Dodson v. C.R. Bard, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:20cv596 (DJN) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | JANIE MILLS DODSON, Plaintiff, v. C.R. BARD, INC., Defendant. |
Plaintiff Janie Mills Dodson ("Plaintiff") brings this state law products liability action against Defendant C.R. Bard, Inc., now Beckton, Dickinson and Company ("Defendant"), alleging that Defendant negligently designed and manufactured a medical device known as the Bard Simon Nitinol Vena Cava Filter ("SNF"), thereby resulting in permanent injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to warn consumers, medical providers and government authorities about the potential injuries caused by the SNF, thereby resulting in the implantation of an unreasonably dangerous device in Plaintiff and causing injuries from which she will not recover. This matter now comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16). For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16). Specifically, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts One and Two of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9), but DENIES Defendant's Motion as to Count Three.
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true the well-plead factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint . Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Against that backdrop, the Court accepts the following facts as alleged for purposes of resolving the instant motion.
In the early 2000's, Plaintiff underwent a medical procedure that involved the implantation of a permanent filter known as the SNF into her inferior vena cava ("IVC") to prevent blood clots from moving throughout her body. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 28.) The structure of the SNF includes a small, umbrella-shaped body and six legs, or struts, that extend down from the body. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) At the time of implantation, Plaintiff received no warnings from her doctor about potential issues with the device. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.)
On July 9, 2018, Plaintiff entered a Spotsylvania County hospital for treatment for sepsis. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) A CT scan and X-ray revealed that the SNF had become dislodged and tilted within Plaintiff's IVC. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-34.) Five of the SNF's legs had perforated the IVC and another muscle in her body. (Am. Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff underwent surgery on July 12, 2020, in an attempt to remove the SNF. (Am. Compl. ¶ 35.) Doctors retrieved one of the legs of the SNF that had detached from the body of the device, but they determined that retrieving the device itself and the remaining legs appeared too risky. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.) Doctors informed Plaintiff that a high likelihood existed that another leg of the SNF would eventually break off and cause further damage, even death, to Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff continues to suffer physical and emotional pain due to the issues with the SNF and her anticipation of future problems arising from its permanent placement in her body. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42-44.)
On July 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for the County of Spotsylvania. (ECF No. 1-1.) On August 4, 2020, Defendant removed the case to this Court onthe basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant filed an initial Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 2020, and, in response, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 31, 2020. (ECF Nos. 4, 9.)
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint raises three counts for relief based on the above allegations. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted negligently in the manufacture of the SNF. (Am. Compl. ¶ 45.) Specifically, Plaintiff states that Defendant failed to conduct adequate testing "in animals, or in humans, to determine the manufacturing issues" in the product, and that Defendant "knew or should have known that the lack of testing and/or manufacturing of the SNF would have contributed to the structural failure causing the fracture" of the device. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47.) In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted negligently in the design of the SNF, reiterating the same allegations averred in support of Count One, including that Defendant did not conduct adequate testing, and that if it had, Defendant would have discovered the design issues with the device. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-52.) Finally, in Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to warn consumers, medical providers and government authorities about the injuries caused by the SNF and the high rates of fracture that occurred during the lifetime of the device. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-59.) Throughout her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cites to several facts, including the results of three studies, FDA complaints and warnings, and Defendant's own marketing materials to support her assertion that Defendant had knowledge of the dangers of the SNF, and thus a duty to warn of the high risks presented by its implantation. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-15, 18-21.) Based on these claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Defendant in the amount of $500,000. (Am. Compl. at 11.)
In response to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, on September 29, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16), moving to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In support of its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that any defect, either manufacturing or design, existed in Defendant's product, giving rise to a right to relief. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss of C.R. Bard ("Def.'s Mem.") (ECF No. 17) at 1.) Rather, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint constitutes "nothing more than a threadbare recitation of the elements of negligent manufacturing, negligent design and failure to warn." (Def.'s Mem. at 1.) Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible failure to warn. (Def.'s Mem. at 7.) Specifically, Defendant states that no facts in the Amended Complaint suggest that Defendant knew of the alleged defects at the time of implantation, and that Virginia has yet to recognize a post-sale duty to warn. (Def.'s Mem. at 7.) Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's failure to specify the date or year of the SNF's implantation negates all of her claims, because Defendant did not "acquire the rights in and liabilities attributable to the SNF until October 19, 2001." (Def.'s Mem. at 9.)
Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on October 13, 2020, , and Defendant filed its Reply on October 19, 2020, (Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss of C.R. Bard ("Def.'s Reply") (ECF No. 20)), rendering Defendant's Motion now ripe for review.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint or counterclaim; it does not serve as the means by which a court will resolve contests surroundingthe facts, determine the merits of a claim or address potential defenses. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court will accept a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true and view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint or counterclaim must state facts sufficient to "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). As the Supreme Court opined in Twombly, a complaint or counterclaim must state "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," though the law does not require "detailed factual allegations." Id. (citations omitted). Ultimately, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," rendering the right "plausible on its face" rather than merely "conceivable." Id. at 555, 570. Thus, a complaint or counterclaim must assert facts that are more than "merely consistent with" the other party's liability. Id. at 557. And the facts alleged must be sufficient to "state all the elements of [any] claim[s]." Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) ().
Assuming that Virginia law applies to Plaintiff's claims, as both parties do in their briefs1, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to Counts One and Two of her Amended Complaint. However, her allegations, taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, support a plausible right to relief as to Count Three.
To recover under a products liability claim of negligence in Virginia, Plaintiff must show that "(1) the [product] was unreasonably dangerous for the use to which it would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably foreseeable purpose, [and] (2) the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the [product] left the defendant's hands." Ball v. Takeda Pharms. Am., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 (E.D. Va. 2013) (citing Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1971); Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (Va. 1975)); see also Sutherlin v. Lowes Home Ctrs., 2014 WL 7345893, at *26 (E.D. Va. Dec. 23, 2014) (). Importantly, "a...
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