Doe v. Alfred

• Decision Date: 04 December 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 6:95-0761.
• Parties: Jane DOE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Edward J. ALFRED, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

906 F. Supp. 1092

Jane DOE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Edward J. ALFRED, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 6:95-0761.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Parkersburg Division.

December 4, 1995.

Michael J. Sharley, Westover, WV, for plaintiffs.

Robert J. Kent and Claudia W. Bentley Bowles, Rice, McDavid, Graff & Love, Martinsburg, WV, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HADEN, Chief Judge.

Pending is Defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion.

I. FACTUAL DEVELOPMENT

Plaintiff K.D. is a teenager who previously attended Jefferson Elementary Center during the 1994-95 school year.¹ Plaintiff Jane Doe is the student's mother. Defendant Edward J. Alfred is the principal of Jefferson Elementary Center; Defendant Ronald V. Stoops is the assistant principal; Defendant William D. Staats was the previous Superintendent of Wood County Schools; and Defendant Daniel D. Curry is the current Superintendent.

The student was diagnosed with learning disabilities while enrolled in the third and fourth grades and since has been educated pursuant to an Individual Education Program ("IEP") as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (IDEA).² Because of K.D.'s attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, his IEP incorporated a Behavior Intervention Plan ("BIP") outlining the procedures to be followed for controlling his aggression.

In March 1995, K.D. was suspended from school because of a physical altercation with a teacher. Plaintiffs allege the suspension violated the IEP and BIP. Plaintiffs also complain of Defendants' release of certain private information to the local news media and the Parkersburg Police Department concerning the incident. Plaintiffs assert they never consented to these disclosures, and the publicity violated K.D.'s right to privacy.

In May 1995, K.D. engaged in another altercation, this time with a fellow schoolmate during a field trip. When they returned to school, K.D. and his classmate were called to Assistant Principal Stoops' office. Mrs. Doe came to the school when summoned by Mr. Stoops, but she was denied immediate access to her son in violation of the BIP.³ While in Stoops' office, another altercation occurred when the classmate provoked K.D. with an undisclosed racial epithet. K.D. then was suspended from school in violation of the BIP.

Later in May 1995, Mrs. Doe met with school and school board officials to discuss the BIP and why it was not followed. She alleges Stoops "belittled her ... and voiced his belief that ... K.D.'s behavior should be dealt with without respect for his disability and irregardless sic of the BIP." Compl. ¶ 20. Still later that month, Mrs. Doe met with an IEP Committee for a "transitional meeting." She claims a representative of the local Federation of Teachers also attended, which violated her son's right to privacy.

Plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court of Wood County, West Virginia on August 2, 1995. Defendants removed the case to this Court on September 5, 1995. Plaintiffs assert Defendants, while acting under color of state law, deprived K.D. of his statutory and constitutional rights to a free appropriate public education ("FAPE")⁴ and student privacy. Plaintiffs aver the right to a FAPE is guaranteed by (1) the IDEA and state statutes and regulations providing for the education of disabled students; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) Article 3, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief for the alleged constitutional and statutory violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Alfred, Stoops, Staats and Curry (the "individual Defendants") also are sued for damages in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs seek only prospective injunctive relief against the Wood County Board of Education (the "Board").

Defendants' motion asserts the complaint must be dismissed because (1) Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA; (2) the IDEA does not provide for monetary damages; (3) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232 et seq. because (a) FERPA does not afford a private right of action; and (b) § 1983 cannot be used under these circumstances to allege a FERPA violation; and (4) the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the individual capacity claims pursuant to West Virginia law.

II. THE LAW

A. Standard Governing a Motion to Dismiss:

A difficult and exacting burden is imposed upon a movant under Rule 12(b)(6). The well-settled standard by which such a motion is analyzed was recently restated by this Court as follows:

`In general, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support its claim and would entitle it to relief. In considering a motion to dismiss, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.' Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied sub nom., American Home Products Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1307, 127 L.Ed.2d 658 (1994).

Hurt v. United States, 889 F.Supp. 248, 251 (S.D.W.Va.1995) (Haden, C.J.) (emphasis added).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the IDEA

Defendants primarily assert Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to them under the IDEA. Defendants claim this failure to exhaust precludes Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for failure to provide the student a FAPE. While not precisely briefed by the parties, the essential question is whether Plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA although damages are not available to Plaintiffs in the administrative process. Some general background on the IDEA is helpful.

In Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), the Supreme Court echoed prior Congressional observations concerning the necessity of the IDEA and its predecessor Acts:⁵

Congress sought `to assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, and to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected.' When the law was passed in 1975, Congress had before it ample evidence that such legislative assurances were sorely needed: 21 years after this Court declared education to be `perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,' congressional studies revealed that better than half of the Nation's 8 million disabled children were not receiving appropriate educational services. Indeed, one out of every eight of these children was excluded from the public school system altogether,; many others were simply `warehoused' in special classes or were neglectfully shepherded through the system until they were old enough to drop out.

Id. at 309, 108 S.Ct. at 596 (citations and quoted authority omitted).

In response to the States' derelictions, Congress created the IDEA to "confer upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public education ... and conditioned federal financial assistance upon a State's compliance with the substantive and procedural goals of the Act." Id. at 310, 108 S.Ct. at 597 (citations omitted).

The IDEA did not accord parents the right to file suit in federal court to redress the denial of a FAPE or other rights protected by the IDEA ab initio. Rather, Congress created a detailed administrative scheme for aggrieved parents to pursue and exhaust prior to filing a federal claim. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 225, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 2398-99, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989); Honig, 484 U.S. at 308, 108 S.Ct. at 596; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010-11, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3467-68, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Combs v. School Bd. of Rockingham County, 15 F.3d 357, 358 (4th Cir.1994); McGovern v. Sullins, 676 F.2d 98, 99 (4th Cir. 1982); Scruggs v. Campbell, 630 F.2d 237, 238-39 (4th Cir.1980).⁶ Title 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made ... during the administrative hearing and appeal process described in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) and (c) shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy....

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).

The inclusion of this administrative process as a prerequisite to a civil action was purposeful, given "Congress' view that the needs of handicapped children are best accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for each handicapped child's education." Smith, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468 (noting as well "Congress' intent that each child's individual education ... be worked out through a process that begins on the local level...."); DeVries v. Spillane, 853 F.2d 264, 266 (4th Cir.1988). As recognized in Smith, "no federal district court presented with a constitutional claim to a public education can duplicate this process." Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012, 104 S.Ct. at 3468. Further, courts repeatedly have observed exhaustion serves many useful functions by:

`(1) permitting the exercise of agency discretion and expertise on issues requiring these characteristics; (2) allowing the full development of technical issues and a factual record prior to court review; (3) preventing deliberate disregard and circumvention of

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