Dodson v. Lemon

JurisdictionOregon
PartiesDODSON v. LEMON.
Citation197 Or. 444,253 P.2d 900
CourtOregon Supreme Court
Decision Date26 February 1953

Duane Vergeer, Portland, for appellant. On the brief were Vergeer & Samuels, Portland.

Edward L. Clark, Jr., McMinnville, for respondent. With him on the brief were Butler, Jack & Beckett, Oregon City, and Marsh, Marsh & Dashney, McMinnville.

Before LATOURETTE, C. J., and WARNER, ROSSMAN, LUSK and PERRY, JJ.

PERRY, Justice.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a collision of automobiles. Plaintiff prevailed and the defendant appeals.

On August 1, 1950, at about 8 o'clock p. m., the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a 1937 Chevrolet pick-up driven by her husband. The pick-up was traveling in a westerly direction on a street in Willamina, and, as the pick-up was proceeding along the street, a large truck with a tandem trailer, going in the same direction, passed the pick-up at an excessive rate of speed.

The defendant, who was at the time of the accident acting as a special police officer for the city, had parked his automobile, which the city had equipped with a siren, in the driveway of a filling station on the south side of this street. The defendant, without sounding his siren, pulled away from the filling station driveway to follow and intercept the large truck and trailer, and, in so doing, drove into and across the street and collided with the pick-up in which the plaintiff was riding.

The defendant claims that the court erred in giving certain instructions and refusing to give requested instructions of the defendant which set out the defendant's theory of the case to the effect that the defendant was at the time of the accident an officer operating an emergency vehicle.

The general rule is:

'Firemen and police officers are vested with official discretion which may not be deemed to be abused by violating statutes and ordinances regulating traffic upon the public highways. This is not because of any statutory enactment exempting peace officers and firemen from such rules of the road, but upon the ground of sound public policy.

'In a word, the statutes, which plaintiff invokes, were unnecessary as to firemen and peace officers, in the discharge of their duties as such. As to them no different status was created by such statutes than the status which was theirs before the enactment of such law.' Buck v. Ice Delivery Co., 146 Or. 132, 138, 29 P.2d 523, 525.

However, subsequent to the above decision, the legislature defined an 'Authorized emergency vehicle', as follows:

'(d) 'Authorized emergency vehicle.' Vehicles of the fire department, fire patrol, police vehicles, emergency vehicles of municipal departments or public service corporations and ambulances while being used for emergency purposes and displaying the required lights and sounding a siren or other audible warning.' § 115-301, O.C.L.A., as amended by § 1, ch. 279, Oregon Laws 1947.

And as to rights of way and speed, the legislature further provided as follows:

'(b) The driver of a vehicle upon a highway shall yield the right of way to authorized emergency vehicles when the latter are operated in emergencies and the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, siren, compression or exhaust whistle. This provision shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, nor shall it protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of an arbitrary exercise of such right of way.' § 115-338, O.C.L.A., as amended by § 1, ch. 301, Oregon Laws 1949.

'The speeds designated in or pursuant to the provisions of this act shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when operated in emergencies and the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust whistle. This provision shall not relieve the driver of an authorized...

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3 cases
  • Wallach v. Allstate Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • March 20, 2008
    ...aggravates a preexisting condition. See Stubbs v. Mason, 252 Or. 547, 551, 450 P.2d 773 (1969) (so holding); Dodson v. Lemon, 197 Or. 444, 449, 253 P.2d 900 (1953) (same). It follows that, in this case, if the second tortfeasor aggravated a preexisting condition and if the second accident w......
  • Jackson v. Olson
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • December 18, 1985
    ...that it is the duty of every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid damage to himself or to others. See Dodson v. Lemon, 197 Or. 444, 253 P.2d 900 (1953).4 See United States v. Hutchins, 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir.1959); Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F.Supp. 271 (D.Vt.1975) (applying Vermo......
  • Anderson v. Finzel
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1955
    ...provisions of § 115-304, O.C.L.A., ORS 483.032, supra. In support of his contention plaintiff cites the cases of Dodson v. Lemon, 197 Or. 444, 446, 253 P.2d 900, 901, and Buck v. Ice Delivery Co., 146 Or. 132, 138, 29 P.2d 523, quoting from the Dodson case the 'The general rule is: "Firemen......

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