Dodgens v. Kent Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | CA No. 8:95-2180-20AK. |
| Citation | 955 F.Supp. 560 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Eddie Forest DODGENS, Plaintiff, v. The KENT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant. |
Edwin L. Turnage, Travelers Rest, SC, for plaintiff.
Andreas N. Satterfield, Jr. and Ellison F. McCoy, Greenville, SC, for defendant.
This matter is before the court with the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 19.02 DSC. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the United States District Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 96 S.Ct 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the magistrate judge or recommit the matter to him with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The plaintiff, Eddie Forest Dodgens ("Dodgens"), alleges causes of action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. The defendant, Kent Manufacturing Company ("Kent"), filed a motion for summary judgment. In his Report and Recommendation, United States Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe, Jr. recommends granting summary judgment on all claims except Dodgens's claim pursuant to the FMLA. Each party filed objections to the portions of the Report and Recommendation that were adverse to them.
Dodgens is a former employee of Kent. At the time of his termination, Dodgens was a third-shift supervisor in the drawing department. His responsibilities included overseeing two pin-drafter operators and two roving machine operators. Basically, Dodgens was supposed to inform the operators as to which material they were to use and to monitor them to ensure that the material was blended properly. Kent contends that six months prior to his termination, Dodgens was confronted about weighing and blending problems that had occurred under his supervision. Approximately two months prior to his termination, Dodgens underwent knee surgery and took a six-week medical leave.
During his leave, Dodgens was contacted twice by the plant manager, Johnny Miller ("Miller"), who requested Dodgens to take a demotion when he returned. Kent contends that Miller contacted Dodgens because the drawing department which Dodgens used to supervise was "running the best it had run" under David Griggs's supervision. Dodgens refused the demotion and remained on medical leave until his doctor certified that he could return to work.
On his second day back at his previous position, Dodgens's supervisor, Jamie Anthony ("Anthony"), informed Dodgens that management was watching him and that he would be fired for any mistakes. Shortly thereafter, a blending error occurred which was caught by Anthony. A second error occurred the following day. The error involved improper mixing of materials and ultimately caused Kent to suffer a loss ranging from five thousand one hundred forty three dollars ($5,143) to twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600). The specific amount is contested by the parties. As a result of this error, Dodgens and one of the operators under his supervision were terminated. This action followed.
Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability. In Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir.1995), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the elements of an ADA claim. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he was in a protected class; (2) he was discharged; (3) at the time of the discharge, he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) his discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 58.
Applying the appropriate summary judgment standard, Magistrate Judge Catoe correctly found that Dodgens cannot show he is a member of the protected class. To be a member of the protected class, Dodgens must show that he has a disability. An individual suffers from a disability if he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The regulations define "physical or mental impairment" as "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting one or more of" various body systems. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). "Major life activities" are defined as "caring for oneself performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
Dodgens claims that his knee injury substantially limits his major life activity of walking. The court disagrees. According to Dodgens's doctor, his disability rating is only fifteen percent. Dodgens's orthopaedist stated that he is able to walk in substantially the same manner as the average person and that he is not significantly restricted in any way in his ability to walk. Furthermore, the interpretive guidelines of the ADA provide that an individual who, as a result of a physical impairment, can walk only at a moderately below-average speed is not substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. at 340; see also Blanton v. Winston Printing Co., 868 F.Supp. 804 (M.D.N.C.1994) (). Therefore, Dodgens has failed to produce sufficient evidence to withstand the motion for summary judgment on his ADA claim.
The FMLA provides eligible employees of a covered employer the right to take unpaid leave for a period of up to twelve work weeks in any twelve-month period for a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.100. In general, the FMLA entitles eligible employees (1) to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in qualifying situations, (2) to the right to maintain health benefits and other employment-related benefits while on leave, and (3) to the right to be reinstated to their previous position or an equivalent position at the end of the leave. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614. The FMLA makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of any of these rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). In this case, it is undisputed that Dodgens was permitted to take leave until being certified to return to work without restrictions by his doctor, that he was allowed to maintain his medical benefits and other company benefits while on leave, and that he was reinstated to the position that he held when the leave commenced. (Pl.'s Dep. at 119.)
Despite these facts, Dodgens first contends that Miller, as an employee of Kent, unlawfully interfered with his rights under the FMLA by calling him twice and requesting that he take a demotion. Second, Dodgens asserts that Kent interfered with his FMLA rights by failing to provide him with literature describing the benefits and leave rights guaranteed by the FMLA. Kent admits that, pursuant to the FMLA, it failed to provide an explanation of the FMLA in its handbook and failed to inform Dodgens of his FMLA leave rights when a request for leave was made. (Def.'s Reply Mem. at 13); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)(1).
The FMLA regulations issued by the Department of Labor state that the terms "interfering with" the exercise of an employee's rights under the FMLA would include violating the FMLA, refusing to authorize FMLA leave, discouraging an employee from taking FMLA leave, and manipulating the work force to avoid responsibilities under the FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). As an administrative agency, the Department of Labor's construction of the statute is entitled to "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945). The court finds that the Department of Labor's interpretation of the terms "interfering with" is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. As such, Dodgens's claim that his FMLA rights were "interfered with" when Miller called him twice during his medical leave and requested that he take a demotion does not state a cognizable claim under the FMLA. Therefore, as to this specific allegation, Dodgens's claim fails as a matter of law.
Kent has clearly violated the FMLA by failing to explain the FMLA benefits and leave rights to Dodgens in its employee handbook or at the time Dodgens requested leave. As 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) states, a violation of the FMLA constitutes interference with FMLA rights. In this case, however, the court would be elevating form over substance to permit this claim to go forward in light of the fact that Dodgens received all of the leave benefits that he was guaranteed pursuant to the FMLA. Accordingly, the court awards summary judgment to Kent on this specific allegation as well.
Dodgens's third claim under the FMLA is that he was terminated for exercising his right to take medical leave. The magistrate judge concluded that, in this situation, the FMLA provides a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The magistrate judge also determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning Dodgens's termination in the context of his FMLA claim. See (Mag. Judge's Rep. & Rec. at 9-10.) The issue of material fact that concerned...
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