Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of the Town of Westport
| Decision Date | 07 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | AC 44153, (AC 44122) |
| Citation | 213 Conn.App. 22,277 A.3d 164 |
| Parties | John DOE 1 et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF WESTPORT et al. John Doe 2 et al. v. Board of Education of the Town of Westport et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Piper A. Paul, Westport, filed briefs for the appellants (plaintiffs in each case).
Jonathan C. Zellner, Stamford, with whom, on the brief, was Ryan T. Daly, for the appellees (defendants in each case).
Moll, Alexander and Bear, Js.
These appeals involve consolidated actions1 concerning complaints of the bullying of two minor children by some of their classmates, which occurred while they attended Coleytown Middle School (middle school) in the town of Westport, and the alleged failures of school staff and administration in addressing those bullying complaints. In Docket No. AC 44153, the plaintiffs, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, and Jack Doe 1,2 appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting, in part, the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the Board of Education of the Town of Westport (board); Micah Lawrence, the vice principal of the middle school; Elliott Landon, the superintendent of schools for the Westport school system; Richard Quiricone, a physical education teacher at the middle school; and the town of Westport (town).3 On appeal, the Doe 1 plaintiffs claim that the court erred in granting the Doe 1 defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Doe 1 plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Doe 1 plaintiffs, (2) determined that the Doe 1 defendants are immune from liability under General Statutes § 10-222l because (a) the allegations of negligence in counts three, four, five, eight, and nine4 involve issues relating to whether the Doe 1 defendants acted in good faith and adequately reported and investigated the bullying allegations, which are factual issues and should not have been decided on a motion for summary judgment, and (b) the Doe 1 defendants failed to respond to six bullying complaints, (3) rendered summary judgment in favor of Lawrence, Landon, and Quiricone with respect to the claim of recklessness in count six because the claim requires a determination of their intent, which is a question of fact, (4) granted the motion for summary judgment as to count ten, which alleges a claim of respondeat superior liability against the board and the town, and (5) granted the motion for summary judgment when a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Landon or the board retaliated against the Doe 1 plaintiffs, as alleged in counts five, six, and nine. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 44153.
In Docket No. AC 44122, the plaintiffs, John Doe 2, Jane Doe 2, and Jack Doe 2,5 appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the board, Kris Szabo, Lawrence, Landon, Quiricone, and the town.6 On appeal, the Doe 2 plaintiffs claim that the court improperly granted the Doe 2 defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Doe 2 plaintiffs claim that (1) the court improperly failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Doe 2 plaintiffs, (2) the allegations of negligence involve factual issues that are not susceptible to summary adjudication, (3) the claim of recklessness against Lawrence, Landon, Szabo, and Quiricone in count five requires a determination of their intent, which is a question of fact, (4) the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment as to the claim of respondeat superior liability against the board and the town in count nine, and (5) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Landon or the board retaliated against the Doe 2 plaintiffs, as alleged in counts four, five, and eight. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 44122.
Before we address the substance of the claims in both appeals, we first set forth our well settled standard of review of a trial court's decision granting a motion for summary judgment. "The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is preventing unnecessary trials. ... If a plaintiff is unable to present sufficient evidence in support of an essential element of his cause of action at trial, he cannot prevail as a matter of law. ... To avert these types of ill-fated cases from advancing to trial, following adequate time for discovery, a plaintiff may properly be called upon at the summary judgment stage to demonstrate that he possesses sufficient counterevidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any, or even all, of the essential elements of his cause of action. ...
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salamone v. Wesleyan University , 210 Conn. App. 435, 443–44, 270 A.3d 172 (2022).
We first address the appeal of the Doe 1 plaintiffs in AC 44153. The record before the court, viewed in the light most favorable to the Doe 1 plaintiffs as the non-moving parties, reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history.
The Doe 1 plaintiffs filed a revised complaint on April 10, 2019, alleging the following facts. Jack Doe 1 was the victim of bullying in the town's school system from January, 2013, to at least June 22, 2017. During that time, he was called names by fellow students, ridiculed about his athletic ability, and subjected to racial epithets, physical assaults, threats, mental abuse, and repeated and numerous comments about his sexual orientation. On March 18, 2016, Jack Doe 1 was attacked and assaulted by four students during gym class at the middle school. The attack, which occurred in an area of the gym where the substitute gym teacher7 could not see the students, was not witnessed by a teacher or an administrator. Following that incident, on March 19, 2016, Jack Doe 1 filed with the administration of the middle school a bullying report that detailed the March 18, 2016 assault. Thereafter, on March 22, 2016, John Doe 1 and Jane Doe 1 filed with the administration several bullying reports that detailed Jack Doe 1's extensive history of being bullied. According to the revised complaint, the Doe 1 defendants never initiated a formal or complete investigation of the March 19, 2016 bullying report filed by Jack Doe 1, and they either failed to investigate or conducted a wholly inadequate investigation of the claims alleged in the March 22, 2016 bullying reports.
Subsequently, John Doe 1 and Jane Doe 1 were informed by Szabo that two bullying complaints had been filed against Jack Doe 1. After those allegations were sustained, Jack Doe 1 received two days of in-school suspension, which the Doe 1 plaintiffs allege was done in retaliation for their complaints of the bullying of Jack Doe 1.
Thereafter, on April 11, 2016, Jack Doe 1 was bullied and called a derogatory name by another student. Jack Doe 1 was very upset by the incident and asked Szabo if he could speak to his guidance counselor, but Szabo refused and, instead, insisted that he write down what happened. Jack Doe 1 then requested to speak with his father, but Szabo refused and, in a hostile manner, grabbed Jack Doe 1's arm and shook it. The April 11, 2016 incident was never investigated, and, on April 12, 2016, Szabo issued a two day out-of-school suspension to Jack Doe 1,8 which the Doe 1 plaintiffs claim was retaliatory in nature. In February, 2018, the Doe 1 plaintiffs commenced the underlying action in AC 44153 against the Doe 1 defendants.
In counts three, four, five, and nine9 of the revised complaint, the Doe 1 plaintiffs allege claims of negligence against the Doe 1 defendants. The claims are premised on the failure of those defendants to comply with a bullying prevention and intervention policy that had been adopted by the board, as well as a safe school climate plan (plan) that the town's public schools had developed and implemented at the direction...
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