Doe v. Borough of Barrington

Citation729 F. Supp. 376
Decision Date29 January 1990
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 88-2642 (SSB).
PartiesJane DOE, on behalf of herself and as guardian ad litem for her minor children, John Doe; Mary Doe; Sally Doe; and Robert Doe, Plaintiffs, v. BOROUGH OF BARRINGTON; Thomas Page, individually and as Chief of Police of the Borough of Barrington; George Breene, individually and as Detective of Barrington Police Department; Borough of Runnemede; Russell Smith, individually and as Patrolman of Runnemede Police Department; Rita DiAngelo, individually and as school employee of the Borough of Runnemede, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

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Tomar, Seliger, Simonoff, Adourian & O'Brien by Theodore M. Lieverman and James Katz, Haddonfield, N.J., for plaintiffs.

Maloney & McCafferty by Michael P. McCafferty, Marlton, N.J., for defendants Borough of Runnemede and Officer Russell Smith.

Montano, Summers, Mullen, Manual & Owens by F. Herbert Owens, III, Westmont, N.J., for defendants Borough of Barrington, Chief of Police Page and Detective Breene.

Robert L. Messick, Haddonfield, N.J., for defendant Rita DiAngelo.

BROTMAN, District Judge.

Presently before the court is the motion of plaintiffs Jane Doe and her children1 for partial summary judgment against defendants Borough of Runnemede ("Runnemede") and Officer Smith. These defendants have cross-moved for summary judgment. This case presents novel issues concerning the privacy rights of individuals who have contracted Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") and the privacy rights of their family members. For the reasons stated in this opinion, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against defendants Runnemede and Smith will be granted. Accordingly, the motion of defendants Runnemede and Smith for summary judgment will be denied.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The facts are largely undisputed. On March 25, 1987, Jane Doe, her husband, and their friend James Tarvis were traveling in the Doe's pickup truck through the Borough of Barrington ("Barrington"). At approximately 9:00 a.m., a Barrington police officer stopped the truck and questioned the occupants. As a result of the vehicle stop, Barrington officers arrested Jane Doe's husband and impounded the pickup truck. Barrington officers escorted Jane Doe, her husband, and James Tarvis to the Barrington Police Station.

When he was initially arrested, Jane Doe's husband told the police officers that he had tested HIV positive and that the officers should be careful in searching him because he had "weeping lesions." There is some dispute over the exact words used by Jane Doe's husband and about the number of persons present when Jane Doe's husband revealed the information. These disputed facts do not change the outcome here. Barrington police released Jane Doe and James Tarvis from custody, but detained Jane Doe's husband on charges of unlawful possession of a hypodermic needle and a burglary detainer entered by Essex County.

Sometime in the late afternoon of the same day, Jane Doe and James Tarvis drove Tarvis's car to the Doe residence in the Borough of Runnemede ("Runnemede"). The car engine was left running, and the car apparently slipped into gear, rolling down the driveway into a neighbor's fence. The neighbors owning the fence are Michael DiAngelo and defendant Rita DiAngelo. Rita DiAngelo is an employee in the school district in Runnemede.

Two Runnemede police officers, Steven Van Camp and defendant Russell Smith, responded to the radio call about the incident. While they were at the scene, Detective Preen of the Barrington police arrived and, in a private conversation with Van Camp, revealed that Jane Doe's husband had been arrested earlier in the day and had told Barrington police officers that he had AIDS. Van Camp then told defendant Smith.

After Jane Doe and Tarvis left the immediate vicinity, defendant Smith told the DiAngelos that Jane Doe's husband had AIDS and that, to protect herself, Rita DiAngelo should wash with disinfectant. There is some dispute about Smith's exact words to the DiAngelos,2 however this dispute does not change the outcome here. Defendant Rita DiAngelo became upset upon hearing this information. Knowing that the four Doe children attended the Downing School in Runnemede, the school that her own daughter attended, DiAngelo contacted other parents with children in the school. She also contacted the media. The next day, eleven parents removed nineteen children from the Downing School due to a panic over the Doe children's attending the school. The media was present, and the story was covered in the local newspapers and on television. At least one of the reports mentioned the name of the Doe family. Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the disclosure, they have suffered harassment, discrimination, and humiliation. They allege they have been shunned by the community.

Plaintiffs brought this civil rights action against the police officer Smith and the municipalities of Barrington and Runnemede for violations of their federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The federal constitutional right is their right to privacy under the fourteenth amendment. The suit contains pendent state claims against defendant DiAngelo for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeks judgment against only defendants Runnemede and Smith; these defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment with their response to plaintiffs' motion.

Plaintiffs maintain that the fourteenth amendment protects them from the government's disclosure of plaintiff Jane Doe's husband's infection with the AIDS virus. Plaintiffs assert that Officer Smith and the Borough of Runnemede are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for this violation of their constitutional rights.

Defendants Runnemede and Smith respond by stating:

1. plaintiffs have no standing because only Jane Doe's husband's privacy was invaded, and he is not party to this suit;3
2. Smith's action was not misconduct, and thus no action can be maintained under section 1983;
3. Jane Doe's husband "published" the information and, therefore, gave up any right to privacy in this information;
4. cases cited by plaintiff are all distinguishable on their facts;
5. there are no conclusive facts about AIDS, thus Smith's warning that DiAngelo might have been exposed through casual contact with Jane Doe was justified; and
6. Runnemede's failure to have an nondisclosure policy for arrestees is not actionable because no other municipality or state agency has a policy in place.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Summary Judgment Standard.

The standard for granting summary judgment is a stringent one, but it is not insurmountable. A court may grant summary judgment only when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986); Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir.1983). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact the court must view all doubt in favor of the nonmoving party. Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1091, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 79 L.Ed.2d 910 (1984); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.1972). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Recent Supreme Court decisions mandate that "a motion for summary judgment must be granted unless the party opposing the motion can produce evidence which, when considered in light of that party's burden of proof at trial, could be the basis for a jury finding in that party's favor." J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Moreover, once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Thus, even if the movant's evidence is merely "colorable" or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

B. Facts about AIDS.

AIDS is a viral disease that weakens or destroys the body's immune system. The disease is caused by the presence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), which attacks the body's T-lymphocyte cells that are a critical part of the body's immune system. As a result, the body is unable to withstand infections it would normally suppress. These resulting infections, known as "opportunistic diseases," eventually cause permanent disability and death. AIDS is defined by New Jersey health regulations as the presence of both the HIV virus and one or more opportunistic diseases.4 Thus, a person may test positive for the HIV virus5 and yet not exhibit any signs of illness; that person is asymptomatic. Persons who exhibit effects of immunodeficiency, such as fever, weight loss, night sweats, or diarrhea, but do not have any opportunistic diseases are described as having AIDS-related Complex ("ARC"). See N.J.A.C. 8:57-1.14(b). AIDS has no known cure.

HIV is transmitted through contact with contaminated blood, semen, or vaginal fluids. The virus is transmitted through activities such as sexual intercourse, anal sex, use of nonsterile hypodermic...

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