Doe v. Alsaud

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: Sweet, U.S.D.J.
• Citation: Doe v. Alsaud, 224 F.Supp.3d 286 (S.D. N.Y. 2016)
• Decision Date: 13 December 2016
• Docket Number: 13 Civ. 571
• Parties: Jane DOE, Plaintiff, v. HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd ALSAUD and Mustapha Ouanes, Defendants.

224 F.Supp.3d 286

Jane DOE, Plaintiff,

v.HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd ALSAUD and Mustapha Ouanes, Defendants.

13 Civ. 571

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed December 13, 2016

Attorneys for Plaintiff MORELLI LAW FIRM LLC, 777 Third Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017, By: Sara A. Strickland, Martha M. McBrayer Pro se MUSTAPHA OCTANES, DIN # 12A2814, Eastern New York Correctional Facility, Box 338, Napanoch, NY 12458

OPINION

Sweet, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff Jane Doe ("Plaintiff" or "Doe") has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 as to pro se defendant Mustapha Ouanes's ("Defendant" or "Ouanes") liability. Based on the conclusions set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is granted.

I. Prior Proceedings

Plaintiff filed the complaint to commence the instant action on January 25, 2013. Plaintiff alleged Ouanes, as an employee of HRH Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd Alsaud ("Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd") and Hariri Interests doing business as Saudi Oger LTD ("Saudi Oger"), sexually assaulted, raped, and sodomized her and another woman, Mary Doe, at the Plaza Hotel on January 26, 2010. Plaintiff alleged claims of negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent retention, and respondeat superior liability against Saudi Oger and Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd, and claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ouanes.

In February 2012, following a two-week trial in New York Criminal Court, a jury convicted Ouanes of five criminal charges: rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and attempted sexual abuse in the first degree. See People v. Ouanes , 123 A.D.3d 480, 998 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1st Dep't 2014), leave to appeal denied , 25 N.Y.3d 1075, 12 N.Y.S.3d 627, 34 N.E.3d 378 (2015). Ouanes was sentenced to ten years in prison.

Plaintiff moved for default judgment against Prince Abdulaziz Bin Fahd for his failure to appear, which was denied on April 3, 2014 for failure to effect proper service. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) Hariri Interests was voluntarily dismissed by stipulation on May 1, 2013. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on May 7, 2013, removing Hariri and withdrawing the negligent hiring claim. By Opinion dated April 3, 2014, all of Plaintiff's remaining claims against Saudi Oger were dismissed for failure to state a claim. By stipulation, all claims against Saudi Oger were dismissed with prejudice on May 22, 2014.

In January 2016, Defendant Ouanes moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment as to Ouanes's liability based on collateral estoppel. By Opinion dated May 6, 2016, both motions were denied. Plaintiff was granted leave to refile.

Plaintiff again moved for summary judgment as to Ouanes's liability on collateral estoppel on June 30, 2016. The motion was taken on submission on August 18, 2016, at which point the motion was deemed fully submitted.

II. The Facts

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, the material facts relevant to this motion are set forth in Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (hereinafter "SUMF"). The facts are not in dispute except as set forth below.

In January 2010, Plaintiff Jane Doe was a 26–year-old nursing student living in Brooklyn, NY. SUMF ¶ 9. She was also employed as a bartender at the now-defunct Habibi Lounge, a Middle Eastern hookah bar, located in Manhattan's East Village. Id. ¶ 12.

After her shift ended around 12:30 or 1:00 am, id. ¶ 13, Plaintiff, some of her co-workers, and several friends met at Veranda, a cocktail lounge in the West Village, for drinks. Id. One of the friends in attendance was "Mary Doe," a 25–year-old NYU student. Id. At Veranda, Defendant Mustapha Ouanes approached Plaintiff and offered to buy her a drink. She declined. Id. ¶ 14. Later that evening, Plaintiff and some of her co-workers and friends, including Mary Doe, went to Falucka Lounge, another cocktail lounge in the West Village. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant also went to Falucka Lounge, id. and while there, he bought a round of champagne for everyone, id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff spoke to Defendant to thank him for the champagne. Id.

At approximately 4:30 or 5:00 am, Mary Doe and Plaintiff left Falucka Lounge and got in a cab to Mary Doe's apartment. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant stated that he was going in the same direction, as he lived at The Plaza Hotel, and joined them in the cab. Id. After Plaintiff and Mary Doe discussed getting something to eat, Defendant suggested they join him at The Plaza Hotel, explaining that since he worked for Saudi Arabian prince, they would be able to get food regardless of the late hour. Id. Plaintiff and Mary Doe agreed, but all of the restaurants were closed when they arrived at The Plaza Hotel, so they accompanied Defendant to his room upon Plaintiff's offer that he would order room service. Id. ¶ 19.

Defendant briefly left the room and returned with three Arab men, who were purportedly there to join them for breakfast. Id. ¶ 20. At approximately 5:30 am, Plaintiff poured mimosas and noticed her drink looked strange; she commented to Mary Doe: "This orange juice looks funny." Id. ¶ 21. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff lost consciousness. Id. ¶ 22.

Throughout the morning of January 26, 2010, Plaintiff came in and out of consciousness as Defendant raped and sodomized her. Id. ¶¶ 23–29. She tried unsuccessfully to move away and scream, as she felt heavily drugged. Id. Mary Doe was also in the room and also appeared to be heavily drugged to the point of immobility. Id. ¶¶ 26–27, 30. Eventually, Plaintiff and Mary Doe were able to threaten Defendant with a broken glass and call 911. Id. ¶ 32.

At approximately 8:00 am, New York City Police Department officers arrived and arrested Defendant. Id. ¶ 33. They escorted Mary Doe and Plaintiff to the Emergency Room at Roosevelt Hospital. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff underwent a rape kit, having multiple contusions and bruises on her body and genitalia. Id. Since the events of January 26, 2010, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and economic loss. Id. ¶¶ 35–36.

Defendant was charged with seven criminal counts against two female victims, Plaintiff Jane Doe and Mary Doe, based on the same occurrences set forth in Plaintiff's civil Complaint here. A comparison of the unredacted version of Plaintiff's Affidavit and the unredacted version of the criminal trial transcript reveals that Counts One (rape in the first degree), Two (criminal sexual act in the first degree), Three (criminal sexual act in the first degree), Four (sexual abuse in the first degree), Five (attempted sexual abuse in the first degree), and Six (assault in the second degree) involved Defendant's crimes against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 38. The Seventh Count (attempt to commit sexual abuse in the first degree) involved Mary Doe. Id.

On February 15, 2012, Defendant was convicted by a jury of five of the criminal charges: rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and attempted sexual assault in the first degree. Id. ¶ 37. Defendant was sentenced to ten years in prison. Id. ¶ 39.

III. The Applicable Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The relevant inquiry on application for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

A court is not charged with weighing the evidence and determining its truth, but with determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. City Transit Auth. , 735 F.Supp. 1205, 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original).

While the moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. CSX Lines, L.L.C. , 432 F.3d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 2005), in cases where the non-moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "It is ordinarily sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence ... on an essential element of the non-movant's claim.... [T]he nonmoving party must [then] come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial ...." Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found. , 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Once the moving party has made a properly supported showing sufficient to suggest the absence of any genuine issue as to a material fact, the nonmoving party ... must come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in his favor").

IV. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the ground of collateral estoppel. See Pl.'s...