Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 13 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-cv-01682-WJM-KLM |
| Parties | DONALD J. DODSON, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, County of Archuleta, State of Colorado, and RICK BELLIS, in his official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter is before the Court on the June 4, 2012 Recommendation by U.S. Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix (the "Recommendation") (ECF No. 34) that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. The Recommendation is incorporated herein by reference. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The facts relevant to a resolution of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are detailed in the Recommendation. Briefly, Plaintiff alleges that his employment with Defendant Board of County Commissioners, County of Archuleta, State of Colorado ("BOCC") was terminated due to age discrimination and in retaliation for reporting certain alleged improprieties. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 4) at 6-9.)
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed on July 15, 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff brings three claims: (1) violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") for agediscrimination and retaliation against his former supervisor Defendant Rick Bellis ("Bellis") and Defendant BOCC; (2) a state law claim for violation of the procedures outlined in the Archuleta County Personnel Policy Manual (the "Manual") against both Defendants; and (3) deprivations of his First Amendment right to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Bellis only. (Id.)
On October 19, 2011, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 asking the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor on all claims. (ECF No. 18.) On November 29, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Response to Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 27), and Defendants filed their Reply to Plaintiff's Response on December 27, 2011 (ECF No. 31).
On June 4, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued her Recommendation that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and that judgment be granted in favor of Defendants on all claims. (ECF No. 34.) On June 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a timely Objection to the Recommendation. (ECF No. 35.)
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Objection to the June 4, 2012 Recommendation is overruled, the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is adopted in its entirety, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
When a Magistrate Judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the District Court Judge "determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's [recommendation] that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, "[t]he districtcourt judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or, conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987).
A fact is "material" if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable juror could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus favoring the right to a trial. Quaker State Mini-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995); Houston v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must then point to specific evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact with regard to each challenged element. See Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002); In re Ribozyme Pharms.,Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1111 (D. Colo. 2002).
Further, in considering the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation in the instant case, the Court is also mindful of Plaintiff's pro se status, and accordingly, reads his pleadings and filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, such liberal construction is intended merely to overlook technical formatting errors and other defects in Plaintiff's use of legal terminology and proper English. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Pro se status does not relieve Plaintiff of the duty to comply with various rules and procedures governing litigants and counsel, or the requirements of the substantive law and, in these regards, the Court will treat Plaintiff according to the same standard as counsel licensed to practice law before the bar of this Court. See McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Ogden v. San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
The Magistrate Judge recommends in her June 4, 2012 Recommendation that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that judgment be granted in favor of Defendants on all claims. (ECF No. 34 at 28.) Plaintiff objects to these findings without making a specific objection as to any particular portion of the Recommendation. He argues only that he needs discovery to prove his claims. (ECF No. 35.) The Court only reviews de novo portions of the Recommendation as to which a specific objection was made. Otherwise, the Court reviews the Recommendation for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Given the limited nature and scope of Plaintiff's Objection, the Court will in this case review the Recommendation for clear error.
The Court has reviewed the rulings of the June 4, 2012 Recommendation and finds no clear error in the Magistrate Judge's determinations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee's note; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is adopted with respect to all claims.
Plaintiff also states in his Objection that (ECF No. 35.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) governs requests for additional time to take discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) provides as follows:
Plaintiff has not presented an affidavit nor has he specified why he cannot present facts in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff does not address the information he needs or why that information is necessary to respond to the Defendants' Motion. "[Rule 56(d)] may not be invoked by the mere assertion that discovery is incomplete or that specific facts necessary to oppose summary judgment areunavailable; the opposing party must demonstrate how additional time will enable him to rebut movant's allegations of no genuine issue of fact." Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 833 (10th Cir. 1986). Further, while the Court may read Plaintiff...
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