Doe v. Abbott Laboratories, Civ. A. No. 94-2913.

• Citation: 892 F. Supp. 811
• Decision Date: 19 July 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-2913.
• Parties: Jane DOE, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

892 F. Supp. 811

Jane DOE, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, et al.

Civ. A. No. 94-2913.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

July 19, 1995.

Richard Lynn Ducote, David R. Fine, Fine & Associates, New Orleans, LA, Troy Gerard Broussard, Covington, LA, for plaintiff.

Henry Bernis Alsobrook, Jr., Richard Anthony Goins, Janis van Meerveld, Adams & Reese, New Orleans, LA, for defendants.

ORDER AND REASONS

JONES, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is "Plaintiff's Motion to Review Magistrate Judge's Order," which was submitted without oral argument on a previous date. Having reviewed the record, the memoranda of the parties and the applicable law, the Court DENIES plaintiff's motion.

Background

Plaintiff originally filed this matter in the 21st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Tangipahoa, State of Louisiana, alleging injuries as a result of the intentional and/or negligent behavior of defendant Richard Green in July 1993. (Exh. B., R.Doc. 2.) Plaintiff alleged that defendant Abbott Laboratories, Green's employer, is also liable for damages. Id.

Following removal to this Court, plaintiff moved to amend her complaint. (R.Doc. 10.) Defendants opposed this motion on the basis that the proposed amendment sought punitive and compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 13981, enacted in 1994, which defendants argued could not be applied retroactively to the date of the alleged wrongdoing. (R.Doc. 11.)¹

The Magistrate Judge granted plaintiff's motion insofar as the amended complaint sought to add factual allegations related to plaintiff's original lawsuit. (R.Doc. 16.) However, the Magistrate Judge refused to allow the amended complaint insofar as it alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 13981, finding that the proposed amendment contained a non-retroactive statutory claim. Id. The Magistrate Judge also denied the claim for a jury demand on the basis that "no new issues are added." Id.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking review of the Magistrate Judge's ruling, which is opposed by defendant. Plaintiff offers no arguments in favor of her motion other than the memoranda filed before the Magistrate Judge.² Plaintiff contends that she should be allowed to amend her complaint freely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) and that her cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 13981 is remedial and thus retroactive. Defendants, in turn, have filed an opposition memorandum that effectively is the same as their opposition memorandum filed before the Magistrate Judge, which contends that the statute at issue should not be applied retroactively.

Law and Application

Pretrial matters decided by a magistrate judge should only be set aside or modified if clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(a). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The present issue does not involve factual findings but an interpretation of law. Thus, the Court will only set aside or modify the Magistrate Judge's ruling if it is contrary to law.

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) sets forth the applicable guidelines to determine whether a claim under a statute enacted after events occur can be applied retroactively to cover those events.

Landgraf specifically involved whether certain provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (hereinafter "1991 Act") which created a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to a Title VII case pending on appeal when the statute was enacted. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1488. The Supreme Court held that the provisions did not apply. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1488.

In doing so, the Supreme Court first examined "whether the statutory text on which petitioner relies manifests an intent that the 1991 Act should be applied to cases that arose and went to trial before its enactment." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1492. The Supreme Court found that the language of the statute that it would take effect on a certain date "does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred on an earlier date." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1493. Further, the Supreme Court found that neither the language in certain sections of the 1991 Act nor the legislative history supported the petitioner's argument of retroactivity. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1493-96. Indeed, the Supreme Court found that the "history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression that the legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1496.

In the present case, the statutory text does not speak to the effective date of § 13981. Nor does the brief legislative history speak to the effective date of this section. See 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853-54. Thus, as the Supreme Court did in Landgraf, the Court must look further to determine whether § 13981 can be applied retroactively to causes of action that arose before its enactment. The Landgraf Court provided the framework for such a determination.

When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not operate absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.

Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1505.

Justice Stevens, writing for the Supreme Court, found that the retroactive application of a claim for punitive damages under the 1991 Act would raise serious constitutional concerns. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. Even before reaching this constitutional question, however, "we would have to be confronted with a statute that explicitly authorized punitive damages for preenactment conduct." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. However, Justice Stevens found that the "Civil Rights Act of 1991 contained no such explicit command." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506.

Similarly, § 13981 contains no such explicit command. Thus, for the same reasons set forth by the Supreme Court in Landgraf, the Court finds that a punitive damages claim under § 13981 can not be applied retroactively.

In Landgraf the Supreme Court found that classification of the compensatory damages claim was not as simple as the classification of the punitive damages claim because "concerns about a lack of fair notice are ... muted by the fact that such discrimination was in many cases (although not this one) already subject to back monetary liability in the form of backpay." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. The Court held that, in effect, the provision at issue only provided "more complete redress for violations of rules established more than a generation ago in the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506.

However, the Court also found that compensatory damages, while intended to make victims whole rather than "sanction wrongdoers," accomplished their goal "by a mechanism that affects the liabilities of defendants." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. As a result, employers must pay for harms caused. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. "The introduction of a right to compensatory damages is also the type of legal change that would have an impact on private parties' planning." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. "An important new legal burden would attach to that conduct." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. The Court concluded that the remedy for compensatory damages did not apply to "events antedating its enactment in the absence of clear congressional intent." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. Thus, in accord with the presumption against retroactivity, the Court held that the provision at issue could not operate retroactively because there was no such clear congressional intent. Id. at ___ - ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1507-08.

In the present case, the Court notes first that, unlike Landgraf, § 13981 was not enacted to provide more complete redress under any prior statute but to establish a civil rights remedy "for crimes of violence motivated by gender committed on the street or in the home." 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1853. Congress found that "a Federal Civil Rights action as specified in this section is necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws and to reduce the substantial adverse effects on interstate commerce caused by crimes of violence motivated by gender." Id.

Additionally, and similar to the determination in Landgraf, the Court finds that the introduction of this new cause of action allowing for compensatory damages has an "impact on private parties' planning" and constitutes an "important new legal burden." Landgraf, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. Finally, the Court finds no clear congressional intent that § 13981 apply to events occurring before its enactment.

Therefore, in accord with the presumption against retroactivity of statutes absent such specific congressional intent, the Court finds that § 13981 cannot be applied retroactively to the instant events which allegedly occurred in July 1993.

Plaintiff argues that § 13981 should be applied retroactively because it is "remedial in nature." However, under the test set forth in Landgraf, plaintiff's argument fails for the reasons explained above. The contention also fails because the Supreme Court, in ruling on the provisions at issue in Landgraf, distinguished these provisions from those in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that Congress specifically designed to overturn prior Supreme Court holdings as to other issues. Landgraf, ___ U.S. at ___ -...