Doe on the demise of Patterson v. Jackman
| Decision Date | 27 November 1854 |
| Citation | 5 Ind. 293 |
| Parties | Doe on the demise of Patterson and Another v. Jackman |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Jefferson Circuit Court.
The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded.
Joseph G. Marshall, for the plaintiff.
Jeremiah Sullivan, for the defendant.
Ejectment for a tract of land in Jefferson county. Verdict for the defendants. New trial refused, and judgment on the verdict.
The material facts of this case are these:
In the year 1829, one Emanuel Meddack died seized of the premises in dispute, leaving two children, Gerardus Meddack and Margaret Patterson. Also at his death he left a will which contains this provision:
"I give to my son Gerardus Meddack, and my daughter Margaret Patterson, all my lands and real estate of every description for and during the term of their natural lives, and after their decease I give the same to their children, the heirs of their bodies, forever."
Margaret Patterson, named in the will, died in the year 1833, leaving Emanuel and Deborah Patterson her only children and heirs who are the plaintiff's lessors. On the 11th of December, 1830, Gerardus Meddack and Margaret Patterson executed a deed in fee to one John Jackman for the land in suit. Under this deed the defendants claim title to the premises, they being in possession, &c.
What estate did Margaret Patterson take under the will? This is the only question in the case. If the effect of the will was to make her an owner in fee, then her deed to Jackman vested in him a like estate. But if she took a life estate only, the fee at her death vested in the plaintiff's lessors, and they would have a right to recover in this action. Which of these positions is correct?
It is said, in argument, that the rule in Shelley's case applies to the case under consideration. That rule is this: "Where a freehold is limited to one for life, and by the same instrument, the inheritance is limited, either mediately or immediately, to heirs or heirs of his body, the first taker takes the whole estate, either in fee simple or fee tail; and the word 'heirs' or 'heirs of the body' are words of limitation, and not of purchase."
This rule is, no doubt, a law of property in Indiana. Still it will not, in any case, be allowed to override the manifest intent of the testator, provided such intention be not unlawful or inconsistent with the rules of law. The rule is not designed to give meaning to words, but to fix the nature and quantity of an estate. Whenever, then, the matter becomes certain that the term heirs is used with an intent that they should take as purchasers, the instrument should be so construed. Indeed there is no rule that can guide us safely through the numerous cases and apparent conflict of authorities on this subject, save that which looks to the intent of the testator.
Upon the first clause of the devise there can be no controversy. "I give all my lands," &c., "to my son Gerardus, and my daughter Margaret, for and during the term of their natural lives." This language admits of but one interpretation. The purpose of the testator to create an estate for life, could not be more directly or strongly expressed. But the language thus used, explicit as it may be, will not prevent the application of the rule, unless the words, "after their decease, I give the same to their children, the heirs of their bodies, forever," indicates that he intended to dispose of an estate in remainder, after the previous life estate was spent.
If full effect can be given to the terms "their children," the case is clearly with the plaintiff, because "where a conveyance was to A., for and during his natural life, and to his children forever," this Court held that the rule in Shelley's case did not apply; that the words "his children" are words of purchase and not of limitation. Sorden v. Gatewood, 1 Ind. 107.
But the term "heirs" is one of limitation. It has a...
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