Doe v. Brown Univ.
| Decision Date | 18 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-1941,17-1941 |
| Citation | 896 F.3d 127 |
| Parties | Jane DOE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. BROWN UNIVERSITY in Providence in the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Jonah Allen Ward, and Yolanda Castillo-Appollonio, Defendants, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Wendy Murphy, with whom Patrick T. Jones, Audrey R. Poore, and Jones Kelleher LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Thomas R. Bender, Associate Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Brown University, with whom Steven M. Richard and Nixon Peabody LLP were on brief, for appellees.
Jenna M. Labourr and Washington Injury Lawyers, PLLC, on brief for amici curiae Equal Means Equal, National Coalition Against Violent Athletes, Allies Reaching for Equality, and Faculty Against Rape, in support of appellant.
Before Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
In November 2013, Jane Doe ("Doe"), then a freshman at Providence College, was sexually assaulted by three students of Brown University ("Brown") on Brown's campus. After Doe reported the assault to the local authorities in the City of Providence, Brown notified Doe that it would conduct an inquiry to determine whether the students had violated Brown's Code of Student Conduct. Doe alleges that eventually, Brown abandoned the investigation and did not initiate any disciplinary action against the three Brown students. Doe then initiated this action seeking damages and equitable relief against Brown under Title IX of the Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The district court granted Brown's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Doe now appeals that decision. For the reasons explained below, we find that Doe's complaint did not, on its face, allege sufficient facts for a plausible Title IX claim against Brown, and therefore affirm the district court's grant of Brown's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Because this case was decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we take the well-pleaded facts from the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 137, 140 (1st Cir. 2016).
On November 21, 2013, Doe, a freshman at Providence College,1 was socializing with some friends at a bar in Providence, Rhode Island. While at the bar, Doe was drugged "against her knowledge and will," transported by taxi to a Brown dormitory, and sexually assaulted by three males over an extended period of time. The assailants were all Brown students and members of Brown's football team. Doe received medical treatment at a Massachusetts hospital shortly thereafter.
On February 3, 2014, Doe reported the sexual assault to the Providence Police Department. A Brown University Police officer was present while Doe gave a statement to the Providence Police. Between February and May 2014, the Providence Police executed several search warrants for the dorm rooms and cell phones of the Brown students suspected of assaulting Doe. The seized cell phones revealed text messages between the Brown students that referenced rape and contained explicit images of Doe, taken at the time of the alleged sexual assault.
On June 19, 2014, Brown University notified Doe that she had a right to file a complaint pursuant to Brown's Code of Student Conduct, but mentioned nothing regarding Doe's right to file a Title IX complaint. Doe then explicitly requested that Brown investigate her sexual assault following Title IX standards. However, Brown insisted that it would only conduct an inquiry under the Code of Student Conduct. As a result, on October 11, 2014, Doe filed a complaint against Brown with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR").2
In June 2016, after Doe had repeatedly requested an update on the status of Brown's inquiry, Brown responded that it never completed the investigation and had abandoned any disciplinary action against the three Brown students. On an unspecified date, Doe withdrew from Providence College out of fear for her safety and well-being while on the Providence College campus and in the general Providence area. This fear, she alleges, was a direct result of Brown's inactions regarding her sexual assault, including Brown's failure to discipline the suspected assailants.
Doe filed suit against Brown seeking compensatory damages and equitable relief under Title IX.3 In her complaint, Doe alleged that Brown had violated Title IX when it acted with deliberate indifference after Doe's sexual assault by failing to provide her a prompt, equitable, and effective response and redress as Title IX requires. She also alleged that Brown failed to enforce Title IX in the response to and redress of sex-based violence about which it knew or should have known, thereby creating a hostile environment prior to Doe's sexual assault. As a direct result of Brown's actions or inactions, Doe claims to have suffered substantial interference with her access to educational opportunities or benefits, ultimately causing her to withdraw from Providence College.
Brown moved for judgment on the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), and after a hearing, the district court granted Brown's motion. Doe v. Brown Univ., 270 F.Supp.3d 556, 563 (D.R.I. 2017). The district court found that "Doe's status as a non-student [of Brown], regardless of her allegations that the Court accepts as true, removes her from Title IX's private-cause-of-action umbrella of protection." Id.
"We review a district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo." Mongeau v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2007). In doing so, "we take the well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (here, the plaintiff)." Kando v. R. I. State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2018). This Court "will affirm a dismissal or judgment on the pleadings if the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to establish a ‘claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F.3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Trans–Spec Truck Serv. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008) ). We are, of course, "not bound by the district court's reasoning but, rather, may affirm the entry of judgment on any ground made manifest by the record." Kando, 880 F.3d at 58.
Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The Supreme Court has recognized an implied "private right of action to enforce [Title IX's] prohibition on intentional sex discrimination," see Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690-93, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which includes actions for monetary damages by private persons and "encompasses intentional sex discrimination in the form of a recipient's deliberate indifference." Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005). While the Court has recognized that this right of action extends to students and employees, it has never expressly restricted it to those two categories of plaintiffs. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) ; North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-21, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982). In fact, the Court has stated that "Title IX ... broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting any person to ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex.’ " Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Sexual harassment, moreover, "can constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX." Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283, 118 S.Ct. 1989.
A recipient of federal funding can be liable under Title IX if "its deliberate indifference ‘subjects’ its students to harassment." Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (brackets omitted). To succeed in bringing such a "deliberate indifference" claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) "he or she was subject to ‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ sexual harassment"; (2) "the harassment caused the plaintiff to be deprived of educational opportunities or benefits"; (3) the funding recipient was aware of such harassment; (4) the harassment occurred "in [the funding recipient's] programs or activities"; and (5) the funding recipient's response, or lack thereof, to the harassment was "clearly unreasonable." Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2007).
Doe dedicates a number of pages of her brief to arguing that based on Cannon's four-part test,4 she has a private right of action against Brown under Title IX. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689-709, 99 S.Ct. 1946. Doe further argues that the district court erred when it found that she had no right to sue Brown because Brown lacked any "authority or capacity to take corrective action on behalf of Doe with regard to her education at Providence College." According to Doe, because Title IX imposes liability when "the [funding] recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs," Davis, 526 U.S. at 645, 119 S.Ct. 1661 —which Doe alleges is the case here—her complaint should have been allowed to proceed. We, however, do not need to reach these arguments in light of our conclusion that the district court's judgment on the pleadings was correct, albeit on other grounds. Rather, this case turns on whether Doe's complaint, on its face, pleads sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim for relief under Title IX. And it does not.
Section 1681(a)'s text, prohibiting that any person "be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to...
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