Doe Patterson Winn

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: THOMPSON
• Citation: Doe Patterson Winn, 24 U.S. 380, 6 L.Ed. 500, 11 Wheat. 380 (1826)
• Decision Date: 08 March 1826
• Parties: DOE, ex dem. PATTERSON, against WINN and Others

24 U.S. 380

6 L.Ed. 500

11 Wheat. 380

DOE, ex dem. PATTERSON, against WINN and Others.

March 8, 1826

Feb. 24th.

THIS cause was argued, by Mr. Berrien and Mr. Wilde, for the plaintiff, and by Mr. White, for the defendant.

March 8th.

Mr. Justice THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case comes up from the Circuit Court for the District of Georgia. And the question presented for decision appears by a certificate of division of opinion in that Court, as to the admissibility of the grant offered in evidence on the part of the plaintiff.

The certificate states, that the plaintiff, to maintain his action, offered in evidence a patent, purporting to be a grant, in due form of law, from the State of Georgia to one Basil Jones, for seven thousand three hundred acres of land, including the premises in question. And, also, the warrant of survey upon which the said tract of land was laid off and surveyed, and the minutes of the Court which granted the warrant. The defendant's counsel objected to the grant's going to the jury, affirming the same to be void in law, inasmuch as no grant could issue under the laws of the State for so great a number of acres as are comprised in the said grant. On which question so made the Court was divided in opinion.

The broad ground assumed in the objection is, that the patent was absolutely void, and not even prima facie evidence of title. The question, as stated, does not distinctly present to the Court the point that was probably intended to be submitted. The objection alleges the patent to be void, because, by the laws of Georgia, no grant could issue for so great a number of acres as seven thousand three hundred, without stating the limitation as to the number of acres. But, from the argument, it is understood, that the limitation contended for on the part of the defendant is to one thousand acres, and that all grants for a greater quantity are absolutely void.

How far it is within the province of a Court of law to entertain inquiries tending to impeach a patent, is a question upon which conflicting opinions have been held; particularly in the different State Courts in this country. By some, the patent is considered only prima facie evidence of title, and open to extrinsic evidence to impeach its validity. By others, that the defect must appear upon the face of the patent, to authorize a Court of law to pronounce it invalid; and that unless the defect does so appear, the patent is only voidable, and recourse must be had to a Court of Chancery to vacate it. By others it has been considered, that the powers of a Court of law were not so broad as laid down in the former of these opinions, nor so limited as in the latter, but that a Court of law may inquire whether the patent was issued without authority, or against the prohibition of a statute, or whether the State had title to the land granted. It is unnecessary, if not improper, at this time, to enter into an examination which of these opinions is best founded in principle. For, so far as the question applies to the present case, it has been settled by this Court in the case of Polk's Lessee v. Wendell et al. (9 Cranch's Rep. 87.) In that part of the case to which I refer, the exceptions under consideration were for causes not apparent on the face of the patent; and the proposition stated for decision is, whether in any, and in what cases, it is allowable, in an action of ejectment, to impeach a grant from the State for causes anterior to its being issued. It is said, that the laws for the sale of public lands provide many guards to secure the regularity of grants, to protect the incipient rights of individuals, and, also, to protect the State from imposition. Officers are appointed to superintend the business, and rules are framed prescribing their duty. These rules are, in general, directory, and when all the proceedings are completed by a patent, issued by the authority of the State, a compliance with these rules is presupposed. That every prerequisite has been performed, is an inference properly deducible, and which every man has a right to draw, from the existence of the grant itself. It would be extremely unreasonable to avoid a grant in any Court for irregularities in the conduct of those who are appointed by the government to supervise the progressive course of a title, from its commencement to its consummation in a patent. But, in order to guard against the conclusion that this doctrine would lead to, closing the door against all inquiry into any matter whatever beyond the grant for the purpose of avoiding it, the Court adds, that the great principles of justice and of law would be violated, if there did not exist some tribunal to which an injured party might appeal, and in which the means by which an elder title was acquired might be examined, if it had been acquired by the violation of principles essential to the validity of a contract; but that a Court of equity is the more eligible tribunal, in general, for these questions and they ought to be excluded from a Court of law. But the Court say, there are cases in which a grant is absolutely void, (or inoperative,) as where the State has no title to the thing granted, or where the officer had no authority to issue the grant. In such cases, the validity of the grant is necessarily examinable at law.

This doctrine was again recognised and sanctioned by this Court five years afterwards, when the same cause (5 Wheat. Rep. 293.) was a second time under consideration; and it is in coincidence with the rule settled in the Supreme Court of New-York in the case of Jackson v. Lawton, (10 Johns. Rep. 23.) We may, therefore, assume as the settled doctrine of this Court, that if a patent is absolutely void upon its face, or the issuing thereof was without authority, or was prohibited by statute, or the State had no title, it may be impeached collaterally in a Court of law, in an action of ejectment. But, in general, other objections and defects complained of must be put in issue, in a regular course of pleadings, on a direct proceeding to avoid the patent; and we are not aware of any contrary rule prevailing in the State Courts of Georgia. But, so far as we have any information on the subject, the practice there is in accordance with the rule laid down by this Court.

The objection in this case to the admissibility of the grant in evidence, is, that it was issued without the authority of law, and in violation of certain statutes of the State of Georgia, which, it is alleged, prohibit the issuing of a grant to any one person for more than one thousand acres of land; and if the statutes referred to will warrant this construction, the objection was well taken, and can be sustained in a Court of law. And this leads to an examination of those statutes as applicable to the grant in question.

The grant bears date on the 24th of May, 1787, and is for 7,300 acres of land in the county of Franklin, described by metes and bounds, and refering to a plat of the same thereunto annexed. No consideration is expressed in the grant, or any designation of the nature of the rights which made up the quantity of land mentioned in the grant, but it is in the common form prescribed by statute. The proceedings of the Court of Franklin county, on the application of Basil Jones, accompany the grant, by which it is ordered that he...