim, in part, and that the remainder survives under the general survival statute, 14 V.S.A. § 1451, because it has vested.

¶ 5. The Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure apply to contested workers' compensation proceedings before the commissioner. See Vermont Workers Compensation Rule 7.100 (2001). Under V.R.C.P. 25(a)(1), "[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties." Thus, V.R.C.P. 25(a)(1) has two requirements: (1) the claim must survive the death of the party, and (2) the party sought to be substituted must be a proper party. State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26, 29, 633 A.2d 272, 274 (1993). The administrators, as claimant's personal representatives, are the proper parties. See 14 V.S.A. § 1401 (administrator may prosecute "in the right of the deceased" actions that survive). The only remaining question, therefore, is whether the particular workers' compensation claim in the present case survives the death of claimant.

¶ 6. It is important at the outset to break down the elements of a workers' compensation claim. If the claim goes to hearing and is successful, it typically contains two major parts: (1) retroactive compensation back to the statutory commencement date, see 21 V.S.A. §§ 642 (total disability compensation after three days of disability from the date of the accident), 646 (partial disability compensation beginning on the eighth day of disability), 664 (commissioner's award specifies commencement date and includes interest on past due amount); and (2) prospective compensation. Although the administrators have not appeared here, their claim below was exclusively for compensation from the commencement of the loss on September 19, 2000 to claimant's death on April 29, 2001. They argued that this retroactive compensation should go to claimant's estate.

¶ 7. Precision's first argument is based on the fact that the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act contains a specific survival statute applicable where the claimant dies from causes other than the workplace accident. See 21 V.S.A. § 639. Precision argues that this specific survival statute does not apply because the claimant was not found by the commissioner to be entitled to compensation before he died, and, in any event, he left no dependents. Because the statute does not apply, Precision argues, the Legislature must have intended that the claimant's claim should not survive his death. Although Precision raises two grounds why the statute does not apply, the second—that the claimant had no dependents—goes only to the amount of benefits that the statute provides and does not, therefore, support the motion to dismiss. Thus, we need consider only its first ground—that the statute does not allow an unadjudicated claim to survive.

¶ 8. We start with the wording of the statute:

§ 639.—Death, payment to dependents

In cases of the death of a person from any cause other than the accident during the period of payments for disability or for the permanent injury, the remaining payments for disability then due or for the permanent injury shall be made to the person's dependents according to the provisions of sections 635 and 636 of this title, or if there are none, the remaining amount due, but not exceeding $5,500.00 for burial and funeral expenses and expenses for out-of-state transportation of the decedent to the place of burial not to exceed $1,000.00, shall be paid in a lump sum to the proper person.

Precision bases its argument against survivability on specific words in the statute— that the death of the worker must occur "during the period of payments" and the statute specifies how the "remaining amount due" is to be distributed. Precision argues that in the absence of a preexisting determination of entitlement for compensation there were no "payments" or "remaining amount due" on the day claimant died, and the statute does not apply. We find this an overly-narrow construction of the statute, particularly since we must construe it liberally in favor of coverage. See Grather v. Gables Inn, Ltd., 170 Vt. 377, 383, 751 A.2d 762, 767 (2000). As we held in Laird v. State Highway Dep't, 112 Vt. 67, 80, 20 A.2d 555, 562 (1941), "[t]he employee's rights are based entirely on the injury and spring into being as soon as it is received." Precision's argument confuses the employee's right to payment with the adjudication of that right.

¶ 9. We are aided in our conclusion by decisions from other states. The majority of courts, in construing statutes like § 639, have concluded that the rights of dependents or the estate do not abate if the claimant dies before the workers' compensation claim is adjudicated. See generally 4 A. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 89.05, at 89-5 (2002); see Ala. Dry Dock v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp., 804 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1986); Reed v. Indus. Comm'n, 104 Ariz. 412, 454 P.2d 157, 162 (1969); Estate of Huey v. J.C. Trucking, Inc., 837 P.2d 1218, 1221-22 (Colo.1992); Estate of Peterson v. J.R. Simplot Co., 83 Idaho 120, 358 P.2d 587, 589 (1961); State Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Richardson, 233 Md. 534, 197 A.2d 428, 431 (1964); Cureton v. Joma Plumbing & Heating Co., 38 N.J. 326, 184 A.2d 644, 647-48 (1962); Powell v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 79 Wash.2d 378, 485 P.2d 990, 995 (1971).

¶ 10. Three decisions are particularly instructive. The first is Cureton v. Joma Plumbing & Heating Co., a factually similar New Jersey Supreme Court case decided under a virtually identical New Jersey statute. The court addressed the argument that there must be a preexisting adjudication of eligibility for compensation prior to the claimant's death as follows:

The fact that the workman had neither received the compensation payments to which he was entitled during his lifetime, nor even had an award entered in his favor, does not alter this result. The law regards done what ought to be done, and will not permit those who are obligated and should have paid the compensation to obtain advantage of the fortuitous circumstance of the workman's death. Any other result would permit the employer or his insurance carrier to gain an undeserved windfall. Moreover, as stated [in an earlier opinion]: "Such a rule would put a premium upon delay in discharging the statutory obligation ...."

184 A.2d at 649-50 (citations omitted) (quoting King v. W. Elec. Co., 122 N.J.L. 442, 5 A.2d 490, 494 (1939)); see also Warrick v. Cheatham County Highway Dep't, 60 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tenn.2001) (elaborating on policy reasons in support of rule that does not require a prior adjudication of eligibility).

¶ 11. The second is State Department of Motor Vehicles v. Richardson, decided under a statute similar to...