Doe v. Byrd
| Decision Date | 27 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-cv-00084 |
| Parties | CHAD DUREN, [1] Plaintiff, v. DAVID BYRD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss (collectively “Motions”). The first motion was filed by Defendant Byrd, who asserts therein that the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) should be (i) dismissed in its entirety under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and (ii) alternatively dismissed as to its requested injunctive and declaratory relief under Fed R. Civ. P 12(b)(1). (Doc. No. 82, “Defendant Byrd's motion”). The second motion was filed by Defendants Wayne County School System (“Wayne County”) and Franks (Doc. No. 84, “Defendants Wayne County and Franks' motion”). In that motion and the memorandum of law in support of it (Doc. No. 85), Defendants Wayne County and Franks (i) adopt the arguments asserted in support of Defendant Byrd's motion, (ii) make additional arguments as to why that the FAC should be dismissed in its entirety (under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) or, alternatively Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c)) for failure to state a claim, and (iii) assert alternatively that Defendant Franks should be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Plaintiff filed a single response to both Motions. (Doc. No. 90). Defendants filed separate Replies. (Doc. Nos. 94, 95).
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant each of the Motions.
BACKGROUND[2]
At the time of the events in question here, Plaintiff, Chad Duren was a public high school student at Wayne County High School located in Wayne County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 33 at ¶ 7).
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Wayne County; Ryan Franks, the Wayne County High School principal (in his individual and official capacities); David Byrd, a member of the Tennessee House of Representatives (in his individual and official capacitates); and John Does 1-99 (in their individual and official capacities) for violations of his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Id. at ¶ 1). Since filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff has graduated from high school. (Doc. No. 71 at 13 n. 8; Doc. No. 57 at 5; Doc. No. 57-10).[3]
Plaintiff claims that he was compelled to engage in political speech when Defendants Wayne County and Franks allegedly forced him to wear a “David Byrd” tee shirt on the school's traditional senior field trip, which (at least that year) was a visit to the Tennessee State Capitol building. (Doc. No. 33 at ¶ 2). At the time of the trip (October 15, 2018), Defendant Byrd was an incumbent running for re-election to the Tennessee House of Representatives. (Id. at ¶ 8). His reelection campaign was hotly contested because Defendant Byrd had been accused of sexual misconduct by numerous former Wayne County High School students. (Id. at ¶ 23). Defendant Byrd provided the tee shirts (with his name and logo on them) to Defendant Franks-who is Defendant Byrd's nephew-for the purpose of distributing them to Wayne County High School students. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 23). Defendant Byrd later reflected in his campaign finance report that the tee shirts were an “in-kind” donation to his re-election campaign. (Id. at ¶ 17).
Prior to the trip, students and families received a voice mail instructing students to change into the “David Byrd” tee shirts before getting on the buses for the field trip. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12). The voice mail stated in part:
Seniors should proceed straight to the cafeteria for roll call and you will receive your Senior ‘19 tee shirt from Representative Byrd. Once you receive your shirt, please go to the bathroom and change into it and then safely place the shirt you had on somewhere in the school. Buses will leave as soon as shirts have been distributed and we will return around the time school is out.
(Id. at ¶ 12). When students arrived at school for the trip, the tee shirts were on a table and school staff and personnel directed students towards the table to pick up a tee shirt. (Id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff alleges that these actions by Defendant Wayne County staff-along with the fact that students were never told that wearing the tee shirts was optional[4]-made him feel compelled to wear the tee shirt on the trip. (Id.).
Plaintiff claims that the rest of the Wayne County High School students also believed wearing the “David Byrd” tee shirts was compulsory because every student who attended the trip wore one. (Id. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff alleges that in order to go on the trip, he would be required to choose one of two options, either of which would have resulted in compelled political speech: 1) wear the tee shirt, or 2) explain why he would not wear it.[5] (Id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff further alleges that rather than choosing either of these options, he “chose not to go” on the class trip. (Id. at ¶ 45).
In other words, as best the Court can tell, Plaintiff alleges that he was compelled to choose one of these two options (because failure to do so was punishable by exclusion from the class trip), which in turn means that he was compelled to engage in political speech. The Court notes that Plaintiff never explicitly claims in the FAC that he himself ultimately had to explain his choice not to attend the trip or wear the tee shirt. Instead, Plaintiff seems to claim that he left before the trip started without doing either, though this is unclear.
On December 11, 2003, Defendant Wayne County had issued a policy stating that “Political literature shall not be distributed through the school to students, nor sent home to parents, nor placed in teachers' mailboxes, lounges, or on school premises.” (Id. at ¶ 25). The policy further states that “No part of the school system, including the facilities, the name, the staff, and the students shall be used for advertising or promoting the interests of any commercial, political or other non-school agency or organization.” (Id.). The policy also explicitly requires Defendant Franks, as principal of Wayne County High School, to screen all materials prior to distribution to “ensure their appropriateness.” (Id.). Plaintiff claims that Defendants were aware of the official policy described above, yet repeatedly permitted staff of Defendant Wayne County to distribute “political literature” to students through school staff personnel. (Id. at ¶ 27).
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts four claims, each one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[6]In the first three counts, Plaintiff claims that each Defendant[7] violated his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments based on compelled speech (Count I), school-sponsored speech (Count II), and selective enforcement (Count III). Plaintiff brings an additional claim (Count IV) against only Defendants Byrd and Franks (in their individual capacities) alleging that they conspired to violate the constitutional rights of students at Wayne County High School, including Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the alleged use of school resources to promote political candidates, political campaigns, and partisan politics is a violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. (Id. at ¶ 28). Plaintiff further claims that requiring him to wear the tee shirt in order to attend the trip violated his constitutional right not to engage in political speech. (Id. at ¶ 15).
Plaintiff claims that, as a result of Defendants' actions (and his missing the trip in response to Defendants' actions), he suffered “harm, ” emotional distress, fear, shame, and humiliation. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 45, 46, 50, 62, 80). Plaintiff seeks money damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. (Id. at ¶ 83). To support his claim for relief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wayne County has a long-standing policy of sponsoring non-neutral, political speech and that he is entitled to injunctive relief to prevent this from happening again in the future.[8] (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 21, 64).
A previous motion to dismiss was filed by Defendant Byrd, and Defendants Wayne County and Franks filed a notice indicating that they joined the motion to dismiss and adopted the arguments contained therein. (Doc. Nos. 39, 62, “Defendants' prior motion to dismiss”). In the prior motion to dismiss, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff failed to plead a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact, meaning that he lacked standing and that therefore Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss this action under Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(1). (Doc. Nos. 39, 40). The Court ultimately denied the prior motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff has standing to bring this lawsuit. (Doc. Nos. 73, 74); Doe v. Byrd, No. 1:18-CV-00084, 2020 WL 1285428 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2020) (Richardson, J.). The present Motions argue, collectively, that Plaintiff's declaratory and injunctive relief claims are moot, that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, that the official capacity claim(s) against Defendant Franks are subject to dismissal as duplicative of the claims against Defendant Wayne County, and (in an argument of especial significance to Wayne County) that Plaintiff's claims are-irrespective of the applicability of qualified immunity-all subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
The particular array of Defendants, kinds of claims against particular Defendants, and arguments made in the Motions is rather confounding. And the same can be said about the relationship between the Defendant-specific claims of Plaintiff and the arguments made in the Motions. The confusion is compounded somewhat by the reality that it is not always clear what Plaintiff is claiming in the FAC or what Defendants are asserting in the Motions ...
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