Doe v. AFL-CIO, Dept. of Organization, Region 6

• Decision Date: 17 December 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C 74-10A.
• Citation: 405 F. Supp. 389
• Parties: Emmett DOE, Jr. v. AFL-CIO, DEPARTMENT OF ORGANIZATION, REGION 6, ATLANTA, GEORGIA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

405 F. Supp. 389

Emmett DOE, Jr. v. AFL-CIO, DEPARTMENT OF ORGANIZATION, REGION 6, ATLANTA, GEORGIA.

Civ. A. No. C 74-10A.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

December 17, 1975.

Laughlin McDonald, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

David W. Crosland, Atlanta, Ga., and Cooper, Mitchel & Crawford, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant.

ORDER

JAMES C. HILL, District Judge.

This case having come on for hearing before the Court and after hearing the evidence and upon consideration of the materials submitted, the Court finds as follows:

1. Plaintiff Emmett Doe is a Negro citizen of the United States and is over the age of 21 years. At the time of the filing of this lawsuit he was a resident of Atlanta, Georgia.

2. Plaintiff commenced this action by filing his complaint on January 3, 1974, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. He seeks declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay, damages and attorney's fees.

3. The defendant AFL-CIO is an organization of affiliated trade unions. The mission of its Department of Organization, Region 6, is to aid and assist affiliates in their organizing efforts and to institute organizing efforts upon its own initiative.

4. Not having a black organizer upon its staff and desiring to add such a person to assist in the organization of black workers in the South, the defendant interviewed a number of prospective trainees during February, 1968. Plaintiff was one of the persons interviewed.

5. Oliver Singleton, the Director of the Department of Organization, Region 6, indicated that he had strong leanings toward hiring plaintiff.

6. Plaintiff was appointed a temporary organizer on the staff of Region 6 effective March 24, 1968, upon the recommendation of Singleton, for a period not to exceed 90 days.

7. Consistent with defendant's desire to organize black employees, Singleton instructed plaintiff by memo dated April 11, 1968, that he should attempt to organize a number of plants within the metropolitan Atlanta area which had a significant number of blacks employed or where blacks formed a majority of the work force.

8. On May 23, 1968, Singleton recommended to W. L. Kircher, Director of Organization, AFL-CIO, Washington, D. C., that plaintiff's appointment be extended for an additional period of 90 days. While expressing some reservations about his recommendation, Singleton also expressed his admiration for plaintiff with regard to his strong convictions on the deficiencies of society and the role of the trade union movement.

9. Doe was notified by Kircher on May 27, 1968, that his appointment as a temporary organizer had been extended for 90 additional days.

10. Then, by letter dated September 4, 1968, Singleton recommended to Kircher that plaintiff be employed permanently as a field representative of AFL-CIO. Singleton again noted that while plaintiff was often critical of the racial policies of some unions, he felt that plaintiff could still be an effective organizer.

11. Accordingly, plaintiff was given the job and regular appointment as an AFL-CIO field representative effective September 20, 1968.

12. Singleton received complaints about plaintiff from several officials of unions affiliated with AFL-CIO to which plaintiff had been assigned for organizing campaigns. Uniformly, these officials objected to plaintiff's style and language, and requested that plaintiff not be assigned to any more of their organizing campaigns.

13. Plaintiff was during this time also commended for his organizing efforts by other union officials.

14. Plaintiff often expressed his belief that the AFL-CIO and its affiliates were not responding to the needs of black workers, that the union movement historically had been insensitive to the needs of black workers, that blacks tended to be exploited by unions for membership purposes, that blacks had been excluded from the union elective process and leadership positions and, that black workers should seek active roles in union affairs. Plaintiff also expressed his view that the AFL-CIO leaders were regressive and lacked social awareness to the problems of black workers. (These expressions were made by plaintiff in talks to and conversations with black workers sought to be persuaded to vote in favor of union membership.) Reports received by Singleton indicated that such were viewed as detrimental to organizing efforts.

15. Plaintiff submitted an expense report for late April and early May which indicated performance of activities on a day when information available to his supervisor indicated he was in Atlanta on that day, rather than Valdosta. When asked to substantiate his work activities for that day, he failed to do so.

16. Plaintiff was dismissed from employment by defendant on July 7, 1969.

17. Plaintiff was terminated from his employment because he failed to follow instructions given to him by his supervisor; he did not work in harmony with some AFL-CIO staff; he submitted apparently inaccurate activities reports; and he committed actions which were injurious to union organization activities.

18. Plaintiff filed a complaint with EEOC on August 13, 1969, alleging that his dismissal had been in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

19. On April 2, 1973, EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant had engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discharging plaintiff because of his race and opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII.

20. On October 6, 1973, plaintiff was advised by letter dated October 4, 1973, that defendant's compliance with Title VII had not been accomplished within the period allowed to the EEOC by Title VII and that he was entitled to institute a civil action in the appropriate federal district court within 90 days of receipt of said letter. This lawsuit was commenced within the 90 day period on January 3, 1974.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

This Court has jurisdiction over this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The plaintiff is a black citizen of the United States. The defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and is engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).

Plaintiff contends that he was dismissed because of his opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII. Section 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides in part:

"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, asserted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this subchapter."

The plain purpose of Title VII is to assure equality of employment opportunities and "to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The Civil Rights Act does not command that any person be hired or retained simply because he is a member of a minority group. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).

In this case plaintiff charges that he was fired because of his statements and opposition to discriminatory practices of AFL-CIO and its affiliates and because of his race. The defendant denies that its decision to fire plaintiff was based upon either of these reasons. The Court agrees with the defendant.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra. There has been no attempt to show by way of a statistical case or otherwise that the defendant has engaged historically in discriminatory employment practices.

The issue in this case narrows down to "Why was plaintiff discharged by the defendant"? In deciding this question the reasons expressed and motives underlying the recommendations of Singleton are crucial. Of course, the Court is mindful that such an inquiry entails an analysis of "subjective intent" or "motive" and should not be allowed to mask the sort of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.

This being the case, a great deal of the evidence that might otherwise be considered hearsay is transferred into direct evidence. In other words, a good deal of testimony was taken as to what Singleton was told by officials of affiliate unions with regard to plaintiff's performance as an organizer. Such would be hearsay if the Court were trying to determine the truth or falsity of those reports. However, it is direct evidence of the information available to Singleton and upon which he acted. The Court's job is not to find out whether or not plaintiff carried weapons or whether he in fact falsified his expense statement for May 5, 1969....